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Review of Austria and European Integration, 1945-1993: Aspects of an Eventful Development (German), by M. Gehler and R. Steininger; and Karl Gruber: Speeches and Documents, 1945-1953: A Selection (German), by M. Gehler

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radically divorces our perspective on the world from that of our ancestors, who had to imagine gods in order to envision what we can see for the price of an airline ticket. This work is useful and well worth reading. It promises a fuller, more detailed continuation of the project of understanding the role flight plays in making us different from our ancestors. All that is necessary for the fulfillment of the promise inherent in this book is for the author to begin stating the questions answered in the material covered here.

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The European function that internationally minded Austrians from the dominant two political traditions have arrogated to themselves during the First and Second Republics has been expressed primarily in three general ways between 1918 and 1989. The Catholic Conservative/Christian Democratic (ÖVP) camp long sought to revivify the old Imperial notion of Austria as a cultural and economic bridge between eastern and western, northern and southern Europe that would facilitate the transmission of western, Christian values and economic development eastward and southward. The Social Democratic camp, on the other hand, has tended to emphasize the unique achievements of interwar Red Vienna, its long tradition of international collegiality, and its well-intentioned, albeit at times problematic concern with the promotion of international solidarity and peace. After 1945, however, both of these Lager maintained that a reconstituted Austria was situated firmly in the political culture of western, liberal democratic values, although it remained a neutral, block-free state on the Cold War’s political fault line. Each political tradition could claim that the circumstances posed by the Cold War, moreover, imbued Austria with the responsibility to serve as a facilitator for constructive dialogue between would-be adversaries and as a beacon of peace and social justice for those who lived either under Soviet-style dictatorship or experienced the often hard-edged uncertainties of western liberal capitalism.

Four Power occupation ended and full sovereignty returned to Austria for the first time in almost two decades through the terms of the State Treaty of 1955. Yet while Austrians were free to determine their own course for the first time in almost decades, the neutrality provisions the federal government had embraced and the persistence of East-West tensions checked the pace and degree of Austria’s integration into the evolving European Community. The collection of essays edited by Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger, as well as the assembled speeches and assorted documents Gehler has compiled from the private papers of former Austrian foreign minister Karl Gruber, have been published in the wake of Austria’s 1992 decision to seek membership in the European Union. Regarded in this light, the two volumes under review represent a retrospec-
tive on Austria’s relationship with the other states involved in the processes contributing to (and also working against) the restoration of Austrian sovereignty and western European integration—as well as an occasion for reflection upon the party political and international legal ramifications of neutral Austria’s participation in the movement toward a united Europe.

Historians of contemporary Europe will appreciate the difficulties Gehler and Steininger cite in regarding the availability of sufficient archival sources and private papers to inform their project. This is particularly true where access to Austrian archival material and unpublished personal papers is concerned. Nonetheless, the contributors demonstrate an able reliance upon a variety of published governmental sources from Western Europe and the United States, as well as portions of certain national and international archival collections and those of private associations and families. These sources yield particular dividends for the later 1940s into the early 1960s and permit several of the authors to develop sound and interesting narratives.

Several of the Gehler/Steininger case studies argue persuasively that, despite the often-stated emphasis upon Austria’s international cooperation and nonalignment, international and domestic political and economic considerations militated against the Second Republic’s assuming and profiting from the role of either honest broker between East and West or as a nonaligned trading partner with the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) states. As Florian Weiẞ points out in his essay on Austrian participation in the Marshall Plan and the larger movement toward closer European interconnection, participation in any western-sponsored integration effort ran the risk of angering the Soviet Union and delaying completion of the State Treaty. For Foreign Minister Gruber and other leading Austrian officials, Weiẞ contends, emphasis upon the value of the domestic political stabilization through acceptance of European Recovery Plan (ERP) assistance manifested an inherent anticommunism and had to be paid off with the neutrality orientation that became the defining feature of Austrian foreign/military policy after 1955. For those in Austria who sought to resurrect the old Habsburger Großraumdenken in modern form (p. 55)—that is, Austrian leadership in the formation of a Danubian basin common market—the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the creation of two German states in 1949, the formalization of the Cold War division of Europe into two distinct camps, and the experience of Soviet kidnappings, confiscation of property, and dismantling of industrial works in Eastern Austria seemed evidence enough that the East-West bridge could not be constructed on terms most Austrians considered viable or desirable. Trade dropped off dramatically with the former Habsburg regions and it became clear by the late 1940s that Austria’s economic recovery and future growth were contingent upon closer economic ties to western Europe.

Essays by Weiẞ, Steininger, Stephan Hamel, and Wolfgang Mederer offer thorough overviews of the central diplomatic and constitutional difficulties involved in negotiating out both neutrality and increasing degrees of Austrian participation in European integration at various stages between 1945 and 1992. On the one hand, one sees that Constitutional Court and foreign ministry experts argued into the 1980s that Austrian sovereignty remained contingent upon the sacrosanctity of the neutrality declaration: indeed, those western European states that had regained their economic health most rapidly had benefited from their participation in NATO. Additionally, officials from the Ministries of Trade and Reconstruction (later Trade, Commerce, and Industry) and Agriculture and Forestry pointed to the strength of those western European states and warned that Austria’s inclusion in a Common Market with these stronger economies would have a deleterious effect upon Austrian growth. Instead, as discussion of the
evolving European Community appeared linked to creation of a common (western) European army in the 1950s, the Austrian government limited itself to observer status in Strasbourg and turned more energetically to the negotiation of bilateral agreements with Italy, Yugoslavia, Germany, and France, and membership in the far less politically contentious European Free Trade Association. On the other hand, with the end of the Cold War Gregor Leitner observes that Austria was forced to scramble to gain ECC membership between 1989 and 1992 or risk becoming a society of “second-class Europeans” (p. 87). The way to full-fledged European integration was facilitated by the skill with which the Austrian government followed a delicate course between economic and cultural cooperation with western Europe and its strict adherence to the neutrality principle.

The strength of the Gehler/Steininger collection is its careful, sound reconstruction of sophisticated diplomatic machinations. The limitations of this approach are apparent in several important respects, however. Although the contributors refer persistently to a Europeanization of Austrian consciousness as a result of Nazism and world war, little is offered to corroborate this hypothesis. The one truly notable exception is Gehler’s own excellent essay on the role of the ÖVP in European-wide cooperation of Christian Democratic forces. Studies of Franz Karasek and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, offered by Helmut Wohnout and Martin Posselt, respectively, fail to integrate these leading Austrian internationalists into the Pan-European movement as thoroughly as might be desired, and appear, consequently, as mere biographic sketches. Moreover, the exclusively elite-level focus of these essays fails to take into account several important questions pertaining to Austria and European integration. As strong as the collection is in conveying a sense of pervasive anti-Soviet/anticommunism, a social/cultural study of the manner in which the Marshall Plan won the hearts, minds, and pocketbooks of most Austrians would have been most welcome, as would have social historical focus upon issues such as displaced persons, postwar migrations, and Austria’s relationship to the United Nations Relief and Recovery Agency (UNRRA). The lingering, troublesome question of Austria’s relationship to Germany would have benefited, too, from a social/cultural approach—for example, the thorny matter of German citizenship offered to Austrians who would claim it during the 1950s, or the problem of recreating suitably internationalist, pro-Austrian and anti-Nazi primary and secondary social studies and history curricula that reflected integrationist values. These are among a range of crucial considerations essential to a definitive study of Austria’s self- vs. European identity.

Gehler’s wonderfully edited volume of Gruber’s speeches and articles is far more successful—not merely as a paean to an individual who held the daunting position of foreign minister during the early Cold War years and who lay the foundation for the State Treaty but also as a window into both progressive Christian Democratic politics and one variation on a nascent sense of Austrian identity. Gruber’s position required the exercise of unparalleled skill as an Austrian diplomatic tightrope walker, and he was equal to the challenge. This is evinced in documents regarding Austro-Italian negotiation over the status of German-speaking South Tyrol and the Slovene minority in the Austrian state of Carinthia, as well as the tension between Gruber’s steadfast anticommunism and his diplomatic grace in dealing with intransigent Soviet occupation authorities.

As the leading representative of Austria’s official face abroad, Gruber took considerable pains to portray Austria as a community committed to democracy and international cooperation, as a political society that had learned invaluable lessons from its dark period of indigenous fascism and National Socialism. In the latter instance, Gruber embraces the myth of Austria-as-First-Victim and overstates the significance of the
Austrian resistance with firmness, even relish—a problematic notion, as Gehler reminds us in his introduction. The work is all the stronger for the way in which this lends greater complexity to Gruber's character and provides linkage to the broader issue of repression/rehistoricization in officially propogated notions of the Austrian self-conception that lingered well into the Waldheim Controversy and beyond. Furthermore, the concept of Austria as first victim of Nazi aggression provided Gruber with a valuable “moral” argument in pushing for the end of Four Power occupation. The Reden und Dokumente is a most commendable collection. With its range and depth, its extensive and helpful chronology and excellent thematic index, the work is the real strength of this two-volume project. It should serve researchers well as an important addition to an all too limited collection of published contemporary Austrian primary source material.

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This collection is a gem that will delight historians of early modern and modern Russia and will interest historians of Europe as well. These twenty essays, spanning the whole of Marc Raeff’s distinguished career, range over a truly impressive gamut of periods and topics—from late Muscovy to late Imperial Russia, from political thought and governmental practice to biography and even social history.

Raeff is without a doubt the premier American historian of Russia’s eighteenth century, but he is much more than that, as this collection attests. His greatest contributions are to be found less in his monographs than in essays scattered across many journals and edited volumes, which is why we are fortunate to have these gathered together here. The volume supplies an impressive bibliography of Raeff’s publications, including his prodigious outpouring of book reviews—over six per year (in four languages) between 1955 and 1992.

Although the scope of issues is vast, most of the essays focus on three main (and interrelated) topics: the weakness of liberal and conservative alternatives to radicalism in Russia; reform of the Imperial state and bureaucracy; and modernization and westernization of Russian society, culture, and politics. The single idea that very nearly unites the whole is that Cameralist methods employed by Russia’s rulers to modernize their country both permitted Russia to aspire to Europeanization and condemned her perennially to fall short: now the autocrat and his loyal bureaucracy outstripping a weakly developed society, now a newly born intelligentsia challenging the regime from the moral (Western) high ground recently occupied by the autocrat. In this context, true liberalism was a nearly untenable position. If one advocated liberal reforms, he was obliged either to rely on the autocracy to implement them or to work to overthrow the autocracy and thus to abandon (if only temporarily) liberalism. Given the overweening might of the state, and the unstructured inertness of society, Russian political activists eagerly borrowed a welter of Western political theories that they “transmuted into action-oriented eschatological programs.” Liberalism was necessarily the least attractive Western ideological export, since it was “in its very essence a negation of abstraction, eschatology, utopia” (p. 38).