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Economic Representation in Democracy

Tyler Nellis

The concept of democracy and the necessary qualities within this form of governance have long been theorized by political thinkers. A large portion of the field focuses on the need for representation based on cultural, ethnic, or gender identity, the need for equal deliberation among citizens, the usefulness of dialogue within the political sphere, and the need for diverse skill sets in decision-making bodies as the necessary qualities within a democracy. However, with the current condition of economic disparity in modern society, there may be a key quality that must be present in a democracy that is apparently lacking from the theoretical discussion. After working through previous thinkers' work on the already established necessary qualities of democracy as well as the rationale for why democracy is the most effective form of governance, the lack of discussion on the concept of economic representation will be discussed. This will lead into the argument that economic representation is a necessity for democratic governance in order to avoid the limited inclusion that a democracy without it would achieve, as well as why economic representation is a stronger quality of recognition in a democracy than the qualities discussed in previous works.

According to Sheldon S. Wolin, "democracy is a project concerned with the political potentialities of ordinary citizens, that is, with their possibilities for becoming political beings through the self-discovery of common concerns and of modes of action for realizing them" (Wolin, 31). As Wolin states that a democracy is concerned with the political potentialities of citizens, it also seems necessary that this potential must be equivalent from one citizen to the next. In other words, if democracy is concerned with the political potentials of citizens, then it

seems to follow that these potentials must be equal among citizens to create an egalitarian political system. This is not to say that every citizen must have equal political responsibilities at all times (a representative democracy clearly provides greater responsibility to current representatives), but to say that each citizen must have equal opportunities to participate in the political sphere. Every citizen must have equal paths of democratic realization in order to prevent certain citizens from having greater possibilities in the political realm. If a certain group of citizens more frequently have the ability to hold a position of power, such as a legislative representative, in their respective democracy, then they have greater democratic potential and in turn have greater democratic influence. Wolin continues to claim that political leadership does not necessarily work to cultivate free-thinking among the population, but instead functions as a sort of “management of collective desires, resentments, anger, fantasies, fears, and hopes and the curatorship of the simulacra of democracy” (Wolin, 33). If the participants within a political group are led or managed by the upper members of the group, the ability of the average citizen to act and think politically is severely hindered. By managing and leading political “free-thinking,” creative boundaries are constructed and free-thinking is restricted within the framework of preexisting ideas created by the political leadership. As a result, problem-solving is hindered by these barriers which political free-thinking cannot overcome. A leadership style of democracy is creatively inefficient as it is unable to best solve problems that may arise in society when compared to a democracy without political leadership that generates freer thinking by its representatives and citizens. The ability to solve problems is crucial for the governing body, and a style of governance that reduces this ability to overcome problems and create solutions should not be cultivated. Not only are there limitations upon free-thinking, but the citizens that are involved with directing and engaging in free-thinking that impacts political outcomes are limited

to those that are within political leadership positions. Therefore, instead of political leadership by the few, political collaboration by the many and the elimination of boundary creation that restricts free-thinking in the political realm would be a more democratic ideal.

Wolin continues to develop this critique of leadership democracy by stating that the politics within this system of governance “is based not, as its defenders allege, upon ‘representative democracy’ but on various representations of democracy: democracy as represented in public opinion polls, electronic town meetings and phone-ins, and as votes” (Wolin, 34). Rather than engaging in true democracy where citizens have equal potential for political involvement, methods to attempt to show that the decisions made by the few align with the desires of the many become the simulacra of democracy—leadership democracy eliminates the possibility of the cultivation of actual democracy by controlling the creativity within politics. Wolin does not appear to believe that democracy exists within the current understanding of a democratic system, but instead believes that “democracy is not about where the political is located but about how it is experienced” (Wolin, 38). For Wolin, democracy appears to exist through the actions taken by individuals aiming to achieve their political potential, not the system itself. Therefore, based on this theory, every individual must be able to reach their political potential and in that moment in which they engage in the political sphere is where democracy exists. In this critique, citizens are unable to reach their political potential due to the fact that their potential is pruned by leadership. Free-thinking that has the potential to exist outside of the boundaries of leadership are unable to flourish. Intellectual and creative potential in politics are essential for citizens to reach their potential and for democracy to exist. A democracy in which equivalent opportunity to achieve potentials is required for citizens in order

to have the right of experience and possibility to partake in political decision-making (Wolin, 39-43).

It is not only necessary for citizens to have equal political potentials, but is also required that citizens have equal potentials in regards to public deliberation, according to Seyla Benhabib. Benhabib's conception of democratic legitimacy contests that it must be derived from "the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern" (Benhabib, 68). In this thinking, a system of governance that calls itself democratic but does not allow all members to equally participate in deliberation is an illegitimate form of democracy. Benhabib further adds to the discussion of democratic deliberation and focuses particularly on the acts of deliberation each citizen should have equal access to within a democracy:

[...] participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate, all have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation, and all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out (Benhabib, 70).

This conception of deliberative democracy does not invoke the requirement of deliberation impacting decision-making, but instead focuses on the ability of all citizens to be involved in the discussion as to what rational conclusions and topics should be addressed for the majority. In other words, the free and equal deliberation among citizens exists within the public and not only within representative bodies. Deliberation must be conducted and directed by all citizens, contrary to the function of political leadership which determines the topics which are deliberated.

In this conception of democracy, citizens determine both the topics of deliberation and the course of deliberation itself.

The concept of deliberation within democracy is further developed by Joshua Cohen as he aims to shift the focus not only onto the equal ability of individuals to participate, but also analyzes the outcomes in a democratic society as well. Cohen claims that “the test for democratic legitimacy will be, in part, substantive—dependent on the content of outcomes, not simply on the processes through which they are reached” (Cohen, 95). According to this, not only does the process of involvement matter for a democracy, but whether or not the involvement is actually connected to the outcomes is also key. Essentially, when the ability to deliberate among citizens generates equal involvement regarding the topics that are to be discussed, the outcomes of policy would be aligned with the deliberation and involvement of citizens, rather than its own separate entity. If everyone can equally deliberate, but the only decision-makers are separate from this completely equal group, the deliberation then has no concrete connection to whatever policies are enacted. Therefore, public deliberation among citizens must permeate into the decisions made by representatives of the public or the decision-making processes that exist within a specific system. If the process of deliberation does not impact the outcomes of decision-making, then democratic deliberation in this scenario exists separately from policy and would not generate decisions supported by the many. This idea of detachment between deliberation and decision-making will be returned to later in the paper, but for now the discussion on the necessary qualities of democracy will continue.

One way to avoid this disconnect in which deliberation does not have an impact on decision-making is to ensure that political bodies or representatives in a democracy are responsive to the public deliberation that occurs. Cohen states that certain social and institutional conditions must be met, and that one key institutional condition that must exist is met “by establishing a framework ensuring the responsiveness and accountability of political power to it through regular competitive elections, conditions of publicity, legislative oversight, and so on” (Cohen, 99). By leaving the methods open-ended with the attachment of “so on,” Cohen is allowing for the possibility of other means which can be used to check responsiveness and accountability of political power, as it is quite clear that the ways in which public accountability can be achieved is not only limited to the three measures listed. However, it seems that having elections of members to the decision-making body could theoretically be a method in which there would be some accountability to public deliberation, but in practice it doesn’t appear that this is an effective way to ensure responsiveness to the public. If representatives with low approval ratings, even slightly below majority approval could be a significant figure, continue to get reelected, the theory that elections serve as a check for public accountability is drawn into question. These low approval rating may serve as a measurement of the disconnect that exists between public deliberation and policy. When Cohen states that one piece of the framework that could ensure responsiveness is the conditions of publicity, it seems that the role of the media to promote transparency in government could greatly serve as a check on accountability. In theory, the media can serve as a monitor on decision-makers and how they are aligned or misaligned with the deliberation and needs of the public. However, if the media becomes focused on supporting a particular political position, its ability to focus on the needs of the public may fall to the wayside and supporting its preferred party or ideology may become priority. Not only can

political ideology influence the actions of the media, but ratings systems become increasingly important as the type of news that is reported is constricted by what improves a studio's ratings. In present conditions, it seems that media may lean towards supporting specific political positions rather than supporting the needs of the public. The best possible scenario for the media to act as a check on the accountability of representation may exist when the media is politically objective and working in the interest of the public rather than working for political or private interests. Although we already have several of these functions in place, such as elections and media, to generate responsiveness to the public, it seems that there is not necessarily a direct driver for elected officials to have to directly align with the public response, other than during election season. All of these measurements to determine if political power responds to the public in Cohen's work seem only to provide soft checks, rather than any concrete way in which political officials must directly interact with or work with the public deliberation and needs.

Significant portions of the previous literature focus on the qualities of communication that must occur within a democratic society. Beyond the simple ability to deliberate equally, a democracy must also allow for open communication between citizens that influences decision-making. Different starting points from which the public discourse begins must be cooperative, rather than competitive according to Iris Marion Young. Young claims that members of a democracy must "understand differences of culture, social perspective, or particularist commitment as resources to draw on for reaching understanding in democratic discussion rather than as divisions that must be overcome" (Young, 120). Communication within the public cannot occur as separate groups competing against the proposed solutions of other groups, but needs instead to consist of the population as a whole working to come to a solution to its issues

together. The competitive model of deliberation leaves out a large percentage of the population from the decision-making process as opposed to a cooperative model, and only takes into account the majority or plurality that has been declared the victor through deliberation. A competitive model of deliberation exists when the purpose of deliberation is for one group to dominate the other, rather than multiple groups collaborating to create the best conclusion for the collective groups involved. A cooperation focused model of deliberation would strive to achieve the best possible solution through critique and creation, rather than the competitive model in which solutions are pitted against each other and only one is chosen without gaining any of the ideas available by other solutions. The competitive model limits the solution to the victor of deliberation, while the cooperative model produces a solution that draws ideas from each group involved.

Failing to recognize difference in democratic communication also limits the points of discussion within the public. If the only discussion occurs based on what the individuals believe that they have in common, no additional perspectives are shared and no new information is considered. As Young claims, “the assumption of prior unity obviates the need for the self-transcendence. If discussion succeeds primarily when it appeals to what the discussants all share, then none need revise their opinions or viewpoints in order to take account of perspectives and experiences beyond them” (Young, 125). The starting point of an assumed group identity prevents individual differences from arising in discussion. Deliberation from within this situation begins from a myth and isn’t productive towards political decisions that align with the needs of the public, but if the differences are first recognized prior to deliberation, then the deliberation is productive as it is no longer based on this myth of commonality, but is based on the reality of

difference. This assumption is especially damaging if the assumed communal starting point is actually false, not only limiting the future discussion, but creating an image that does not in fact unify the public. An assumed identity would also strictly limit discussion by “othering” or ignoring the deliberation of those who do not fit this exact identity. Eliminating those who do not necessarily meet the assumed unifying identity further limits the diversity of discussion within the public. “Othering” in a situation where it is only “us or them” creates these harmful effects. However, “othering” in a situation where instead of simply “us or them” the understood reality is that “we are all others” creates the positive effect of allowing this deliberation to begin from real difference and not mythical commonality. The differences in these two types of “otherings” exist in the purposes, one of which is to separate from the majority or common group, and the second is to understand difference and constructively move forward from those various starting points.

An assumed group identity can also lead to harmful effects for representation within a democracy. This concern over a unified identity can lead the public to be more concerned with the representation of that same mythical commonality of the community, rather than the actuality of the community. Anne Phillips adds to this discussion by stating that “what is to be represented then takes priority over who does the representation. Issues of political presence are largely discounted, for when difference is considered in terms of intellectual diversity, it does not much matter who represents the range of ideas” (Phillips, 140-141). By beginning from the point of myth, citizens are grouped as one under this idea, leading representation to focus on the idea and not the citizens themselves. By overlooking citizens completely in representation, the priority is placed on maintaining and working for this myth. Reality is pushed to the side and the myth of community becomes the focal point if democracy is constructed with this foundation of a false

common. This function of democracy is counterintuitive to its own purpose by limiting the diversity of viewpoints that are involved in the government, leading to a misrepresentation based on the assumed identity or assumed communal values of the public.

This separation between the assumed identity and the actual representation in government is what leads to the conflict between Phillip's concepts of a politics of ideas and a politics of presence. Rather than including all members of the public, the focus on the politics of ideas leads to the exclusion of public groups from representation by only requiring the representatives to represent the ideas that are "shared" by the community. Representation then is steered towards only focusing on representing the values of the assumed public, and can fail to represent the real public by not allowing groups to have a presence in representation (Phillips, 140-141). This focus on ideas rather than presence in politics can lead the public, or at least those in representation positions, to become entrenched in only the assumed ideas that are important to the public. Phillips states that "if the range of ideas has been curtailed by orthodoxies that rendered alternatives invisible, there will be no satisfactory solution short of changing the people who represent and develop ideas" (Phillips, 142). Not only must those individuals that are representatives of the public change, but groups must be able to question their identities in a genealogical manner (Phillips, 144). This dual method to shift the focus of politics from ideas to presence allows representation within a democracy to be both ideologically and culturally representative of the various groups of the public.

A key issue that arises when certain groups are left out of decision-making is that groups are advocated for by representatives that may not actually know what would be the best policies

to pursue to benefit said group. Phillips states that “where policy initiatives are worked out *for* rather than *with* a politically excluded constituency, they rarely engage with all relevant concerns” (Phillips, 147). The smaller the group that is within representative bodies, the less the relevancy of the policies that are created and passed by the government. Limiting the groups that are represented not only reduces the decision-making skills that are present, but always reduces the cultural and economic awareness that is needed to create legislation that properly addresses the needs of various communities. The assigned needs of a group by an “outsider” prevents the actual needs of that group from being known by policy makers. Instead, it creates a perpetual sinkhole in which the assumed needs are fought for, but once, or if, these arduous battles are won, no actual progress is seen in that section of the community due to the fact that they were fighting for something that didn’t need to be the priority. A lack of presence in politics for classes or groups leads to their needs being prescribed to them by representatives, rather than the representatives being from their own class or group that understands the community’s actual needs.

In order to incorporate a politics of presence into a democratic government, the plurality of society must be embraced both from cultural and political standpoints. Accepting this plurality allows the public to fully address the needs it has, while still recognizing the needs of separate groups rather than simply fulfilling the needs of the majority and creating policies from there (Mouffe, 246). Recognizing plurality in society “refuses the objective of unanimity and homogeneity which is always revealed as fictitious and based on acts of exclusion” (Mouffe, 246). If this false collective were to be accepted by the public, then having representatives that only identify with this image would be deemed legitimate representatives of their constituents.

Accepting the false commonality leads to reducing presence within representative bodies. By reducing presence in politics, the only citizens that truly have a presence within decision-making are those that align with the false common identity of society. For all of the other citizens that do not fit this assumed identity, they lack a presence in politics and therefore would be outsiders within their own government's decision-making. The political usefulness of perpetuating the idea that there are in fact separate identity groups within one society prevents the common identity myth from validating the representation of only one group within decision-making bodies. By recognizing the diversity within a society, the need for diverse presence within representation would follow suit. Presence in politics should be equally diverse as the various identities within a given society.

Along the same school of thought as the need to recognize plurality in democracy, the need for diversity in skill sets of representatives is discussed by H el ene Landemore. Landemore begins her discussion by claiming the usefulness of heuristics in the political realm. Heuristics can be defined as "second-best rules of thumb that can be used in lieu of the more adequate complex models only available under ideal circumstances" (Landemore, 162). Heuristics are not considered to be ideal, but are "highly economical and usually effective' given the limited computational abilities of human beings" (Landemore, 162). Landemore claims that the use of political heuristics is necessary based on the complexity and uncertainty that is present within the political sphere.

For Landemore, complexity refers to the "various cognitive limitations, as well as to more ambiguous causes such as the vagueness of our concepts and the limited social space

available to reconcile values” (Landemore, 164). Uncertainty refers to the “realm of outcomes and associated risk that we are not aware of” as well as “the absence of knowledge about not just the probabilities attached to certain known outcomes, but the absence of knowledge about the very nature and number of potential outcomes and their associated probabilities” within the political realm (Landemore, 165-166). In essence, governance from this perspective is necessary to address both the complexity and uncertainty faced within political decisions. Therefore, the form of governance that is chosen should be that which best addresses these two qualities of politics. Landemore thus sees a political heuristic as the most effective manner with which humans can work to limit the effects of complexity and uncertainty within the political. The next step beyond identifying the use of heuristics for governance as the most effective way to address complexity and uncertainty entails evaluating the effectiveness of a specific heuristic and identifying what qualities of the heuristic are necessary to maximize its own effectiveness. Heuristics have been identified as the most effective governance method—the next phase is to analyze and increase the effectiveness of the most effective platform.

Landemore claims that the most rational political heuristic that humans can employ is democracy. The two components of democracy that make it the most viable heuristic for the political sphere are “deliberation among free and equal citizens, and majority rule” (Landemore, 166). Landemore follows the previous literature on the components of democracy by reinforcing her theory with a focus on deliberation within democracy, but the notion of majority rule does not immediately refer to identity representation or presence, but in practice would achieve these goals through equal inclusion in decision-making for all in society.

Another key support for democracy as the most rational heuristic is its level of inclusiveness for decision-making, especially when compared to other forms of governance with

limited diversity within decision-making bodies, such as an aristocracy or autocracy. The need for the greatest level of inclusiveness stems from the need to make the heuristic as effective as possible at addressing the issues of complexity and uncertainty. By including members from all of society rather than a small portion, cognitive diversity is increased and the skill sets for problem solving increases alongside it. Cognitive diversity refers to the multiplicity of viewpoints and skill sets that would be present if members from groups that span all of society are included in decision-making bodies, rather than only one or a few groups. A high level of cognitive diversity makes democracy more effective as it provides greater possibility to find solutions to problems in society, which helps to reduce this specific unknown variable in the public policy equation (Landemore, 167). By increasing the diversity of presence in this heuristic, the knowledge of issues faced by society is also expanded. In order to make this style of equal inclusion the most effective, the weights of deliberation and votes provided by various citizens must also be equal (Landemore, 168). If citizens have unequal rights or influence through speech, then the public deliberation of some would have greater impacts than others, and if something such as plural voting (when the vote of a single citizen is counted multiple times or weighted differently) is in place, then the voices of citizens within democratic decision-making are not truly equal (Landemore, 168).

Including the entire population in decision-making also provides the advantage of greater breadth of political knowledge. Landemore assumes throughout her work that “the larger population’s knowledge is more evenly distributed across all political issues than political experts’ knowledge” (Landemore, 171). While the “experts” may be able to come up with a greater number of particular solutions to a specific societal problem, this would not as effectively combat political uncertainty when compared to the wide variety of solutions for individual

problems as well as all of the societal problems which policy would need to address. The question for Landemore's heuristic is "not [focused on] how to choose between pre-defined laws and policies, but who to include and on what terms in the decision-process is meant to identify these options and then settle on one of them" (Landemore, 170). Landemore concludes that the presence of radical uncertainty in the political leads to "radical equality [becoming] the only rational heuristic" (Landemore, 174). Radical equality becomes the only rational heuristic as radical equality leads a heuristic governance model to be as effective in the political sphere as it can possibly be. Radical equality is necessary for the effectiveness of governance to reach its full potential.

Despite the discussion on deliberation, dialogue, identity, and rational governance in the previous literature, there appears to be a gap in research, specifically in regards to economic representation within democracy. Although representation based on identity is discussed by previous thinkers, the necessity for representation based on economic status may be equally important. In this context, economic representation refers to the presence of representatives from a particular economic status within the decision-making bodies of the government. In a similar manner that representation and presence based on identity requires separate groups to be recognized and embraced within the government, economic representation and presence would also require the acknowledgment that there are various economic statuses within the society. This does not mean that the fact that varying economic classes exist within society merely needs to be known, but instead means that this acknowledgement of economic difference needs to be recognized and addressed within the political sphere. By first recognizing the economic difference, this recognition can become integral to representation in politics and can allow for greater presence of underrepresented economic groups. In a similar manner that the myth of a

common identity reduces political presence and has harmful effects, an assumed economic commonality or status would also reduce presence in politics and have harmful effects.

Economic difference is becoming increasingly important as the inequality of wealth continues to grow within developed nations and the world altogether. In the United States alone, income inequality has greatly increased “since [the] 1980s” (Piketty, 294). Within the last three decades, “the upper [class]’ share [of national income has] increased from 30-35 percent of national income in the 1970s to 45-50 percent in the 2000s—an increase of 15 points of national income” (Piketty, 294). Regardless of one’s views on the relationship between inequality and justice, this level of income inequality within the United States is argued to have had a significant impact on the financial crisis in the 2000s. Thomas Piketty states that the increase in inequality in the United States led to a “virtual stagnation of the purchasing power of the lower and middle classes in the United States” (Piketty, 297). If these economic inequalities between classes are duplicated and become representative or political inequalities between classes, the issues created by vast inequality would be perpetuated within society. Recognizing income inequality and its effects on the economy can lead a society to prevent these same outcomes from occurring within policy-making. If the policy power of the lower and middle classes is stunted while the political influence of the upper class dramatically increases, then the same harmful effects at the hands of inequality that occurred within the economy will occur within government. Recognizing economic difference in politics will prevent the political power of the lower and middle classes from being limited by ensuring that the myth of a common economic class in a single country is not perpetuated within governmental representation. This myth of a common economic class can occur when it is determined that society is enhancing its quality of

life through increased GDP or lower unemployment, although the actual benefits of these measurements may be felt the most by small portions of the population.

Not acknowledging economic difference can have the same harmful effects within the political as failing to acknowledge various identities, or creating a single, false identity for the society in which decisions are rooted. These harmful effects may be even greater for failing to recognize economic difference than failing to recognize identity difference if the representatives elected all stem from a single economic group that may be an extreme minority in the country. If economic difference is ignored and instead the economic status of the community as a whole is used to make policy decisions, a significant portion of the population may be marginalized depending on what economic status or statuses have a presence within representation. However, problems can still exist if economic difference is recognized, but economic presence is not attained. This would generate the issue of representation for various economic groups by members of other economic groups rather than their own. The actual needs of some groups would be left out of deliberation, and policy that is created to benefit those that are not present would be prescribed rather than created through cooperation. The presence of all groups that have the right to deliberate within the democracy is necessary for all of these perspectives of deliberation to influence the process and outcomes of decision-making.

The recognition and presence of economic difference is also necessary when analyzing the deliberation within a democracy. In the age of mass media, economic difference plays a crucial role in the level of equality in public deliberation. Individuals who own media corporations or news outlets have a significantly greater voice in public deliberation as they can control what is communicated to possibly millions of citizens. This imbalance in public deliberation makes it that much more important to have equal deliberation within decision-

making. If the public may not be equal in this realm due to economic difference, then it must be guaranteed that deliberation between various economic statuses be equal within representative bodies by ensuring that each group has a proportionate presence within the government. The current lack of economic presence and recognition may be caused by a similar myth of commonality that was previously discussed in regards to identity. If the nation's economic problems are taken as a singular issue, specific economic groups that may be taking the brunt of the shortcomings may be overlooked. Rather than understanding the intricate details of the groups in society that are at an economic disadvantage, the focus tends to be on communal measurements of stability, such as GDP or unemployment rate. While these measurements for the quality of life in a society may improve through governmental action, these improvements may only be felt by a small percentage of the citizens. General measurements of improvement fail to specify what groups specifically improved from decisions made by government representatives. A lack of recognition of economic difference would threaten equal deliberation discussed by both Benhabib and Landemore, but these harmful effects can be reduced by achieving a politics of presence based on economic representation.

Understanding economic difference may also increase accountability for the representatives of each economic group. If an election system were to still be in place, citizens would campaign to be representatives of their specific economic status. This could possibly increase accountability due to the representative running in order to directly support his or her economic group, and could also increase legislative effectiveness as each representative would directly know the needs of the group as they themselves are part of it. If this were to work together with current electoral districts that are in place, a possible change that could be made would be to increase representatives based on economic make-up of districts, or to have the

majority group of the district have an elected official. However, maintaining a district system would be difficult with the implementation of elections based on economic identity. In the current system, one representative can be elected for a district that could contain a multitude of economic groups. After economic difference is recognized, elections could possibly serve as a stiffer check on accountability for representatives.

Economic difference would also have significant impacts on the conceptualization of democracy as a heuristic device for Landemore. It seems that the next logical step based on Landemore's work is a possible shift from election based representation towards something similar to a lottery to determine representatives. A lottery would provide equal opportunity for all citizens to be involved within the decision-making process. A lottery would also generate the possibility of creating a diverse skill set for problem solving by eliminating known variables that may determine who is able to run a campaign for election and replacing them with uncertainty. This would also reduce the use of experts from a single identity in decision-making and provide the possibility for every identity to have a potential presence in representation. If economic difference were still unrecognized, then regardless if a representative lottery were set in place or not, there would still be a lack of economic recognition and presence in decision-making. Economic difference must be recognized in order to allow for various groups to have a presence in representation, and understanding this difference would help to create the structure of the representative lottery.

Although Landemore argues that egalitarian inclusiveness is superior as a heuristic over inegalitarian inclusiveness, recognizing economic difference could possibly lead to this heuristic leaning towards inegalitarian inclusiveness for the better. If the representative lottery were to be put in place after economic difference were present in the political sphere, it could be an

effective tactic to proportionately represent each economic group by providing lottery picks to each economic group equal to its portion of the population. This could possibly be considered inegalitarian by limiting the potential of representative inclusion based on economic status, but would provide each economic group with its necessary presence in decision-making. Conducting the lottery this way would also provide cognitive and skill diversity by selecting representatives from all economic groups in the society. This style of a controlled lottery may provide greater cognitive ability than a straight lottery due to the fact that members of each economic group would be present, and therefore, the issues faced by each group would be known and present within representation.

It may be pertinent to conduct this representative lottery based on economic identity rather than culture, gender, ethnic, or other identities as all of these other possible qualifiers would be contained within each economic class. If the lottery were to be conducted using another identity, each group may not necessarily have a common ground that would help them to deliberate towards a common political goal. If the lottery were conducted using economic identity, each group would have economic status as common ground from which policy decisions can stem. Although they may have disagreements based on culture, ethnicity, or gender, their economic commonality would allow them to cooperate for common economic goals in policy.

In a simplistic example to explain what is meant by this type of inegalitarian, representative lottery, let us assume that there are three economic groups in a society. One way in which these economic groups can possibly be measured is through net worth of citizens. The three groups in this society can be understood as lower, middle, and upper. For this example, the lower economic group contains 50% of the population, the middle group contains 40% of the

population, and the upper group contains 10% of the population. Based on these percentages, the lower group would have 50% of the lottery picks for representatives, the middle group 40%, and the upper group 10%. Essentially, the representative lottery would not be drawn from the general public as a whole. The percentage of picks available to each group would be proportionate to the percentage of the population that resides within that group. Therefore, 50% of representatives in the government are from the lower group, 40% are from the middle group, and 10% are from the upper group. Understanding economic difference and allowing this to permeate into the representative lottery structure would guarantee that each economic group would have a presence within representation that is equal to their presence within society. If the lottery were conducted as a whole without dividing the number of picks by economic group, each group's presence in politics may not be equal to their presence in society.

Although these figures may appear to be completely arbitrary, these percentage breakdowns of lower, middle, and upper class have been used by economists when analyzing the distribution of total income within the United States. Thomas Piketty refers to the "bottom 50%" as the lower class, "the middle 40%" as the middle class, and "the top 10%" as the upper class (Piketty, 249). Piketty is not attempting to establish these percentages as the strict formation of classes within the United States as he states that his "definition of 'middle class' (as the 'middle' 40 percent) is highly contestable, since the income (or wealth) of everyone in the group is, by construction, above the median for the society in question" (Piketty, 251). However, the deciles created and used by Piketty for this example of inequality in the United States offer significant insight into the distribution of wealth in this particular society. First, the measurement of total income in this case refers to the summation of income generated from both labor and capital (Piketty, 249). The data for the United States in 2010 reveals that the lower class' share of the

national income was 20%, the middle class' share 30%, and the upper class' share 50% (Piketty, 249). If this same level of inequality were allowed to trickle into political representation, the upper class would have equal representative power to both the middle and lower class combined. In reality, the influence of classes may be even more unequal in politics than it currently is in income. Preventing this same level of inequality within politics is necessary in order to properly maintain a democratic government and to avoid similar harmful effects upon society that have been stemmed from the income inequality present in society.

Lastly, it is crucially important to recognize economic difference and allow this difference to permeate into the political sphere to guarantee that policy is made by and for the people, instead of simply for the people. By understanding the existence of various economic groups within society, one can analyze what groups are present in the government as well as the legislation created by these representatives to determine if there is a disconnect between who is representing the citizens and what needs are left out by the policies created. There may exist a gap between socioeconomics and politics which could be preventing citizens within a democracy from influencing decision-making and to have their needs understood and remedied through policy. By bridging this gap and joining socioeconomic understanding of class with politics, this step could be made to push democracy that exists today closer towards the theoretical democracy which provides proper representation and deliberation to its citizens.

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