CONTENTS

| OAEPS Mission, Officers and Executive Committee | ii |
| JEP Editorial Board, Editorial Policy, and Manuscript Instructions | iii |
| Presidents, Current and Past | iv |
| Letter from the Editor | v |

**ARTICLES**—Volume 21, No. 1, 2014

| PARTISANSHIP AND MONETARY POLICY: WHY DO ELECTED OFFICIALS ACQUIESCE TO CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE? | 1 |
| William Davis |

| THE POOR LAWS: A COMPARISON OF THREE ORIGINAL REFORM PROPOSALS | 19 |
| Rachel Wilson |

| THE VALUE OF STATE POLITICAL SCIENCE ORGANIZATIONS | 31 |
| Darren Wheeler |

| UNITED STATES EXPORTS AND OPINIONS IN IMPORTING COUNTRIES | 41 |
| John Blair and Nikolaus Williams |

| OHIO’S CURRENT AGRICULTURAL USE VALUE PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY, RECOUPEMENT, AND CURRENT ISSUES | 51 |
| Allen Prindle |

| PAIN, PUNISHMENT AND NIETZSCHE’S VITALIST POLITICS | 58 |
| Jonathan McKenzie |

https://collected.jcu.edu/jep
DOI: 10.59604/1046-2309.1107
THE OHIO ASSOCIATION OF ECONOMISTS AND POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

Mission

The Ohio Association of Economists and Political Scientists is a not-for-profit, professional association of practitioners, academics, and students in economics, political science, and related fields. It is devoted to the understanding and dissemination of knowledge, and to the facilitation of dialogue regarding economic and political concepts and events. Our emphasis is on how the interaction of these two social sciences impact Ohioans.

Officers
2012–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRESIDENT</th>
<th>VICE-PRESIDENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David McClough</td>
<td>Dandan Lui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Northern University</td>
<td>Kent State University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECRETARY</th>
<th>TREASURER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert P. Rogers</td>
<td>Gary Keener</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashland University</td>
<td>Heidelberg College</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDITOR-IN-CHIEF</th>
<th>VICE-PRESIDENT, COMMUNICATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth A. Stiles</td>
<td>Andrew Lucker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Carroll University</td>
<td>Case Western University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Executive Committee
2012–2013
(Officers plus the following: )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Michael Carroll</th>
<th>Katherine Kontak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowling Green State University</td>
<td>Bowling Green State University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dennis Petruska</th>
<th>Michael Spicer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngstown State University</td>
<td>Cleveland State University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peter Vanderhart</th>
<th>Rachel Wilson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowling Green State University</td>
<td>Wittenberg University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Journal of Economics and Politics

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
ELIZABETH STILES
JOHN CARROLL UNIVERSITY
CLEVELAND, OHIO 44118

(216) 397-4671
estiles@jcu.edu

ASSOCIATE EDITORS
TOM SUTTON
Baldwin Wallace University
Cleveland, Ohio 44118

DAVID MCCLOUGH
Ohio Northern University
Bowling Green, Ohio 43403

EDITORIAL POLICY
The Journal of Economics and Politics is a scholarly journal directed to a broad audience of economists and political scientists. It is sponsored by the Ohio Association of Economists and Political Scientists (OAEPS) but is open to contributions from non-members as well as from members. It has a particular interest in the publication of articles dealing with Ohio and with the region, but it is a general journal. No particular method or approach is favored over another.

Instructions for the Submission of Manuscripts
Send the manuscript to the editor-in-chief via e-mail. The manuscript should be a clean copy, single-spaced print, using MS Word for Windows. Complete manuscript preparation instructions are available from the Editor-in-Chief once the paper is accepted for publication. The Journal of Economics and Politics is a refereed journal. Refereeing is double-blind; therefore, the name(s), affiliation(s), and address(es) of the author(s), title of the paper, and other identifying statements should be on a separate page. This page will be removed before sending the manuscript to the referees. The first page of the paper should contain the title and text, but no reference to the author(s) that would allow the referees to identify the author(s) or affiliation(s). As a general rule, the paper should be approximately twenty pages long. Under special circumstances, substantially longer papers may be considered for publication in more than one part. Short research notes of two or three pages are encouraged. Mathematical notation, figures, and tables should be held to the minimum required for the presentation of the material. Use Word formatting for tables. Author(s) of papers accepted for publication must provide the entire manuscripts, including figures, charts, and tables, in one file accessible by MS Word for Windows. This can be e-mailed to the new Editor-in-Chief, Elizabeth Stiles at estiles@jcu.edu. Notes and references should be at the end of the manuscript rather than in the text. Attribution extent and style vary by profession and custom. Consult this issue of the Journal of Economics and Politics for the style used in attributions.
## PRESIDENTS

**The Ohio Association of Economics and Political Scientists**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRESIDENT</th>
<th>AFFILIATION</th>
<th>FIELD</th>
<th>END OF TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harvey Walker</td>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.D. Patton</td>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roy Sherman</td>
<td>University of Akron</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Titus</td>
<td>Kenyon College</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burton French</td>
<td>Miami University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burton French</td>
<td>Miami University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burton French</td>
<td>Miami University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valdemar Carlson</td>
<td>Antioch College</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. R. McGowen</td>
<td>Kenyon College</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David King</td>
<td>University of Akron</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Thatcher</td>
<td>Miami University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilfred Binkley</td>
<td>Ohio Northern University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd Helms</td>
<td>Bowling Green State U.</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvey Mansfield</td>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Picard</td>
<td>Ohio University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donovan Emch</td>
<td>University of Toledo</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vant Kabler</td>
<td>Ohio Wesleyan University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Vinacke</td>
<td>University of Cincinnati</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meno Lovenstein</td>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Van Dorn</td>
<td>Kent State University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leland Gordon</td>
<td>Dennison College</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray Gusteson</td>
<td>Ohio University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvin Tostlebe</td>
<td>Wooster College</td>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Martin</td>
<td>Capital University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. C. Chiang</td>
<td>Dennison College</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. J. Benedict</td>
<td>Hiram College</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen Wiley</td>
<td>Bowling Green State U.</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas A. Flinn</td>
<td>Oberlin College</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Jenny</td>
<td>Wooster College</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard Hamilton</td>
<td>Bowling Green State U.</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Wessel</td>
<td>University of Cincinnati</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Speck</td>
<td>Muskingum College</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank W. Y. Cheng</td>
<td>Marietta College</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Waltzer</td>
<td>Miami University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burton Deveau</td>
<td>Ohio University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kathleen Barber</td>
<td>John Carroll University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Skinner</td>
<td>University of Cincinnati</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Tucker</td>
<td>Ohio University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Giesbrecht</td>
<td>Wilmington College</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Flickinger</td>
<td>Wittenberg University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Gallo</td>
<td>University of Cincinnati</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lois Pelekoudas</td>
<td>Central State University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry G. Rennie</td>
<td>University of Toledo</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Hill</td>
<td>Marietta College</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Ebert</td>
<td>Baldwin-Wallace College</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Anderson</td>
<td>Bowling Green State U.</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo Navin</td>
<td>Bowling Green State U.</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bing</td>
<td>Heidelberg College</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecil Gouke</td>
<td>Ohio State University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Louthan</td>
<td>Ohio Wesleyan University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yiu-Wu Liu</td>
<td>Youngstown State U.</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Lieberman</td>
<td>University of Akron</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Sandver</td>
<td>Ohio Wesleyan University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Jordan</td>
<td>Ohio University–Zanesville</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice Simon</td>
<td>Ohio Wesleyan University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Anderson</td>
<td>Bowling Green State U.</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Stocks</td>
<td>Youngstown State University</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig Ramsay</td>
<td>Ohio Wesleyan University</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Rolleston</td>
<td>Baldwin-Wallace College</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

It is my pleasure to assume the duties as Editor-In-Chief of the Journal of Economics and Politics (JEP), the academic publication of the seventy-three year old Ohio Association of Economists and Political Scientists (OAEPS). Thanks to our previous editor, Dr. Mary Ellen Benedict of Bowling Green State University, for her excellent work these past few years. Joining me on the editing team are Dr. Thomas Sutton, Associate Editor of Political Science and Dr. David McClough, Associate Editor of Economics. You may submit papers to us for consideration for publication in JEP by sending an email to estiles@jcu.edu and sending the paper as an attachment.

The Annual Meeting of the Ohio Association of Economists and Political Scientists (OAEPS) was held on September 27–28 at Kent State University. Papers presented at the conference receive feedback and presenters are encouraged to submit their papers to the journal for possible publication. Please visit our website at www.oaeps.org for more information on the conference.

I would also like to remind you about the Young Scholar Award. The award is selected from the published papers in the JEP each year. Awardees must either be working toward their terminal degree or be in tenure-track status to be eligible for the award. This year, we have selected Dr. William Davis of Walsh University for his paper **Partisanship and Monetary Policy: Why do Elected Officials Acquiesce to Central Bank Independence?**

Sincerely,

Elizabeth A. Stiles, MPA, PhD
John Carroll University
Political Science Department
1 John Carroll Boulevard
University Heights, OH 44118

https://collected.jcu.edu/jep
DOI: 10.59604/1046-2309.1107
PARTISANSHIP AND MONETARY POLICY: WHY DO ELECTED OFFICIALS ACQUIESCE TO CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE?

WILLIAM DAVIS
WALSH UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
With the establishment of independent central banks, many governments have delegated key economic and social policy powers to an unelected bureaucrat. Democratic theory and much of the central bank literature implies that elected officials should not give up the power to affect public policy. Further, power-seeking politicians and partisan governments, particularly those of the left, should reject the sort of macroeconomic policy which typically results from independent central banks. Using a multinational cross-sectional time series data set consisting of a nearly forty year period, the analysis tests for relationships between changes in partisanship and central bank independence (CBI). Findings support the contention that partisan politicians are willing to tolerate the loss of an important policy-making tool as it increases their credibility and electability on the one hand, while improving the likelihood of success of preferred policies, paid for by the fiscal tools, which they still likely control once in office on the other.
1. INTRODUCTION

With the establishment of independent central banks across the globe, many countries have created a policy area separate from the links to partisan electoral politics. This depoliticization of monetary policy has had generally positive economic outcomes, including low interest and inflation rates. Since at least the end of the Cold War, governments from developed as well as lesser developed democracies to newly democratizing and post-communist regimes have delegated the management of monetary policy to an independent agent or central bank. However, in delegating these powers to a central bank bureaucrat the ability of elected officials and policy makers to utilize an effective policy tool for implementation of such policies of economic growth and employment has been severely constrained. According to much of the relevant literature, highlighted subsequently, politicians and more specifically, partisans of the left are assumed to be keenly interested in their powers over employment and social policy decisions because these can directly affect future electoral success. Why then would elected politicians surrender these important policy powers to a third party?

This question has particular relevance to the United States, for example, where the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) has increasingly become a target of scrutiny. The Fed has been critiqued not only for its policies and role in the financial crisis of 2008, but as being the product of dubious constitutionality. Nevertheless, support of the Federal Reserve among the press and political elites continues. This paper provides a theory of central bank independence (CBI) and the inherent partisan trade-offs that account for inconsistencies between politicians as power seekers and the surrendering of their powers to central banks. Partisan politicians are willing to tolerate the loss of an important policy-making tool because it increases their credibility to the financial markets and electability to the voters, on the one hand, while improving the likelihood of success of preferred policies, paid for by the fiscal tools, which they still likely control once in office, on the other. The conclusion discusses the implications of these findings and offers some suggestions for future research.

2. ELECTED OFFICIALS AND THE DELEGATION OF POLITICAL POWER

From earliest times central banks, such as the Swedish Riksbank (1668) and the Bank of England (1694), were established as a source of financing for governments. They were also set up to deal with financial and economic crises such as the Bank of France (1800) and the Federal Reserve (1913). These banks often issued private notes which served as currency (Bordo, 2007). The power to create and lend money by these private stockholding companies, separate from the government treasury, in effect produced independence and today independence is enshrined in most central bank charters.

The abdication of monetary policy-making power by elected officials, regardless of partisan stripe, is perplexing because we tend to assume that politicians are power seeking (Lasswell, 1948) and it also poses serious concerns regarding the question of democratic legitimacy. Democratic theory posits that, in democracies, elected officials need the support of their constituencies. Arguably, this principle is the cornerstone upon which the very idea of democracy rests. Lippmann (1922), for example, states that from “Plato and Aristotle through Machiavelli and Hobbes to the democratic theorists” democracy is predicated on the ideal of public policy that is responsive to the public. The delegation of policy power from elected representatives to unelected bureaucrats is unseemly from the perspective of democratic responsiveness. Policy decisions, which in effect have partisan implications, may be more legitimately left to elected legislators and executives who are closer to “the will of the people” (Boix, 1998). Nevertheless, central bank institutional regimes represent, in effect, a restraint on elected politicians’ ability to manipulate monetary policy as a tool to achieve their constituents’ preferred social policy outcomes (McNamara, 2002). Critics of CBI from this perspective should be expected to be from across the political partisan lines. However, from a democratic responsiveness perspective, this literature does not provide definitive answers.
There may be economic policy payoffs to the institution of an independent central bank. The establishment of CBI has in effect established rules or institutionalized the kinds of outcome choices available and effectively limits policy makers’ options (Alesina, Cohen & Roubini, 1997). Simmons goes so far as to suggest that “international rules of good monetary conduct have become ‘legalized’” (2000, p. 573). Independent central banks are said to “insulate monetary policy from politically induced monetary volatility due to partisan or opportunistic motivations” (Alesina, Cohen & Roubini, 1997, p. 212). More broadly, compliance with International Monetary Fund (IMF) “good monetary practices,” increases a governments’ credibility with international markets (Simmons, 2000, p. 574).9

CBI has been further shown to be associated with not only inflation/price stability, but with higher economic growth as well (Alesina and Summers, 1993; Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb, 1993; Cukierman and Webb, 1994; Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1992; De Long and Summers, 1992). Franzese (1999) shows that central banks are, in fact, superior when dealing with external “shocks” such as the inflationary results of the end of the Bretton Woods monetary regime, the oil crises and partisan policies. Rogoff (1985) showed that governments gained credibility and that interest rate stability is better achieved by central banks that are independent of government control. The relationship between stable or low inflation has been tested with largely similar results (Oatley, 1999a). It has been argued that in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, CBI has resulted in increased credibility by signaling to “the markets” (Simmons, 2000; Maxfield, 1997). This is because governments with high levels of CBI signal to markets and voters alike that they will credibly maintain stable monetary rates, which in turn induces capital investment and increases prospects for future economic growth.

This range of possible central bank governance allowed by international norms of “good monetary conduct” is associated with a low inflation rate biased policy regime enforced by an independent central bank, which is traditionally integral to liberal or laissez-faire economic practices.10 Franzese stipulates that “pro-independence” or liberal and conservative governments “will seek to institutionalize greater central bank independence when they are ascendant” (1999, p. 702). The choice of low inflation over job growth has therefore been decided by CBI and represents essentially the institutionalization of liberal or neoliberal monetary policy.11 Delegation, or institutionalization of monetary policy through CBI, it has been pointed out, is rarely reversed (Keefer and Stasavage, 1998). Yet this arrangement is not without costs.

The establishment of CBI is perplexing nevertheless because of the highly partisan nature of electoral politics. Much of the traditional literature, Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) for example, assert that while left-of-center governments care more about unemployment, right-of-center governments care more about controlling inflation. Quinn and Inclan (1997) link partisanship, in combination with economic structure, with a degree of capital account openness in OECD nations (as did Li and Smith, 2002). Further, Milner and Judkins (2004) link partisanship with trade openness. Since central bank charters often specifically state their powers over interest rate stability, which promotes growth, rightists are more likely to be content with central bank independence.12 In the effort to appeal to their primary base left parties promote traditional left policies such as higher wages, more control and regulation of the economy and higher rates of employment, which can adversely affect interest rate and growth dynamics (Alvarez et al., 1991; Di Bartolomeo, 2001). Moreover, the creation of central bank institutional regimes forces financial choices which have social and therefore partisan outcomes, which has been pointed out by several studies (Garrett and Lang, 1991 and 1995; McNamara, 2002).

Monetary policy has been an instrument of partisan policy and has been an indispensable tool of most left-leaning governments in their efforts at job creation. This relationship is so strong that it is frequently an implicit assumption of many formal partisan models (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1988). This is particularly so for left-of-center governments, while right-of-center governments are assumed to have a policy preference for the goals of independent central bankers, namely low interest rates and stable monetary policy, over full employment goals. Alesina et al. (1997, p. 45) state “left-wing parties are more willing to
bear the costs of inflation to fight unemployment.” It has been argued therefore, that the choice governments make for more central bank independence, indeed, represents a de facto repudiation of traditional left-of-center economic policy dispositions in favor of liberal monetary regimes by both left and right governments (Garrett & Lang, 1991).

Garrett and Lang (1991) pose an interesting partisan question: “Why do some governments, such as the 1974-1979 Labor government in Britain and Mitterand’s government in France, initially pursue partisan policies but subsequently turn dramatically away from them?” (1991, p. 563). One likely answer is that pragmatic politicians seeking re-election will abandon a failing policy. Moreover, if independent central banks are instituted by right-of-center governments, as they had been (i.e., Germany, UK, US and many democratizing countries, etc.) why do left-of-center governments, which the literature implies should reject central bank independence, not reclaim control over monetary policy when they return to power?13 The answer suggested in the next section is that it may be that delegated monetary policy serves a partisan policy strategy.

3. WHY PARTISAN GOVERNMENTS MAKE THE TRADE-OFF

Policy makers’ attempts to manipulate markets for purposes of social policy have long been recognized for producing unintended results. Charles Lindblom (1982), for example, states that Polanyi’s (1944) assessment of eighteenth century Britain “demonstrated how easily regulation of the market could derange the economy” (1982, p. 329). Lindblom argued that politicians are “induced” to maintain the market friendly status quo because the “penalty visited on them by business disincentives caused by proposed policies is that declining business activity is a threat to the party and the officials in power” (1982, p. 329). Lindblom’s lament that “market systems imprison or cripple the policy-making process” provides a basis for this analysis (1982, p. 329). Central bank independence amounts to the institutionalization of low interest rate regime preferences over inflation biased or left-of-center policy. This is the result of long-term changes in policy attitudes “induced” by the corresponding “penalty” produced by a given government policy. Bipartisan acceptance is perhaps a watershed mark, demonstrating the shift away from traditional left-of-center economic policy throughout the developed democracies toward liberal tenets.14

For the purpose of this argument, it is assumed that politicians are political actors (Lasswell, 1948) and political parties want to represent the interests of their constituents and provide an outlet for the expression of those interests (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1988; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Also, it is important to recognize that the “left” is a fairly diverse group; it can therefore be inaccurate to paint it with a broad brush. While the left is assumed to prefer policies that provide jobs to their constituents over other economic outcomes, say stable interest rates, there is significant variation. For example, there are major differences between Democrats in the US, New Labour (or “New old Labour” of former PM Brown’s faction) in the UK and French Socialists with respect to economic policy views. For example, Democrats do not share an historical association with Marxist theory with European left-of-center partisans. Additionally, while Social Democrats in Germany have specifically rejected the radical associations of their past15 and have a long history of support for central bank independence and New Labour increased the independence of the Bank of England, French Socialists have long complained about strictures of the European Monetary Union (EMU). More recently, in addition to its monetary policy, Spain’s formerly ruling Socialists relinquished a significant fiscal policy to European Union Central Bank oversight with the establishment of a debt ceiling constitutional amendment, similar to the more conservative governments of France’s Gaullists and Germany’s Christian Democrats.16 Nevertheless, while many parties of the left differ in their degree of enthusiasm for CBI, once in power, many of these parties paradoxically support a policy constraint anathema to traditional left or socialist economic prescriptions.
3.1 CBI INCREASES CREDIBILITY AND ELECTABILITY

There are two primary reasons why partisans on the left reject the traditional preference for control of macroeconomic policy for aspects of liberal economic policy. First, partisan politicians are willing to tolerate this loss of an important policy-making tool because it increases their credibility and this secondly, increases their electability. Left partisans make a trade-off, which implies rejecting a long tradition of leftist macroeconomic policy for a free-market oriented neoliberal policy in order to gain acceptance of the financial markets. Many traditional policy positions of left-wing parties of the past are anathema to financial markets and result in stifled economic growth (Lindblom, 1982; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). This is typically because of the tradeoff between monetary growth, its effect on unemployment, and inflation and growth of the economy (Sweeney, 1996; Cukierman and Lipper, 1999; Stasavage, 2003). The problem for left governments here is that private industry, bankers, and investors are reluctant to invest their capital where future inflation and therefore profits are less predictable. Hence these governments suffer a credibility problem and the capital necessary for job creation goes elsewhere. By delegating monetary policy to unelected bureaucrats, politicians attract private sector investment while avoiding responsibility for any negative impact central bank policy tradeoffs may have on their voters.

There has been a general repudiation of leftist economic policies since the 1980s and particularly after 1990 and the demise of the Soviet Union. For example, the primary, though certainly not exclusive, supporter of socialist economics, which can be assumed to be antithetical to neoliberal monetary policy and central bank independence, are from the left of the political spectrum. From today’s vantage point it is difficult to imagine the prestige and the influence this model once held. The demise of the Soviet Union would naturally affect a decline in statist central economic planning and therefore resistance to central bank independence would correspondingly decline. This association with the model of the former Soviet Union hurt the left’s credibility and electability.

Additionally, beginning with the Thatcher reforms in the UK and Reagan reforms in the US, an apparent string of neoclassical economic turn-around or success stories began. Economic development and democratization in Chile, South Korea and the “Asian Tigers” among developing countries and the former socialist East European economies after the Cold War seemed to repudiate central economic planning. Since then numerous left-of-center governments have separated with traditional leftist economic policy. This was evident in the US during the Clinton administration’s “triangulation” after 1994 (Morris 1997), Gerhard Schröder’s “Neue Mitte” of the 1998 general election in Germany and as suggested by Garrett’s example of Britain’s Labour and New Labour after the 1990s, as well as France’s early 1980’s Socialists. Because of inferior performance of leftist macroeconomic policy, it necessitated a rejection of traditional leftist policy (Garrett & Lang, 1991). Despite some costs in alienating their ideological base, there are several primary benefits that governments of various partisan makeup receive with the implementation of central bank independence. Chiefly, as has been mentioned, central bank independence gives governments needed credibility.

Governments gain needed credibility by institutionalizing a low inflation policy at the cost of delegating a “tool” for job creation (Keefer & Stasavage, 2003, p. 420). This trade-off amounts, arguably, to an abrogation of elected officials’ “right” to use monetary creation as a tool of job growth. Since left-of-center governments are most likely to prefer the use of monetary policy as a tool for achieving social policy, the trade-off cost is disproportionately paid by left-wing governments (Lohman, 1992). Keefer and Stasavage confirm this same point, stating that “policy reformers” of the left “face frustration if, ... they grant policymaking authority” to institutions like the central bank (2003, p. 421). However, central bank independence is a matter of degrees and is most effective under left-wing governments because independent central banks offset inflationary job creation policies of the left (Franzese, 1999). Franzese shows that central bank independence has greater effect than often thought in mitigating the “inflationary impacts” of left governments’ inflationary bias (1999, p. 699). Governments, therefore, gain when maintaining an independent monetary policy and adherence to “good monetary practices,” particularly if they are of the left (Maxfield, 1997). Thus, when governments create independent central banks, they, in
effect, trade their ability to use monetary policy for credibility. Furthermore, by signaling to the markets that they are prudent players, left governments gain a complicit financial partner in the markets, which want steady interest rates and a clearer expectation of future profits. This gaining of the confidence of the market, as well as the general public, perhaps helps the left governments thwart a potential alliance of powerful market and electoral groups within the opposing party.

Does gaining support of the “capitalist” markets create a risk that the left may be viewed as “selling-out,” risking the possibility of core constituencies “punishing” them at the polls in the next election? Analysis of this question has produced evidence that this risk or electoral cost is minimal. It has been shown that voter constituents are unlikely to punish their party even when it assumes central bank policies which appear contrary to its stated goals, particularly when the role of responsibility for policy is unclear (Powell and Whitten, 1993). For example, if a party can say to its constituents that it must go along with central bank independence because of its coalitions or structural impositions created by former administrations it is unlikely that voters will prefer the party that is even more attached to the policy. In a sense the government claims its “hands are tied” and “we’re better than the alternative.” Furthermore, the left-right ideological dimension has been demonstrated to be the primary determinant of voter choice (Budge et al., 2001, p. 159). Partisan choices tend to be consistent because political parties tend to remain ideologically consistent (Budge et al., 2001, p. 81). The result of these developments is a policy convergence of the left and the right regarding economic policy as analyzed by previous scholarship (Garrett and Lange, 1991; Garrett, 1995, 1998; Boix, 1998; Oatley, 1999b; Clark, 2002; Franzese, 2002a). If, as Powell and Whitten (1993) suggest, left governments will not be punished by their constituencies in a later election cycle, there is no political disincentive for such a strategy.

### 3.2 Paying for Expensive Social Policy

A third reason for supporting central bank independence is that it improves the likelihood of success of the left’s preferred social policies, paid for by the fiscal tools (taxation and debt), which they still likely control once in office. Once elected, the new government can hope for a complicit financial partner to help implement financial policy and maintain the growth economy necessary for expensive social policy. Governments that want to implement expensive social policy, to make good on election and party platforms or manifestos require a successful macroeconomic policy. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen find that central bank independence not only lowers inflation but that “growth and unemployment is not related to the degree of central bank independence” (1997, p. 218) as Rogoff (1985) feared. That is, the trade-off for growth does not mean reduced real growth. Low interest rate regimes can coexist with the growth economies left governments wish to deliver, as promised, to their constituents and accordingly tax to pay for policy. Grille, Masiandaro and Tabellini (1991) furthermore, also showed that not only does central bank independence result in lower inflation rates, but it does so with little or no cost to growth, foreshadowing Alesina et al.’s results. They conclude that “having an independent central bank is almost like having a free lunch; there are benefits but no apparent costs in terms of macroeconomic performance” (1991).

Moreover, central bank independence does not result in lower levels of sustainable social payments, as was once feared by some on the left (Lohman, 1992, p. 273). Cukierman (2002) showed that, contrary to fears of neo-Keynesian welfare advocates, an independent central bank is not necessarily the end of social welfare. He stipulates that the opposite may be true, “social welfare is a monotonically increasing function of central bank independence and of the (assumed) positively related level of reputation” (2002, p. 22). Left-of-center governments therefore get credibility without the fear of reducing growth or welfare with central bank independence. Cukierman (2002) shows that social welfare is not changed by central bank independence; it is the economic basis supporting social spending that has changed. Further, Garrett and Lang (1991) calculated that despite a general move toward conservative macroeconomic policy there was not a corresponding trend in fiscal policy or spending.

6
The creation of a monetary policy that delivers growth and social welfare without sacrificing inflation is an enormous accomplishment for modern governments. For governments of the left as well as rightist monetarists this appears to be a win-win situation. Since many social policies favored by left parties are often expensive, prudent left governments require a growing private sector from which to draw tax dollars to pay for social services promised to their constituencies. In order to achieve policy objectives, left governments need prosperous economies that result from implementation of central bank independence or the institutionalization of conservative economic policies. They then make assurances to the financial markets, or signals, that they are responsible actors and will not infringe on their interests.

This, in short, is a strategy to get elected and after election appear to be a credible financial partner and create and pay for effective policy. This seeming paradox between electoral success and economic or policy success is solved by maintaining a party platform that adheres to traditional constituency concerns while at the same time signaling their “tied hands” regarding monetary central bank independence policy to the financial markets. Left-of-center governments remain true to their traditional leftist rhetoric regarding social policy spending to appeal to their traditional power base but quietly “turn coats” with regard to monetary policy and assume traditional conservative macroeconomic policy. This accounts for Garret and Lang’s (1995) finding of continued electoral success for left governments and at the same time the distancing from traditional leftist economic policy by these same parties when in government.

### 3.3 HYPOTHESES

The general phenomenon this study attempts to explain is why political partisans acquiesce to CBI. The delegation of policy power from a democratic responsiveness perspective is expected to hold across partisan lines. There should therefore be little policy difference with regard to CBI along partisan lines and thus the level of central bank independence should not greatly vary to the degree that a government’s ideology varies from right to left. This suggests a challenge to the claims from the literature that left governments seek to gain control over economic growth and employment policy powers and is a test of following hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 1:** As the left partisan composition of the government increases, central bank independence will decrease.

Moreover, with the fall of Communism, many newly democratizing governments established independent central banks after 1990. According to the alternative theory put forth here, it is expected that as partisan (left) governments increase, central bank independence should increase in contrast to claims from the literature.

**Hypothesis 2:** Left partisan government spending increases will positively correlate to CBI increases after the Cold War (1990).

Despite the suggestion of a convergence on monetary policy, there is little evidence to suggest that left governments, as well as right governments, converge with regard to their rates of spending. This trend has largely continued and leads to a challenge to the second hypothesis

**Hypothesis 3:** Left governments’ spending preferences will be negatively correlated to the level of central bank independence.

The creation of a monetary regime that delivers growth and welfare without sacrificing inflation seems to be an enormous accomplishment for the left, as well as traditional central bank independence supporters: a win-win situation. This however, is somewhat deceptive. Franzese’s weighted-average model demonstrates a marked decrease in the impact of central bank anti-inflationary effect for all developed economies since 1980 (1999, p. 700). This demonstrates that “the structure of political interests pushes discretionary policy makers to pursue anti-inflationary policy anyway” (1999, p. 701). This is the result of structural trends throughout the developed democracies, that is to say, “increasing trade-openness and increasing financial-sector strength (and in some places also increasing right-partisanship and decreasing
union density)” (1999, p. 701). Central bank independence is not the cause of low inflationary trends therefore, but the result. Left-of-center support for central bank independence is actually further evidence of the suggested repudiation of left-wing economic policies which are biased toward inflation. Franzese concludes, “the anti-inflation forces currently hold the political edge” (1999, p. 701).

One can assume that left-of-center parties, like all parties, represent the interests of their constituents and provide an outlet for the expression of those interests (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987; Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p. 10). In the effort to appeal to their primary base, many left parties still make appeals to traditional leftist policy proposal such as higher wages, more control and regulation of the economy and higher rates of employment. However, as has been noted, many traditional policy positions of left-wing parties of the past are anathema to financial markets and result in stifled economic growth (Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p. 286). What’s more, interactions between fiscal and monetary policy can also affect interest rate and growth dynamics (see e.g. Alvarez et al., 1991 or Di Bartolomeo, 2001). A perception that the government is going to spend a great deal may fuel fears of inflation and lead the central bank to raise interest rates more than it otherwise would, producing “inducements” to return to status quo policy.

Since many social policies favored by left parties are expensive, prudent left governments seek a growing private sector from which to draw tax revenue to pay for social services promised to their constituencies. In order to achieve policy objectives then, left governments need prosperous economies brought about by implementation of central bank independence or the institutionalization of market-friendly economic policies. They then make assurances to the financial markets, or signals, that they are responsible actors and will not infringe on their interests. The primary signal is adherence to central bank independence and representing an implicit repudiation of traditional left government policy.19

This seeming paradox between electoral success and economic or policy success is solved by maintaining a party platform that adheres to traditional constituency concerns while at the same time signaling their “tied hands” regarding monetary central bank independence policy to the financial markets. The model is an attempt to explain that, while maintaining traditional manifesto rhetoric to appeal to their constituencies, left governments eschew traditional leftist macroeconomic policy in increasing numbers since the 1980s and especially after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War (1990) is a pivotal watershed moment in the demise of leftist monetary regimes. Therefore, there should be no major substantive differences between the policies of either left governments or right governments with regard to CBI monetary policy after 1990.

The preceding discussion leads to three additional hypotheses

**Hypothesis 4:** Interest rate stability will be positively correlated to the level of central bank independence.

**Hypothesis 5:** Unemployment will be negatively correlated to the level of central bank independence.

**Hypothesis 6:** Election years will be negatively correlated to the level of central bank independence.

4. **Research Design and Statistical Methodology**

The research method, a Panel Corrected Standard Errors regression model will allow for an analysis of the data to view changes in partisanship and central bank independence over an extensive period from 1960 to 1998. Theoretically, the literature suggests that left governments should be less likely to support central bank independence. If the model is correct the empirical data should suggest that this is not the case. Therefore it should be sufficient to measure the effect on central bank independence when governments move to a more leftist ideological makeup. That is, as leftist composition of the government increases we should not see substantial or corresponding degrees in the decreases in central bank independence.
4.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Central bank independence will be the Franseze (2002) composite measure. This measure calculates the degree of freedom from political manipulation possible in order to capture the central bank’s ability to pursue anti-inflationary policy without interference for 21 western democracies.20 This measure is a scaled average of legal independence based on the methodology of characterization of independence by several analyses, including answers to survey questions completed by relevant individuals at central banks (Cukierman, 1992), a measure of economic and political central bank independence (Grilli, et al., 1991), and Bade and Parkin’s (1982) index of CBI. The Cukierman and Lippi (1999) index of legal central bank independence (LVAU) was also considered but lacked the depth and variability for the purposes of this analysis.

4.2 INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES

The primary explanatory variable, government left-right ideology, or Government Partisanship, should explain if government composition affects the level of central bank independence. In 1998, Heemin Kim and Richard C. Fording proposed a comprehensive method for measuring government ideology for the corresponding countries of the CBI measure. This measure will be used to gauge an ideological left or right component of the government. The content analysis is based on the party manifestos, so it can also be deduced from this data if a government or party maintains the rhetoric of their leftist traditions and can be compared to their actions on CBI and economic policy while in office.21 That is, do their words match their deeds?

A lagged variable is used to account for the fact that government policy with regard to budgets is not immediate because of the democratic and legislative process from budget conception to enactment. Interest rates, however, can be changed almost instantly. The budget conception to enactment may be at least a year in the process, but for simplicity and consistency the variable uses a one year lag.

These measures were checked for validity and reliability by comparing the results to previous manifesto and experts’ results (i.e., Castles and Mair, 1984), such as Eurobarmeter’s ideological self-placement survey data, as well as Stimson’s (1998) “policy mood” indicator for the US (Kim and Fording, 1998, p. 82, 2002, p. 196). The success of these cross-validations and the utility of the ratio method measure offer a reliable tool for the analysis of the ideological dynamics’ effects on parties, voters and governments over time. This measure should help explain if the partisan composition of government affects the level of central bank independence and/or spending habits. Although the literature would lead us to expect a negative relationship between left governments and CBI, the model predicts little, if any, strong relationship between Government Partisanship and CBI.

There are five additional variables considered here in addition to the primary explanatory variable of government ideology. I control for the end of the Cold War and an interaction term for government ideology and the Cold War, government debt spending, interest rate stability, unemployment and elections according to the theoretical expectations expressed earlier. A binary dummy post-Cold War variable serves to capture the changes brought about by the demise of the Soviet Union. Oatley’s (1999a) model uses a dummy variable to capture the political differences post-1990. This makes intuitive sense since changes brought on by the end of the Cold War, including German unification, concerns about EU integration, unpopular US policy or ideological factors, as well as the interests of particular political players, had some causal relationship in post-Cold War realities. This measure will allow the model to detect if the exclusion of the socialist model as a viable alternative is responsible in part for the increase in “good monetary practice” and detect if the elimination of the socialist model as a viable alternative is responsible solely or in part for the increase in central bank independence. It may also provide support for the assumption that the decrease in government supports for policies of the left regarding macroeconomic policy is based on the loss of cache or prestige of ideological-based socialist economic dogma. The author anticipates the post-Cold War variable to be positively correlated with increasing CBI.
Following Oatley’s (1999a) precedent, an interactive term is used to detect if there are differences between government partisanship and post-1990 due to the changes brought on by the fall of the Soviet Union. It may also provide support for the assumption that the decrease in government support for policies of the Left regarding macroeconomic policy is based on the loss of cache or prestige of socialist economic policy. Control variables for election year cycles and debt spending balance are also included. This should capture the pre-election year fiscal spending predicted by Hibbs’ model of partisanship (1977) and accounts for any effect of budget balances on rates of interest in keeping with Oatley’s (1999a) precedent. Other control variables, including debt spending, interest rates, unemployment and election cycles as control variables, as well as spending and interest rates are from the Franzese (2002a) data. By adding these variables to the equation it can be assessed if any relationship of the primary “causal” variables is spurious and give direction as to the real causal factors.

4.3 MODEL

The following is the general form of the completed model:

\[ \text{CBI} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Government Partisanship-1} + \beta_2 \text{Post1990} + \beta_3 \text{Post1990} \times \text{Government Partisanship-1} + \beta_4 \text{Debt Spending} + \beta_5 \text{Interest Rates} + \beta_6 \text{Unemployment} + \beta_7 \text{Election Year} + \varepsilon \]

Where: \( \text{CBI} = \) index of central bank independence. \( \text{Government Partisanship(t-1)} = \) A one year lag of median government ideology of the government in power Left or Right as measured by the Kim and Fording method using MRG data. Post’90 = The post-Cold War period dummy, coded 0s up to 1990 and 1s thereafter. \( \text{Post1990} \times \text{Government Partisanship-1} = \) interaction term. \( \text{Debt Spending} = \) average annual change in government debt spending. \( \text{Interest Rates} = \) Long term interest rates stability. \( \text{Unemployment} = \) rates of unemployment. \( \text{Election Year} = \) whether or not an election was held in a particular year.

The empirical test should provide evidence supporting the contentions discussed previously. Therefore, the model expects to find, in contradiction to what the literature on this topic would lead us to predict, no substantial reduction in central bank independence when the partisan composition of the government increases (i.e., in particular, when leftist governments assume office). The model also expect this to hold true despite left-partisan promises as measured by this analysis of party manifestos within the Kim and Fording ideology measure.

4.4 METHOD

The first step in the modeling of this time series implies the identification of a possible trend between the dependent variable and the corresponding independent variable lag. While an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model has some precedent (i.e., Oatley, 1999a, p. 1014), a panel corrected model with standard errors is used for this study. The use of pooled panel data as the dependent variable may produce spurious results if the data is non-stationary. The Phillips-Perron method, conducted under the null hypothesis of stationarity, was used to test for stationarity in the time series regression, as per Beck and Katz (1995). Gujarati (2003) states that this test is essentially the same as the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test but allows for the analysis without adding lagged difference terms. This lagging of difference terms reduces the N one year, and since a lagged independent variable is already used, which further causes a loss of one year, this method is preferable. Analyses were performed and the results indicate that the potential problem of nonstationary series is not present in the analysis. 22

The model utilizes a first order auto regressive scheme (AR1) with tests for auto correlation and heteroscedasticity. In order to minimize the potential statistical problems, such as bias in the estimation of standard error, autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity, Prais-Winsten transformed regression with Prais-Winsten specified Robust Standard Errors is used. 23 Because of the iterative process used in a Prais-Winsten regression there is no need to use a lagged dependent variable. This offers a simplified modeling of the relationship between a lagged Government Partisanship variable and the effect on the CBI variable.
according to the theory posited here. A Durbin-Watson test was used to detect possible autocorrelation\textsuperscript{24} and no such problems were found with the models.

While admittedly studies of this type can have certain spatial as well as small N difficulties, typical for single country time series, it nevertheless should show the trends and relationships which have taken shape since unification in 1990, and may be important for this analysis. Therefore a thirty-seven-year period from 1960 to 1998 should be sufficient to indicate trends and divergence from them.

4.5 RESULTS

The results here are robust to alternative specifications and estimation techniques. For example, using stabilized variance by a square root transformation, as well as a natural log transformation of the dependent variables, were not substantively different than the OLS models with robust standard errors. This is in line with the results of similar analyses (i.e., Oatley, 1999, p. 1014).

Table 1 presents the statistical results and Table 2 presents a results summary for the model, where the Government Partisanship measure is regressed on the index of CBI, including Cold War, interaction and control variables. The theory developed here did not have a specific prediction regarding the intercept, the expected value of CBI when all the independent values are held constant at their theoretical values of zero. The Partisanship variable represents the expected change in the value of CBI for a one unit increase in Government Partisanship when the other variables are held constant at zero. Although it is positively correlated at .0014 to CBI, which is contrary to accepted theory in much of the literature, it is not significant at the 95% level.\textsuperscript{25} The results thus appear to be what had been expected according to the theory put forth here: the analysis finds no support for the contention that left governments reject CBI.

While this was expected from a democratic responsiveness perspective, the analysis cannot definitively explain why partisans accept CBI. In any event, the coefficient of the Partisanship variable is not substantively important in and of itself but only when it is viewed in the context of the conditionality imposed upon it by the other constitutive variables.

The effect of the Cold War period in explaining the relationship between government partisanship and CBI policy is demonstrated by the post-Cold War variable. The coefficient for this variable represents the expected change in the value of CBI when its value takes on a 1 and when the Government Partisanship is held constant. In accordance to the theory put forth here, the positive coefficient estimate of .09 and its significance (t = 4.59) supports the supposition that the existence or absence of the Cold War was a major factor in determining relationship between the government partisanship of the OECD countries and the dependent variable CBI.

The Government Partisanship*Post-CW, is an interactive variable comprised of the product of Government Partisanship and the post-Cold War variable, was designed to express the expected change in the relationship between Government Partisanship and CBI when the Cold War was over (i.e., when the post-Cold War variable moves from 0 to 1). According to the theory put forth here, this should have had the effect of reducing the strength of the link between government partisanship and the CBI dependent variable.\textsuperscript{26} The interaction term is positive as expected and is significant. This tells us, that in the post-Cold War period, the government ideology relationship to CBI becomes increasingly positive. This is also significant at the 95% level. Substantively, during the Cold War, the effect of increasing Left government ideology is difficult to assess based on the results here, but after 1990 it is clear that regardless of the ideological make-up of the government, both left and right governments became increasingly amenable to CBI.

While the effect of a one unit increase in the control variables for debt spending, interest rates, unemployment and election years, holding all other variables constant, resulted in some effects on CBI, these effects were not significant. The spending relationship expected here cannot be definitively demonstrated. This may be because a difference between left and right governments’ spending is not discernible. That is, left and right governments spend equally. The lack of significant results suggests that
such a relationship should be further examined. The measure of election year politics, particularly
tailoring policy or a boost in fiscal stimuli or other benefits to the voters, which are often peculiar to
election years (Hibbs, 1977, 1992), was not significant. Additionally, events and circumstances, which
might be turned to an advantage and electoral success, such as the Iraq crisis for the US or the European
floods in 2002 should be captured in such a variable. The relatively low probability of significance makes
ascertaining its substantive importance difficult and these hypotheses are not supported. 27

5. CONCLUSION

This paper has been an attempt to show the paradoxical relationship between partisan ideology and
corresponding support for central bank independence. These results help to explain the paradoxical
relationship between the left-partisan ideology and corresponding support for “good” or liberal monetary
practices. Although Democratic theory would suggest both left and right partisan governments should
reject an independent central bank, they both acquiesce for economic and electoral benefits.

Why do partisan politicians allow an unelected institution to assume an important tool for the
implementation of such policies as economic growth and employment? While the right is acquiescent to
CBI because it institutionalizes its preferred economic policies, these findings support the contention that
there are three primary reasons why the left has rejected traditional leftist macroeconomic policy in favor
of CBI. First, a CBI acquiescent policy gains acceptance of the financial markets and, therefore,
credibility. Second, market credibility helps achieve electability. Third, a successful macroeconomic
policy better allows governments that want to implement expensive redistributive social policy and
achieve maximum employment to make good on electoral promises. A successful macroeconomic policy
is one that pays the bills and this is one criterion where traditional leftist economic policy has repeatedly
failed. Because of inferior performance, most left-leaning parties have adopted what Simmons called
“international rules of good monetary conduct.”

These data and results moreover show support for the partisan convergence hypothesis. Oatley (1999b)
recognized that it was too early to make judgments about partisan assumptions and relationships which
were in place for decades. He therefore attributed the initial results, which suggested a partisan
convergence, to the recession in the early 1990s, as well as EU integration pressures among several
OECD member states. This study was an attempt to clarify these uncertainties with the advantage of time
and more complete data. These results provide convincing empirical support to suggest that, at the very
least, the traditional relationships studied have been disrupted for a significant period and that this is
attributable to a partisan convergence from left to right with regard to monetary policy.

This study also has policy implications. Critics who claim that the US is moving toward a social
democratic model at a time when the social democracies of Europe are continuing to move toward fiscal
conservatism may be heartened by these results. 28 If these critiques are correct US policy makers can
expect to be “induced” to return to the status quo by the corresponding “penalty” of reduced economic
activity, as Lindblom (1982) expected. Lindblom however, was highly critical of this “market as prison”
or what later scholars more favorably referred to as the “institutionalization” of good economic
behavior.0 29 What happens when words become deeds and rhetoric designed to please constituents, in fact
defines policy makers’ preferences, preferences which are impervious to market inducements? The
dynamics outlined in this analysis may be an effect of the ending of the Cold War. Newly-freed Eastern
European governments, rejecting the command economy forced upon them for so long, may have aspired
to adopt all the attributes of western democracy, including CBI. It remains to be seen if these results have
relevance to recent governments’ behavior or the current US attempts to grapple with existing economic
crises. The relatively short temporal period and the pooled data may blur country specific idiosyncrasies.
As these data do not cover up to the present period, new and better data collections efforts and
comprehensive process-tracing case studies must therefore, be launched. Further analyses will be needed
to assess if these findings are an established trend or an anomaly to long established partisan patterns.
REFERENCES


International Organization 45, 539–64.
American Journal of Political Science 41, 165–84.


### Table 1: The Effect of Government Partisanship on CBI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>CBI Coefficient (Standard Errors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Government Partisanship</td>
<td>.0014 (.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1990</td>
<td>.089*** (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt.* Post-1990</td>
<td>.0006** (.0003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Spending</td>
<td>-.47 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-.006 (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.02 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td>.025 (.03)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression using robust standard errors.+

N = 36
R-squared = 0.6589
Prob > F = 0.0000

***P-value = 0.01
**P-value = 0.05
*P-value = 0.10

+ Durbin-Watson statistic (original) 0.906475
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.725360

### Table 2: Summary of Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis and Independent Variable</th>
<th>Expected Effect on CBI</th>
<th>Finding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Partisanship</td>
<td>Negative/ No Effect</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Post-Cold War</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive - Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Partisanship*Post-1990 period</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive - Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Spending</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Inflation</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Unemployment</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Election Year</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX: GOVERNMENT PARTISANSHIP MEASURE

The measure is created by compiling data on each political party manifesto (Manifesto Research Group hereafter MRG) data for each country in the analysis. Content analysis is used to determine the left-right mapping of party documents for each election for the countries in question. This is accomplished through a rigorous comparison of traditional content analysis as well as computer-assisted content analysis of the manifestos for agreement on the specific units of analysis (Budge et al., 2001, p. 90). By counting specific phrases within sentences they compile a number for and against an ideological left or right position comprising a percentage of the total. They are subtracted from each other to create the value (Ideology = (% IDLeft - % IDRight) – 100%). The government measure is comprised of the ideology measure for the government members of each ruling party as a weighted proportion of the actual government cabinet posts for each particular party IDParty = (IDLeft – IDRight) / (IDLeft – IDRight) thereby creating a ratio measure instead of the subtractive method of the MRG/CMP (Kim and Fording, 2002, p. 191, Budge et al, 2001, p. 169).

ENDNOTES

1 The 2008 monetary crisis notwithstanding, there is a strong correlation between central bank independence and lower levels of inflation (Alesina and Summers, 1993).
2 Article II of the Federal Reserve Act (1913) gives the CB powers over monetary as well as employment policy.
5 And to some degree employment policy as the Federal Reserve System in the US is unique among central banks with its full employment mandate. Also, admittedly most criticism is on the fringes of partisan divide, examples include Representatives Ron Paul’s (2009) End the Fed and Dennis Kucinich http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-r_-QRKy66g; http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2864340017700873183. The H.R.1207 - Federal Reserve Transparency Act introduced by Congressman Ron Paul on February 26, 2009, which would have given Congress’ General Accounting Office the right to audit the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy was altered to such an extent that Paul voted against it.
6 Time named Ben Bernanke “Man of the Year for 2009.” See also H.R.1207 – of 2011 has been put forth by Rep. Barney Frank, would concentrate power in Washington by stripping the twelve regional Fed board members from interest rate setting votes. As of this writing the bill has failed to attract a co-sponsor.
7 Ben Bernanke gives a succinct account of the rationale for modern central bank independence in his remarks to the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, May 25, 2010.
8 See footnotes 4 and 5, which suggest this is indeed the case.
9 Such as the 1977 IMF Articles of Agreement VII, which bound members to IMF exchange rate rules (Simmons, 2000).
10 For the purposes of my argument, I use the term liberal in the classical liberal economic sense. This would include Smith-Ricardian liberalism through to Milton Friedman and the Neoliberal-Washington consensus.
There is a wealth of scholarship on this topic. Please see Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985), Grille, Masciandaro & Tabellini (1991) and Franzese (1999) for some excellent examples.

Recent electoral success of left parties in Latin America has shown that, and Venezuela’s Chavez’s attempts at controlling the central bank notwithstanding, CBI has remained remarkably resilient. Also, CBI, once granted, is enormously difficult to rescind. Structural impediments may therefore render preferences of subsequent governments irrelevant. See also Evans-Pritchard (2011).

Despite what some critics of Barack Obama view as a move to the left. See Miller (2009).

The Social Democratic Party at the Bad Goedoberg Conference, November 15, 1959, formally rejected Marxist economic analysis, policy and dogma.

See Goebel (2011).

Despite sovereign debt concerns.

See footnotes 4 and 5.

For purposes of parsimony, this characterization of signaling is admittedly a bit simplistic. Sometimes, state mandated increasing wages and other “irresponsible” policies can reassure markets by fostering social peace and employer-worker agreements. Signaling, either to constituents or markets, in other words, has real effects, some of which can be beneficial—it doesn’t just “distort” “responsible” economic policies. Further, the very notion of CBI is a politically generated concept—“liberal” does not mean policy “neutral.”


Despite sovereign debt concerns.

See footnotes 4 and 5.

For purposes of parsimony, this characterization of signaling is admittedly a bit simplistic. Sometimes, state mandated increasing wages and other “irresponsible” policies can reassure markets by fostering social peace and employer-worker agreements. Signaling, either to constituents or markets, in other words, has real effects, some of which can be beneficial—it doesn’t just “distort” “responsible” economic policies. Further, the very notion of CBI is a politically generated concept—“liberal” does not mean policy “neutral.”

The twenty-one countries included in the data set (Franzese, 2002a) are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.A. All partisanship data included in the data set for these countries are listed in Budge et al. (2001).

See Appendix for details on the variable calculation.

Regression models which compensate for potential serial correlation with lagged variables were also tested; however the lagged variables are not significant at the 95% level, so I believe there is no serial correlation problem in the models.

Models based on first differences (AR1) rather than lagged dependent variables have certain advantages for small N time series and in this analysis generally produced substantively identical results as the OLS model. Prais-Winsten fits a linear regression of dependent variable on independent variables that is corrected for first-order serially-correlated residuals using the Prais-Winsten (1954) transformed regression estimator, the Cochrane-Orcutt (1949) transformed regression estimator, or a version of the search method suggested by Hildreth-Lu (1960), using multiple iterations, according to Stata 8.

The tests indicate no such problems with the models.

See Table 1.

The marginal effects of the variables in a multiplicative interaction models must be properly highlighted in order for a substantive interpretation of the regression results to be meaningful (Friedrich, 1982; Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2005: 11). The correct marginal effect of the primary explanatory variable is calculated as: \( \beta_1 + \beta_3 * Z \) (\( \beta_1 + \beta_3 * CWt \) in my case). This means that the coefficient of my Partisanship variable is not substantively important in and of itself but only when it is viewed in the context of the conditionality imposed upon it by the other constitutive variable. It is the coefficient of Partisanship plus the coefficient of Partisanship*ColdWar which is substantively interesting.


See footnote 12.

See footnote 10.
THE POOR LAWS: A COMPARISON OF THREE ORIGINAL REFORM PROPOSALS

RACHEL WILSON
WITTENBERG UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
Attitudes towards the problem of the poor and the Poor Laws in England are examined with a reading of three original pamphlets written from the 1700s to the 1900s. Each pamphlet proposes a sincere solution to poverty. While all three of these reformers had great regard for the impoverished and agreed on the need to overhaul the Poor Laws, each had policy preferences. The first two reformers were ultimately trying to coerce the behavior of the able-bodied poor through individual responsibility and industry. The final reformer focused on the prevention of poverty with redistribution of wealth as a major vehicle to this end. Almost three hundred years after the first pamphlet was written, policy makers and advocates of the poor are still debating how to solve the problem of poverty.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

“You will always have the poor among you.” —John 12:8

Prior to the start of mercantilism, most of Great Britain lived under feudalism. This agrarian economic system was based on regional self-containment and overseen by the paternalistic Lords. Traditionally it was the Lord’s obligation to take care of his fief, including his serfs; however, there was considerable variation from Lord to Lord. Despite the occasional fraternities that promised modest aid to participants suffering a calamity, the feudal system kept the majority of the people living at subsistence level with scant, local charity when calamity or illness struck (Richardson, 2005).

Feudalism began to wane during the seventeenth century as Great Britain evolved into an urban, mercantilist economy. Mercantilism shifted the focus from regional agricultural production to intense market production with an emphasis on national output. Consequently, the central government took on a larger role in establishing economic security, which manifested itself in an obsession with a positive foreign trade balance (Mencher, 1967). This fixation stemmed from the mercantilist conviction that international trade was zero-sum. To stay competitive, mercantilists believed in keeping wages low not only to support low export prices but also to dampen domestic consumption leaving more goods to export. Like feudalism, this new mercantilist system kept the majority of the people at a subsistence level.

The evolution from subsistence agriculture to greater market production did not eliminate the poor but merely replaced the medieval serf with a new type of poor, known as the laboring poor. The laboring poor were often divided into three subgroups. Many referred to the first class of poor as the impotent poor, which suffered from chronic illness or old age and needed broad outside care. The second group was the able-bodied poor who were impoverished from unemployment and needed temporary relief. Finally, there were the vagrants or beggars who were perceived as capable of working but refusing to do so. Members of the “undeserving poor” were occasionally sent to houses of correction for punishment (Higginbotham, 2011).

The state of the laboring poor worsened in the increasingly national and disconnected economy. A minor illness or tragedy could ruin a family dependent on a wage earner living paycheck to paycheck. This rising pressure prompted the central government to pass the Poor Law Act of 1601, which compelled local governments to collect a property tax to pay for the provision and care of local poor. Unlike modern property taxes, this property tax was largely paid by the tenant and not the owner of the property (Higginbotham, 2011). Contemporary literature refers to this tax as the “poor rate.”

The Poor Law Act of 1601 represented a marked departure from individual charity to a centralized aid system based on taxation and redistribution (Cowherd, 1960). Over the next three and a half centuries the taxes and expenditures on the Poor Laws surged, causing a series of amendments collectively referred to as the Poor Laws. Many scholars divide the Poor Laws into two subsets: the “old” that originated with the 1601 Act and the “new” that began with the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (Boyer, 2010).

In general, the old Poor Laws permitted greater local control and decision making in their application. Each parish overseer could choose a combination of “outdoor relief,” i.e. food and wage subsidies, and “indoor relief,” i.e. parish poor houses (Persky, 1997). In an overall effort to manage the poor’s whereabouts, the law established vagrancy laws with prison sentences and even the possibility of death for “sturdy vagabonds” (Persky, 1997).

Variations between parish relief programs caused a concentration of the impoverished in more generous parishes. An unofficial open and closed parish system developed. In a closed parish, one or two affluent leaders would prevent settlement of the laboring poor in order to avoid the responsibility of aid. Closed parishes could then selectively use the poor from neighboring parishes for necessary labor (Song, 2002). Consequently, legislation such as the Settlement Act of 1662 attempted to tie relief to residents confirmed through birth, marriage or long-term work in an effort to prevent the disparity created by closed parishes.
Those found in the wrong parish could be forcibly removed (Bloy, 2006). Of course, measures such as these contributed to serious labor mobility problems.

In 1722, *Knatchbull’s Act* (aka, The Workhouse Test Act) was passed to establish both public and private workhouses to employ the poor. In an effort to discourage free riding, the act sought to make the workhouse exceedingly unattractive, while simultaneously legislating the ability to deny any assistance to those unwilling to enter a workhouse (Cowherd, 1960). To comply with the act, many smaller parishes consolidated and others used private subcontractors. However, the workhouses proved to be severely inefficient for many reasons, not the least of which was the legal requirement that workhouses take the impotent and children along with the able-bodied poor (Cowherd, 1960).

By the early 1800s, mercantilism was being supplanted by a laissez-faire philosophy that proclaimed a new attitude towards the poor. The system described above was at the time aiding 11 percent of the population (Persky, 1997). However, popular opinion highlighted its ineffectiveness with increasing cost and still rising pauperism (Edsall, 1971). Popular opinion increasingly rejected the mercantilist view that many of the poor were victims of circumstances and instead embraced the laissez-faire belief that the majority of the poor should be accountable for their actions. As such, state aid only discouraged work. The mainstream no longer saw their Christian duty as relieving the poor through charity. Rather, they felt obligated to foster responsibility and industry through sharp reform of the “generous” system. As a result a Royal Commission was initiated in 1832 to investigate and put forth recommendations for reform (Boyer, 2010).

To characterize the Royal Commission of 1832 as biased is an understatement. The commission’s unstated purpose was to prove that the current system did not incentivize the poor to better themselves. Their report repeatedly used words like “idleness” and “profligacy,” highlighting their contempt for the undeserving poor (Edsall, 1971). The commission quickly reported that the current *Poor Laws* encouraged laziness and fraud and promoted immorality when it gave aid to bastard children. One major recommendation of the commission was a time limit for relief, ostensibly in response to employers who took advantage of the system by keeping wages artificially low so that the laboring poor would remain eligible for relief (de Pennington, 2011). The commission also strongly recommended more centralized administration and even less desirable conditions in workhouses. In short, the commission proposed strengthening the tie of relief for able-bodied men to employment in the deplorable workhouses (Edsall, 1971).

While the commission’s recommendations were not adopted in entirety, they did help to shape the *Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834*. The most important aspects of this act were the creation of a more centralized system of aid, the grouping of parishes into Poor Law Unions, and the new restriction that relief would solely come from workhouses. The most contentious part was the “bastardy clause,” which freed fathers from an obligation to their illegitimate children, thus placing the whole responsibility on the mother. The intention of the clause was to discourage women from having children out of wedlock. However, the bastardy clause was met with public outrage and shortly overturned (Higginbotham, 2011).

In time, workhouses became even more deplorable and unhygienic. Over the next century, as the mainstream witnessed the cruel stigmatization of the poor and severe injustices done to them, the pendulum swung again towards improving the conditions of the poor. As a result, a new Royal Commission was initiated in 1905 (Higginbotham, 2011). The final report of this Royal Commission was not as cohesive as its predecessor a century earlier. In fact, it produced a majority report, as well as a minority report. While the majority report focused on amending the current system, the minority report called for a complete overhaul from poor relief to poverty prevention. The commission’s most lasting legacy was its influence on setting the stage for the coming welfare state in 1948 (Boyer, 2010).
II. SELECTION OF ORIGINAL PAMPHLETS

Attitudes towards the problem of the poor and the Poor Laws are examined using primary historical sources, specifically three original pamphlets written from the 1700s to the 1900s. These pamphlets are all a part of the library at the London School of Economics (LSE), which holds 90,000 original pamphlets “published and written by pressure groups, political parties, and individual campaigners” (“Pamphlet Collection”). While there is not room to examine every pamphlet written on the Poor Laws, these three pamphlets reflect the sentiment toward the poor from three different time periods by individuals who were compelled enough to move beyond reflective observation and offer a thorough plan.

The first pamphlet, by the famous author Daniel Defoe, is the oldest pamphlets of the trio. It was written in 1713, which is approximately halfway between the birth of the old Poor Laws in 1601 and the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 that signaled the new Poor Law era. Thus, it was written after enough time for the repercussions of the old Poor Laws to be felt and thoroughly inspire an alternative plan. The second pamphlet, by Professor Robert J. Morrison, was written in 1842, ostensibly in response to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. Driven by strong religious conviction, Morrison believed he could offer a more utopian workhouse. The final pamphlet, by Beatrice Webb, was written in 1912, which is almost two hundred years after Defoe’s. Its timing is also approximately half way between the start of the new Poor Law era and its replacement, known as the Welfare State. Written by one of the founders of the prestigious London School of Economics, this piece significantly moves from the Poor Law’s strategy of containment to a comprehensive welfare plan.

III. REVIEW OF ORIGINAL PAMPHLETS

A. "PROPOSALS FOR IMPLOYING THE POOR IN AND ABOUT THE CITY OF LONDON WITHOUT ANY CHARGE TO THE PUBLICK" BY DANIEL DEFOE, PUBLISHED IN 1713

Daniel Defoe was an English writer at the turn of the eighteenth century most famous for his novel, Robinson Crusoe. He also founded one of the first economic and political journals, Review of the Affairs of France and of All Europe. Defoe moved beyond mere political and economic commentary on the problem of the poor and devised a plan to solve the problem in his pamphlet entitled "Proposals for imploying the poor in and about the city of London without any charge to the publick."

Defoe’s pamphlet was written a little more than a century after the initial Poor Law Act of 1601. He begins his pamphlet by reviewing established fact: the poor fill our streets begging and their numbers increase daily. While he believes it is Christian duty to take care of proper objects of charity like the sick and old, it is his contention that the rest of the poor have become a public grievance. He observes that they willingly tell lies about misfortune and feign illness to receive relief. He even argues that many have plenty at home, yet still seek aid, which confirms their lack of fear of God.

Defoe declares that such “injudicious management and indulgence” is costing the nation more and more. He cites as evidence the growth of the annual cost of the poor from £30,000 to £100,000. He argues that such an expense is just a temporary fix and does nothing to alleviate the long-term circumstances of the poor. He questions if it would be smarter to spend this large sum on materials and tools to “set the poor to work.” His conclusion reflects a very mercantilist attitude: set the poor to work and then use Britain’s large shipping industry to sell the fruits of the poor abroad.

Before Defoe meticulously details his proposal, he addresses a few potential objections. First, Defoe recognizes that those currently in trade jobs may be concerned with increased competition for their jobs if the poor are set to work. His solution is to choose an industry presently neglected: fishery manufacturing. According to Defoe, choosing this industry will also help the United Kingdom to compete with the Dutch who dominate fishing.
Next Defoe deals with the objection he fears most likely to hinder his proposal. Defoe realizes that without the help of the gentry his proposal will never be considered. He acknowledges that the gentry and farmers may be concerned with his plan reducing the price of labor and consequently, rents from land. To overcome such an obstacle, Defoe cleverly reasons that the new income of the poor will essentially increase demand for all goods thus raising prices and profits, including land.

Finally, Defoe addresses the objection that workhouses already exist, thus making his proposal redundant. He pacifies this objection by focusing on his plan’s future public return and eventual elimination of the poor rate. He reminds the reader that the workhouses cost more and more each year.

With potential opposition effectively dealt with, Defoe begins laying out his comprehensive proposal. He refers to his vision as a “college,” presumably because of its resemblance to a college campus. Defoe proposes to have his prototype built on the Thames River with the capability of housing 2,000 poor. He specifies that it should contain gardens, shops (bakers, butchers, brewers, etc.), a hospital, a chapel, magistrate/steward corridors, schools, and ten wards, each bearing the name of a benefactor. He calls on Parliament to appoint professionals for the college, such as stewards and physicians.

Defoe meticulously itemizes the provision of food and the raw materials necessary for manufacturing fishing-related items such as ropes and sails. He details the role of the stewards in assigning the residents tasks according to their ability and the importance of uniforms to distinguish between the jobs. Each resident will be required to take an oath to follow the rules and submit to the internal justice system headed by Parliamentary appointees. Defoe even prescribes punishments such as whipping for a second begging offense. Defoe stresses that the profits should be kept at a bank where they will be audited quarterly to prevent fraud.

Defoe skillfully recognizes the need to honor the benefactors and the Queen and proposes a yearly fish dinner for their honor. A statue of Queen Anne will grace the college entrance and the college itself will be named “Queen Anne’s College of Industry.” In fact, the whole proposal will add to her honor in that “so many thousands of her poor subjects shall be perpetually provided for and rescued from ignorance, idleness and beggary.”

Defoe calculates that his proposal will need an initial sum of £30,000 and henceforth be self-sustaining. He assumes that the queen could easily appoint some wealthy people to raise the money to free the kingdom from the burden of the poor. Since the British are already collecting money for French and Irish refugees, logically they will contribute money for their own people. Defoe concludes with the certainty of God’s blessing on such a proposal.

Defoe’s proposal demonstrates genuine concern for the problem of the poor while holding contemporaneous attitudes about the difference between deserving poor and undeserving poor. His pamphlet is written less than two decades after the onset of the workhouses. One can assume his firsthand observation of the current system, which provides mere subsistence and results in a perpetual state of poverty, gave rise to his pragmatic plan to change the poor’s circumstances. Defoe’s plan does embrace progressive tools such as trade and demonstrates keen foresight to respond to objections beforehand. It is riddled with simplistic assumptions. For example, he fails to fully address how the poor will be incentivized to work. According to Defoe, the poor, with their simple minds, will happily go along with his well-reasoned plan. Similarly, he never addresses the innate reasons as to why Great Britain has a neglected fishing industry. Of course, this oversight reflects the mercantilist lack of understanding of comparative advantages. Overall, his attitude is paternalistic toward the poor and borders on patronizing.

B. “PROPOSALS TO ABOLISH ALL POOR-LAWS EXCEPT FOR THE OLD AND INFIRM; AND TO ESTABLISH ASYLUM FARMS ON WHICH TO LOCATE THE DESTITUTE ABLE-BODIED POOR; WHO MIGHT THEREON MAINTAIN THEMSELVES AND BENEFIT THE COUNTRY £18,600,000 ANNUALLY.” BY ROBERT J. MORRISON ESQ. IN 1842.
Robert J. Morrison was a lecturer on agricultural education at Kent Agricultural College at the time of the pamphlet’s publication. According to original letters he wrote that are documented in the *William and Mary Quarterly*, he went on to become a professor of history and political science at William and Mary College (Morrison, 1921). “Pamphlets like [this] were written in [response to] the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act by which poor relief to the able-bodied was given only in the workhouse” (Humphries, 2005). Morrison’s was one of many pamphlets written with religious determination to find a more humane alternative to the workhouses. In fact, Morrison opens his pamphlet with deep sorrow that a Christian nation, commissioned by Jesus to preach good news to the poor, has poor in a worse condition than ever before.

Like his predecessor Defoe from a century past, Morrison offers a “common sense” proposal to make producers out of the idle. In his assessment, his proposal will provide the nation with a “swarm of honey bees” that will lead to increasing tax revenue through their new income and a cessation of the poor rates. Morrison further resembles Defoe in his idealistic plan to rescue the poor “from demi-starvation, to be placed in the lap of plenty” through setting the poor to work rather than merely providing them with daily relief.

One noteworthy distinction of Morrison’s proposal from Defoe’s is his focus on the motivation of his plan. Instead of opening up his pamphlet by answering potential objections, Morrison spends the first seven pages laying a scriptural basis for abolishing laws that oppress the poor. In Morrison’s opinion, the United Kingdom is waver ing on daring God to punish them for their lack of love and kindness towards the poor. He details many Psalms and Proverbs where God expresses his regards for the poor. For example, Morrison documents how in Isaiah God promises to reward those who show kindness to the poor, how Ezekiel attributes the neglect of the poor as a reason for Sodom’s destruction, and how Daniel compares righteousness to showing mercy to the poor. He finishes his examination of the Old Testament with many examples from the minor prophets where God declares He is more interested in His people helping the poor than in traditions such as fasting.

Morrison also documents the New Testament’s attitude towards the poor starting with the Gospels. He begins by recounting Jesus’ words to the rich young man to sell all he had and give it to the poor in order to be perfect. He also notes that Jesus declared salvation for Zacheus once Zacheus gave half of his possessions to the poor. In Morrison’s opinion, giving to the poor was more important to Jesus than any ceremony or tradition. As a result, it is very difficult for Morrison to comprehend how a Christian nation could legally criminalize begging. It is quite clear to Morrison that if Jesus openly condemned those disciples who rebuked the beggars, He must be unhappy with Britain.

Morrison ends his motivational section with a review of the Epistles. Again, he finds that they are filled with the same charge to Christians of giving to the poor. He points out that the book of John radically declares that God’s love cannot be in a person if he does not help his brother in need. He reminds his reader that James defines pure religion as visiting the fatherless and widows in their affliction. Morrison concludes his rousing demi-sermon by declaring that Christian duty to the poor should flow from the spirit of the Golden Rule.

Morrison then begins the core of his proposal, which hinges on establishing a farming commune. Given his current occupation as a lecturer on agriculture, it is not surprising that Morrison’s plan rested on farming. His proposal showcases the calculating expertise that he possesses in the field of agriculture.

Like Defoe, Morrison naively saw the solution of the poor as a mere application of mathematics and accounting. He begins his meticulous detailed proposal by calculating that if there are 1.2 million poor then it will take 6,000 farms of 200 people per farm (families of five) to render the poor independent. He even breaks down the amount of farms per county in England. In Morrison’s estimation, 200 people per farm is enough to be profitable and small enough to find the necessary acreage.
Morrison estimates the amount of acreage necessary to execute his scheme by starting with the weekly and annual amounts of food required to feed the farmers. To do so, he estimates that each farm will house forty persons in each of five groups: able-bodied men, able-bodied women, boys from nine to twenty years old, girls from nine to twenty years old, and children under nine. Then he estimates the amount necessary to feed individuals in each category. In calculating the food amounts, he assumes the poor will mainly have a vegetarian diet, as that is what they are accustomed too. He generously includes one pint of good beer a day per man and a half of a pint for each woman. After tedious discussion, Morrison settles on a farm of 162 acres, which includes acres for grazing animals. Worried that some may fear his calculations could fall short of providing for 200 people, he quotes the Farmer’s Calendar that shows an average acre produces even more than he estimates.

Morrison includes a careful discourse on the importance of manure in a successful farm. Since manure is often one of the largest expenses, he requires the farm to have the minimal amount of animals necessary to generate enough manure. He laboriously details other expenses such as replacement of worn tools and clothes, as well as flax and hemp for the women to work in winter.

Morrison believes ongoing expenses can easily be covered with the profit that the farms will generate from selling their excess produce. After estimating the expected price for the produce and goods, he confidently predicts an £800 yearly profit per farm. Of course, ten percent will go to the patron of the farm and five percent to the matron. The rest will be divided among the residents with approximately two-thirds going to the adults and a third to the young adults. To encourage industry he will hold back a portion for anyone showing extra talent. He believes that the average family should get £12 a year, while a very talented family may receive double!

Not wanting to leave any factor to chance, Morrison details his expectations for matching skills properly to work. He expects about half of the men and boys to be inclined to farm work and itemizes how many should be needed for subcategories like plowing and spreading manure. The other half will be inclined to what he refers to as mechanics such as tailoring and carpentry. Similarly, the females will be divided into “outwork” such as making milk and butter and tending to poultry and “house work” such as sewing and cooking. Morrison concludes the details of his proposal with specific dimensions for all buildings from houses to sheds and with daily schedules staggered to accommodate all.

After minutely detailing his plan, Morrison incredibly acknowledges the need for flexibility, specifically in keeping workers motivated. In order to keep the work from becoming monotonous, jobs should be altered within reason. Furthermore, residents are to be treated as free and independent and compulsion avoided at all cost. He believes that the workers will just need constant reminding “all are equally interested in the increase of the farm.”

Morrison closes his pamphlet noting that the wretchedness of current alternatives will be enough advertisement for his proposal. However to insure its appeal, he restates its ability to increase the national revenue and cease the poor rates.

Morrison’s pamphlet is written less than a decade after the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. The pamphlet was a backlash against the new Poor Laws that departed from the old law’s focus on Christian charity and instead stigmatized the poor for their laziness and punished idleness by making relief minimal. Many were outraged at the injustices done to the poor. Morrison’s pamphlet is a prime example of such righteous anger and appeal to the Christian consciousness.

While Defoe’s plan seeks to capitalize on a neglected industry, Morrison relies on traditional farming trade. It seems that Morrison’s proposal is not much different from the conventional operation of peasant farms for hundreds of years. While he gives Christian motivation for establishing the farms, he assumes that the only thing hindering the success of the poor is start-up capital. His plan is even more static than Defoe’s, hinging on very particular and capricious details such as weather and internal motivation.
C. “COMPLETE NATIONAL PROVISION FOR SICKNESS: HOW TO AMEND THE INSURANCE ACT” WRITTEN BY BEATRICE WEBB IN 1912

Beatrice Webb was a British reformer around the turn of the twentieth century. She and her husband Sidney, both leaders of the collectivist Fabian society, are credited as the founders of the prestigious London School of Economics. During the 1920s, the Webbs coauthored a three-volume piece, English Poor Law History, a classical work on the matter albeit occasionally tainted with accusations of a hidden agenda in its historical research (Kidd, 1987). Beatrice was one of the key writers of the controversial Minority Report written for the 1905 Commission on the Poor Laws.

As a Fabian who valued cooperative action over individual free-market activity, Beatrice boldly advocated her viewpoint in numerous pamphlets. Webb seems to have written “Complete National Provision for Sickness: How to Amend the Insurance Act” for the National Committee for the Prevention of Destitution in an effort to further promote the Minority Report’s recommendations. According to her opening, the Minority Report’s primary recommendation was to repeal the Poor Law’s authority over several classes of poor and redefine laws specific to each class. For example, she believed poor children should be reassigned to the local education authority and the sick and disabled to the local health authority.

However, examination of the pamphlet reveals the main focus to be an amendment to the Insurance Act. According to Webb, wage earners living paycheck to paycheck live in constant threat of sickness or injury. A serious illness could easily result in prolonged unemployment and ruin a whole family, no matter how thrifty the family. Webb believes that the recently passed Insurance Act does nothing to correct this credible state of terror.

Webb begins her main argument by juxtaposing the healthcare of the wealthy and the poor. The wealthy and middle classes no longer believe sickness comes from acts of God but rather biological and environmental phenomena with random and assignable origins. Thus, they have been able to make substantial strides in sickness prevention via improved drainage, antiseptics and technological advancements in treatments and surgery. Webb contests that in many arenas the upper classes have practically eradicated diseases.

It is Webb’s contention that the poor have a much different state of health. She argues that the poor are living in such ill health that they are in no better condition than that of the Middle Ages. It is here that Webb’s prescription departs significantly from the two pamphlets previously reviewed. Whereas Defoe and Morrison both relied heavily on private donations and charity to help the poor work their way out of poverty, Webb believes it is chiefly the government’s responsibility to take action and elevate the poor, essentially through redistribution of income.

To reinforce her argument, Webb reviews the system created by the Insurance Act’s system. The act compels

> “every working-man to pay four pence a week out of his wages, and promise that the Society which he joins shall provide him with ten shillings a week sick pay when he is ill, besides a doctor of his own choice, thirty shillings for his wife’s lying-in, admission to a sanatorium if he becomes consumptive and most valuable of all, if the funds hold out so that the promise can be fulfilled a pension of five shillings a week, after two years’ payments, on breakdown at any age.”

In Webb’s opinion, this system falls short in helping the poor in a number of ways. First, Webb takes issue with capitalists being allowed to administer the system for a profit. Specifically, if the contributors lapse in payment the policy is canceled and the previous payments become “pure profits.” Webb applauds historical cooperatives known as Friendly Societies for showing such care and concern from their member-managers, while disparaging the current capitalist insurance companies for being managed by a
small number of profit-seeking wealthy investors with no regard for the poor’s circumstances. She labels
the current system a “financial octopus,” claiming that it destroys the laboring man’s Friendly Societies
and Trade unions. Webb insists that the government should amend the system to only allow non-profit
organizations to administer the plans and transfer all current memberships to local Friendly Societies or
establish new ones. However, she never addresses how the Friendly Societies should make assessments
for insurability, nor does she tackle the larger political and economic problems the contemporaneous
Friendly Societies were battling (Broten, 2010).

Webb’s next objection concerns those who are too ignorant to understand why money is even being taken
out of their pay and thus fail to join any group. She concludes that although these poor contribute, they
are not insured and thus the government should immediately deem them enrolled. In fact, she contends
that no one earning below the poverty level should pay anything for coverage. Again, she does not detail
how their premiums will be financed.

Similarly, she believes the casual worker should receive automatic free coverage. She argues that casual
workers are harmed as the current system forces the employer to pay the weekly employer’s share of
insurance coverage on the first day of the week even if the casual worker intends to work less than a
week. As a result, employers are reluctant to hire casual workers unless the latter pay both the employer’s
and employee’s share.

Next Webb objects to the lack of a government guarantee of payments. Webb rhetorically wonders how
the government can compel workers to pay for coverage that is not guaranteed. To Webb, this fringes on
fraud and dishonesty.

Ironically after painstakingly listing those who should not have to pay, she criticizes the inability of the
system to be fully funded. She believes that since no medical exams are conducted of the insured, the
system fails to calculate the needed payments in an actuarially sound manner. Unlike Defoe and
Morrison, she does not give detailed plans for how to accomplish her recommendations.

Webb further criticizes the system for its elevation of tuberculosis and neglect of all other illnesses. For
example, the system only covers dependents if they have tuberculosis. She contends that a dependent’s
health is just as important as the employee’s and thus should be fully covered. Similarly, the plan only
allows the insured to enter a county sanatorium for tuberculosis. Webb advocates coverage of all serious
illness, arguing that proper care and rest will advance a healthy workforce. She also demands that the
government compel schools to establish clinics for children.

Webb’s final critique demonstrates that her proposals will make Poor Law doctors obsolete. She contends
that these doctors’ services are untimely and practically pointless, as the law shamefully requires the poor
to prove that they are sufficiently ill and destitute to receive care. Webb calls for Parliament to form a
unified medical committee, which would appoint both a national minister of health and local county
officials to run county clinics. She uses this final demand as an opportunity to call for a complete
abolition of Poor Laws now!

In closing, Webb casually mentions the financing of her proposals. She believes the majority will come
from abolishing the Poor Laws and optimistically expects to save money from reducing the occurrence of
illnesses. Of course, any additional needs would come from the national government’s annual surplus.

IV. CONCLUSION

While all three of these reformers had great concern for the impoverished and agreed on the need to
overhaul the Poor Laws, each had distinct policy preferences. Defoe and Morrison were ultimately trying
to coerce the behavior of the able-bodied poor through individual responsibility and industry. They both
wanted to set the able-bodied poor to work but fail to prescribe a remedy for dealing with the sick and
elderly poor. Ironically, at times their positions were similar to the communist assertion that economic
growth is merely an application of simple arithmetic and accounting.
Webb focused on the prevention of poverty with redistribution of wealth as a major vehicle to this end. She passes no judgment on the able-bodied poor but instead centered her attention on how the government can and should aid the sick and elderly poor. Unlike Defoe and Morrison, who sought to remove the Poor Laws and essentially the poor class by making the poor productive, Webb sought a system to supplement the able-bodied poor and thus by default acknowledges the inevitability of the poor class. While Defoe and Morrison embraced traditional modes of private charity, Webb supported a greater role of government responsibility in providing for its citizens.

These pamphlets scratch the surface of the literature written on the problem of the Poor Laws. Writings concerning the Poor Laws were not left to nonfiction approaches alone. Famous authors like Charles Dickens used fiction to advocate the cause of the poor in many of his novels. Dickens’ feelings could not be more clearly seen than in the postscript of his novel Our Mutual Friend:

That my view of the Poor Law may not be mistaken or misrepresented, I will state it. I believe there has been in England, since the days of the STUARTS, no law so often infamously administered, no law so often openly violated, no law habitually so ill-supervised. In the majority of the shameful cases of disease and death from destitution, that shock the Public and disgrace the country, the illegality is quite equal to the inhumanity—and known language could say no more of their lawlessness.

Although the workhouses were abolished in 1920, the lingering responsibilities of the Poor Laws were not fully dissolved until 1948. Even today, Britain, along with many other nations, wrestles with the question of the poor. Indeed, there are several similarities between the pamphlets and recent political rhetoric in the United States.

The swinging pendulum of public opinion that characterized the legacy of the Poor Laws remains in recent times. Bill Clinton’s vow to end welfare as we know it, by imposing work requirements and placing lifetime limits on assistance was precipitated by a country disgusted with the “welfare queens” so famously demonized by Ronald Regan. California further mirrored the controversial “bastard clause” in 1997 by passing reform measures to stop increasing family benefits if a mother had another child while on welfare (Wood, 1997). Modern calls for drug testing of welfare recipients echo the public sentiment of concerns of dependency that ultimately lead to the new Poor Laws (Whitaker, 2012). Recent laws of residency requirements for welfare recipients in select states mimic the open and closed parish systems (Allard et. al., 2000). Conversely, Webb’s outcry for an expansion of the Poor Laws to include education and healthcare mirror the recent actions of the Obama administration. From the passage of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, to the more recent modifications by Obama’s Health and Human Services department relaxing Clinton’s work requirements, the national mood seems to suggest that temporary relief is indeed not enough (Good, 2012).

Both Defoe and Morrison found the Poor Laws insufficient to incentivize work. As a result, they each detailed work plans requiring government action targeted towards chronic unemployment. Their intentions parallel the public works programs of the last century. Most recently, The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 created over $100 billion in infrastructure work programs in an effort to stimulate the economy and increase employment (“Breakdown Of Funding By Category,” 2012). Controversial signs touting the act’s slogan, “Putting America Back to Work,” dotted the roadwork, reportedly costing between $5 and $20 million (Karl, 2010).

Another enduring theme is the question of private versus public charity and, specifically, religious involvement in both. In one matter or another, all three authors were motivated by an ethical and moral obligation. However, Morrison evokes a religious call more directly than the others with his numerous scriptural references. Today politicians on both sides of the aisle still quote Scripture to justify their positions on welfare. President George W. Bush put it into action when he established the Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives in 2001 in an effort to promote compassionate conservatism (“Fact
Sheet: Compassionate Conservatism,” 2002). This office attempted to merge the responsibility for the poor into a joint public and private endeavor by having the government subsidize religious charities. The office found support in both parties when President Barack Obama continued the initiative despite anger from his base (Mooney, 2009).

Almost three hundred years after the first pamphlet was written, policy makers and advocates of the poor are still debating how to solve the problem of the poor. It often seems to each generation that the current problems of the poor are unique to their time. History begs to differ. By juxtaposing three pamphlets from distinct historical periods and considering recent national policies, we can see what appears to be a timeless tension between national largesse towards the poor and fears of creating a dependent class.

REFERENCES


Morrison, R. J. (1842). Proposal to Abolish All Poor-Laws, Except for the Old and Infirm: and to Establish Asylum Farms, on which to Locate the Destructible Able-Bodied Poor; Who Might Thereon Maintain Themselves, and Benefit the county 18,600,00 Annually. London: Sherwood, Gilbert and Piper.


THE VALUE OF STATE POLITICAL SCIENCE ORGANIZATIONS

DARREN WHEELER
BALL STATE UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT

Fewer than half of the states in the United States have a state political science organization and of these even fewer can be said to have active, vibrant organizations. This article argues for a revitalization of the state-level political science organization, as these organizations can offer a variety of important research, service, and networking/socialization benefits to political scientists at all stages of their careers.
INTRODUCTION

Part of the professional socialization process for political scientists consists of membership in professional organizations. Professional organizations in the discipline are generally designed to promote the interests of their members, exchange ideas on teaching and research, and provide avenues to network with other political scientists (Gupta and Waismel-Manor, 2006; Cooper, 2008; Zorn, 2000). While professional political science organizations exist at the international, national, regional, state, and local levels, the focus of this article is the state-level political science organization. Fewer than half the states in the U.S. have such an organization and several large states such as California and Texas appear to have no state-level organization at all. This article argues for a revitalization of the state-level political science organization, as it offers a variety of important research, service, and networking/socialization benefits to political scientists (and students) of all stripes.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are numerous professional organizations that attract political scientists at the international, regional, state, and local levels. Some organizations are general in nature while others cater to specific audiences defined by location and/or subject matter. The American Political Science Association (APSA) is the discipline’s national professional society. With over 15,000 members from over 100 countries, it is the largest professional organization in the discipline.¹ Other organizations that boast large numbers of political scientists include the International Studies Association (ISA), with a membership of over 5,000² and the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), whose members number over 9,000.³ These organizations contain members who work in academia, government, non-profit, and international organizations. Also prominent among political science organizations are regional organizations, such as the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA).⁴ MPSA and other regional organizations, such as the Western Political Science Association (WPSA)⁵ and the Southern Political Science Association (SPSA),⁶ also sport large memberships, multi-day conferences, a professional journal, and reputations as valuable networking vehicles.⁷

The author was unable to locate any published scholarly papers, books, or articles dealing specifically (or even tangentially) with state political science organizations outside of a handful of articles with a general focus on the benefits of attending professional conferences (Cooper, 2008; Gupta and Waismel-Manor, 2006), information that could apply to state political science conferences, though they are not specifically mentioned by name. Gathering information on state political science organizations is not a simple task, primarily because there is no central place where such information exists. There is a listing of state organizations on APSA’s web site, but much of this data is missing, incomplete, or outdated.⁸ As a result, answering even the basic question of whether a state has a political science organization can be a murky one, since it is certainly possible for organizations to exist without a web presence. The information contained in this article is largely derived from the links found on APSA’s page, targeted Internet searches, and email correspondence with state organization officers. Most of the remaining observations are those of the author who has participated in a variety of capacities in state political science organizations in Florida, Georgia, Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.

The APSA web page lists twenty-four states as having state political science organizations (table 1). An additional web search revealed no additional state organizations. Many of the states listed as having state organizations on the APSA page have no more than a list of officers or a contact person. As a result, it can be difficult to ascertain whether the state organization is an active one. From the APSA list, Kansas and West Virginia were determined to have inactive organizations, leaving a total of twenty-two active state political science organizations.

Many states on the APSA list have web links to that state organization’s web page. The quality of state organization web pages and the amount of information provided on these pages also varies considerably. Some states such as Pennsylvania, Alabama, Oklahoma, and Ohio provide considerable information about
their organizations, including contact information, bylaws/constitutions, histories of their respective organizations, and journal/conference information. Other state organization web pages have not been updated in a considerable period of time, and some are just ‘dead links.’ Several large states, such as California and Texas, appear to have no statewide organization. Less than a quarter of the states that do have organizations can be found west of the Mississippi River (with Oklahoma being the westernmost (figure 1)).

Some of these state organizations have been around for a considerable period of time. The Ohio and New York organizations date back to the 1940s and the Pennsylvania Political Science Association claims the title of the oldest state political science organization with its founding in 1939. The Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, and West Virginia associations were established in the 1960s, and the Arkansas, Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Florida associations were established in the 1970s. Founding dates on the remaining state organizations are unavailable. No states have added organizations since the 1970s.

Membership data is almost completely unavailable online but membership numbers in state organizations generally run from as low as a few dozen to as high as a few hundred. Yearly membership dues for faculty range from twenty to one hundred dollars, with most between twenty to forty dollars. Student memberships generally range from five to forty dollars, with most falling in the ten to twenty dollar range. Many of these memberships, even at the lower end of the range, include journal subscriptions. Membership in state organizations is considerably cheaper than their regional and national counterparts. APSA membership dues for regular members fall on a sliding scale and range from $97–$316, based on one’s yearly salary. MPSA dues likewise range from $62–$117. The WPSA charges regular members a flat annual fee of $70 per year. Student rates for both APSA and MPSA are currently $45 per year while WPSA charges $40 (APSA 2013, MPSA 2013, WPSA 2013).

Another way in which state political science organizations are different from regional and national organizations is in terms of organizational goals. APSA lists the following as its core objectives:

- Promoting scholarly research and communication, domestically and internationally.
- Promoting high quality teaching and education about politics and government.
- Diversifying the profession and representing its diversity.
- Increasing academic and non-academic opportunities for members.
- Strengthening the professional environment for political science.
- Representing the professional interests of political scientists.
- Defending the legitimacy of scholarly research into politics and government.
- Recognizing outstanding work in the discipline.
- Encouraging the application of rigorous ethical and intellectual standards in the profession.
- Serving the public, including disseminating research and preparing citizens to be effective citizens and political participants (APSA 2013).

These objectives are certainly broad and most state organization objectives and goals reference at least some of them. For instance, the Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania organizations all specifically note that one of their primary objectives is to foster scholarly research in the discipline of political science. The Kentucky, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania organizations also articulate the goal of disseminating research to facilitate public discussion about citizenship, politics, and government.

However, some subtle differences can be found. Virginia, Pennsylvania, Alabama, and North Carolina all emphasize the state organization’s role in developing and maintaining communication and “collegial relations” among political scientists within the state and the surrounding region. The Virginia organization in particular emphasizes its networking role. Other organizations such as those in Kentucky and Minnesota also place an emphasis on the importance of a strong relationship between political scientists and policy makers/public officials. Some of these organizations place an emphasis on holding
an annual conference where research can be presented. Sponsoring a meeting or annual conference was particularly referenced by the Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, and Ohio organizations.

One common theme that receives less emphasis at the regional and national level, but that runs through the mission statements of many state organizations, is an explicit focus on fostering participation among graduate and undergraduate students. The Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, and Ohio organizations all emphasize this particular purpose. The Mississippi Political Science Association web site states, “While the association encourages participation by faculty and graduate students, it particularly emphasizes undergraduate participation.” Even a brief review of the mission statements of these state organizations compared to APSA would seem to indicate that some of these organizations pursue goals that receive less attention at the national level, particularized goals which in some instances may be more important to political scientists who reside in that specific state.

This short review of state political science organization characteristics raises a number of interesting questions. For instance, why have organizations developed in some states but not others? Are there general (or particular) organizational challenges faced in some states that are not present in others? Why are there almost no state political organizations west of the Mississippi? Why have there been no new state organizations since the 1970s? In short, future research in this area is writing on a largely blank slate. This article focuses on what state organizations have of value to political scientists.

**Research and the State Organization**

Many, if not most, political scientists are expected to engage in scholarly research as a condition of employment at their respective colleges and universities. While the old “publish or perish” mantra means different things to different types of colleges, the expectation that political scientists will do at least some publishing via peer-reviewed articles or scholarly books is widespread. The pressure to publish is especially great for junior-level faculty on the tenure track. At the same time, publishing expectations for graduate students have risen as well. It is common for job search committees to find newly minted PhDs with peer-reviewed publications on their vita. With this pressure to publish, state political science organizations can provide one outlet for the research efforts of political scientists at all stages of their careers.

**A. Conferences**

One stage of the research process involves presenting at professional conferences. Conferences can serve a number of important functions for individual political scientists. They provide opportunities to present research and discuss it with colleagues, allow individuals to catch up on the latest trends in the discipline, and they provide opportunities to network with other scholars in a particular subfield (Cooper, 2006; Zorn, 2000; Gupta & Waisel-Manor, 2006; Van Cott, 2005). Acceptance rate for conference papers at regional conferences is moderately high, while competition for a seat at APSA is stiffer with a rejection rate for papers that exceeds 50% (Sigelman, 2008). Moreover, participation at specialty conferences is often by invitation only—and that is often reserved to senior scholars who are well established in a particular subfield. One of the benefits of participating in a state political science conference is that it is easier to get one’s work accepted for presentation. Rejection rates for paper proposals at state conferences are extraordinarily low (in fact, the author has yet to meet people in a state organization that say “no” to the prospect of more papers at their conferences).

The majority of state political science organizations hold yearly conferences. Attendance at these conferences can vary considerably and range from roughly 50–250 individuals. Indeed, for some state organizations holding a yearly conference is the primary goal of the organization. Some conferences, such as those in Georgia, Oklahoma and New York, are large enough to draw publishers/sponsors such as McGraw-Hill, Cengage Learning, and W.W. Norton, have book displays and a job placement service.
The number of papers presented at these state conferences can vary considerably. A sampling of recent state conferences showed that the numbers can range from about two dozen to over one hundred papers at a given conference, with most conferences averaging between twenty and fifty papers presented. Most state political science conferences have panels specifically dedicated to graduate and undergraduate student research. Moreover, about a third of state organizations offer cash awards for the best graduate and undergraduate papers presented at their conferences. Virtually all of these state conferences also offer numerous roundtable discussions on everything from teaching to state-specific issues. In many instances, state and local politicians are invited to participate, often adding a real-world perspective to academic discussions. Some state conferences also boast keynote speakers who often include distinguished political scientists and state/national legislators. In other words, these small state conferences can, and often do, pack a considerable amount of activity and information into a small conference, especially when it comes to the participation of elected officials.

State political science conferences can be particularly good places for graduate students and junior faculty to gain experience making research presentations. Presenting at state conferences can especially benefit those unfamiliar with the panel format used at most political science conferences. Making APSA one’s first conference presentation can be an intimidating experience. State conferences are smaller venues and can provide opportunities to develop and refine one’s presentation style and learn the professional norms associated with presenting one’s research on conference panels. Even for political scientists that do not need smaller venues, state conferences can provide a good vehicle to test-drive new ideas or elicit feedback at early stages of the research process. And while it is true that one’s panel most likely will not be attended by lots of ‘big names’ in the subfield, it is also true in many instances that attendance at panels in state conferences is no worse than what one might find at many regional conferences (Zorn, 2000).

B. STATE JOURNALS

While most political scientists are expected to publish their research, not everyone is necessarily expected to publish in the discipline’s top-tier journals or write multiple scholarly books in order to achieve tenure and/or promotion. True, everyone would like to publish in the American Political Science Review (APSR), but many, if not most, scholars find publication outlets in lower-tier or subfield journals. Competition for limited space leads most of the top-tier journals in the discipline to have very high rejection rates. The Journal of Politics, considered one of the top journals in American politics, rejected 75% of submissions outright in 2010. Authors of 13% of the submissions were asked to revise and resubmit their papers, while only 12% of submissions were initially accepted (Leighley and Mishler, 2011). In 2010 another top journal, the American Journal of Political Science “desk-rejected” 24% of its submissions (meaning they were not even sent out for peer review). Another 61% are subsequently rejected by the reviewers, resulting once again in a very low publication rate (Wilson, 2011). Finally, the American Political Science Review, considered by many to be the discipline’s flagship journal, had an overall rejection rate of 93.5% in 2008–2009 (Rogowski, 2010). At the same time, submissions to these top-tier journals continue to climb as pressures to publish continue.

In addition to aiding researchers in the area of conference presentations, ten state associations also have peer-reviewed journals (See Table 2). Some, like the Indiana Journal of Political Science, have been around for a considerable period of time, while others such as Kentucky’s Commonwealth Review of Political Science are brand-new. These journals are generally published annually and the article acceptance rate for these state journals is much higher than top-tier journals. These state journals often have preferences for work pertaining to the politics of that state (e.g., the Florida Political Chronicle and Oklahoma Politics emphasize articles focusing on their respective states) or will give association members/conference attendees a leg up in the review/decision-making process (e.g., the Indiana Journal of Political Science gives preference to in-state faculty/students and its state conference attendees). However, these state-level journals are generally receptive to a wide variety of topics and methods. Some
(Arkansas and Pennsylvania) are also amenable to publishing book reviews and research notes. The fact that some state political science organizations are joint organizations (e.g., Political Scientists and Economists or Political Scientists and Criminal Justice) also can offer opportunities for interdisciplinary publishing. One example of this is the Ohio association’s *Journal of Economics and Politics*. Naysayers rightly observe that, at least for many, one is not going to make tenure or get that job at a prestigious Research I university by publishing exclusively in state-level political science journals. However, state political science journals can provide an outlet for pieces that are good, yet have a local focus and therefore are not destined for a national audience.

**Professional Service and State Organizations**

Political scientists, like other academics, are also generally expected to engage in professional service. This can usually take a variety of forms and includes service to students, one’s department, the university, the community, and the profession itself. State political science organizations provide an excellent opportunity for professional service, often an important component for those on the tenure track. State organizations often tend to be small so junior level faculty (and sometimes even graduate students) can easily find themselves in leadership positions that only senior faculty occupy in regional and national organizations. One could serve as an officer, an editorial board member, awards committee member, panel organizer, journal editor, manuscript reviewer, or panel chair/discussant. For some these may amount to nothing more than vita lines, but for others these types of opportunities can offer valuable experience, especially for junior faculty who may aspire to engage in similar activities for regional or national political science organizations at some point in the future.

Graduate students may benefit the most from the service opportunities offered by state political science organizations. For students who have never chaired a panel before or served as a discussant, state conferences provide a lower-stress venue to gain valuable experience. These conferences allow graduate students to develop professional skills in a venue that is smaller than regional or national conferences. Again, hiring universities are increasingly expecting newly minted graduate students to have attended conferences and state organizations provide one easy opportunity to do this.

Even undergraduates can benefit from participation in a state political science organization. Conferences at the regional and national level often restrict graduate student participation and undergraduate participation can be even rarer. State conferences can show undergraduate students who are interested in political science just what it is their professors do outside of the classroom. They can be exposed to what it means to conduct serious, rigorous research, either as reviewers or participants in a state-level conference.

**Networking and State Political Science Organizations**

In a 2000 paper on political science professional meetings, Professor Christopher Zorn opened with the assertion that “unequivocally and without qualification … the most important thing that happens at professional meetings is not what goes on in the panels” (1). It is often the conversations that occur after the panels, in the hallways, or over dinner and a cup of coffee that makes the conference experience a valuable one. Making the argument that state political science organizations provide valuable forums for networking may seem counterintuitive at first blush. These conferences are almost invariably smaller, are often ignored by faculty from that state’s flagship university, and are not likely to draw a number of experts in any one particular subfield.

Despite this, there are at least two ways in which these conferences can provide good networking opportunities. First, the settings that one finds in state political science organizations are almost invariably more intimate and allow for a degree of one-to-one contact that can be far more difficult to achieve at larger regional and national conferences. If one scans the program lineups for many recent state political science conferences, one might be surprised to find more ‘big names’ than one might initially expect.
Second, state conferences can also provide an avenue to network with political scientists in other institutions within a particular state, one’s academic neighbors so to speak. The mission statements of the North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia organizations place a specific emphasis on this. Interaction of this type can be valuable at a number of levels. Political science departments in the same state may be facing similar budget or curriculum issues where communication and coordination among the state’s political scientists can prove helpful. Some state organizations also seek to provide an active discussion between academics and state and local policy makers (e.g., Minnesota, Kentucky, and Alabama emphasize this).

One final benefit of state-level political science organizations that should not be overlooked is cost. Attending conferences is a must for political scientists and travelling to conferences can be expensive. Travel to regional conferences can easily run into the hundreds of dollars and travel (including registration and hotel) to APSA can exceed a thousand dollars. State conferences have the dual benefit of generally having low registration fees (especially for students) and being closer to one’s institution, resulting in lower airfare/travel costs and often cheaper hotel costs as well. In an era where travel budgets for faculty are shrinking and travel money for students is often non-existent, cost can be an important consideration when choosing which professional conferences to attend.

**CONCLUSION**

This article has highlighted a number of benefits that senior faculty, junior faculty, and students can accrue from participating in state political science organizations. To be clear, the argument in this article is not that these benefits can *only* be had via state organizations. Regional and national professional organizations are often preferable venues to pursue some of the research, service, and networking benefits described above. Still, state organizations can hold the potential for some unique opportunities especially for junior faculty and graduate students. There are truly opportunities for everyone regardless of age or experience. As a result, political scientists who seek to expand their professional horizons would do well to look no further than their local state political science organization.
TABLE 1: U.S. STATE POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alabama Political Science Association</th>
<th>Mississippi Political Science Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas Political Science Association</td>
<td>New Jersey State Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Political Science Association</td>
<td>New York State Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia Political Science Association</td>
<td>North Carolina Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois Political Science Association</td>
<td>Ohio Assn. of Econ. and Political Scientists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana Political Science Association</td>
<td>Oklahoma Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa Conference of Political Scientists</td>
<td>Pennsylvania Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky Political Science Association</td>
<td>South Carolina Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana Political Science Association</td>
<td>Tennessee Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan Conference of Political Scientists</td>
<td>Virginia Conference of Political Scientists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota Political Science Association</td>
<td>Wisconsin Political Science Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 1

State Political Science Organizations
### Table 2: Journals of State Political Science Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Journal Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>The Midsouth Political Science Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>The Florida Political Chronicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Proceedings of the GPSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Illinois Political Science Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Indiana Journal of Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>The Commonwealth Review of Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Journal of Economics and Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Oklahoma Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Commonwealth: A Journal of Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>The Journal of Political Science</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina, and Ohio are all affiliated with the journal *Politics & Policy*, a journal published by the Policy Studies Organization.

### References


ENDNOTES

7 Other regional political science organizations include: Southwest Political Science Association, located at http://www.swpsa.org and the National Capital Area Political Science Association, located at http://www.apsanet.org/ncapsa.
9 See e.g., The Pennsylvania Political Science Association (hereafter cited as PPSA) at http://faculty.njcu.edu/fmoran/ppsa/papoliscihome.htm and the Oklahoma Political Science Association (hereafter cited as OPSA) at http://www.cameron.edu/history_government/opsa.
12 For an example of journal rankings in Political Science, see Giles and Garand (2007).
UNITED STATES EXPORTS AND OPINIONS IN IMPORTING COUNTRIES

JOHN P. BLAIR
WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY

NIKOLAUS WILLIAMS
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of foreign opinions on a country’s exports. Specifically, the relationships between an importing country’s favorable opinions towards the U.S. and imports from the U.S. are considered. It was hypothesized that the more favorable foreign opinion is, the greater U.S. exports will be. Regressions results are consistent with the hypothesis. Implications and caveats are discussed.
UNITED STATES EXPORTS AND OPINIONS IN IMPORTING COUNTRIES

This paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, a brief review of the literature summarizes the basic core explanations for global trade patterns and then extends them to the impacts of attitudes towards other countries. The importance on international trade of attitudes towards trading partners has not been studied extensively in traditional economics. Public opinion may influence trade through its effect on consumer behavior and political actions. In the second section, two regression models are developed to consider the influence of public opinion on trade. The first model expresses U.S. exports to countries as a function of control variables and opinions towards the United States in the importing country. The second model examines the responsiveness of imports from the U.S. to changes in public opinion in the importing country. Model results are presented and discussed in the third section. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that public opinion towards a country influence trade. Policy implications and suggestions for further research are discussed in the concluding section.

PUBLIC OPINION AND TRADE: MARKETING AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

Economists have traditionally focused on a fairly narrow range of variables to explain the direction and scope of international trade. The theory of comparative advantage, the cornerstone of trade theory, is basically a welfare maximizing theory of organization. The Hecksher-Ohlin theorem explained comparative advantages as a reflection of a country’s resource endowment. Leontief (1954) showed the importance of factor heterogeneity. Over the past fifty years, concepts of product differentiation (Helpman, 1984), economies of scale, and noncompetitive markets (Krugman, 1980) have contributed to a rich and rigorous theory of trade determinants.

Good models typically forgo complete explanations of reality for simplicity. In this regard, the economic models of trade have been very successful. Helpman (1999), however, noted that economic explanations of global trade patterns were still incomplete and “the nature of the world is changing rapidly,” implying that other important explanations of global trading patterns will emerge (142). His conclusion is strengthened as technological changes and diminished transportation costs have reduced the importance of cost factors based on natural resource endowments central to the core economic viewpoint.

As the significance of world trade has grown, other factors have supplemented the traditional micro-economic tools. This literature review shows that consumer preferences, public opinion more generally, as well as government trade policies and practices, provide an aggregate background that helps explain trade determinants. This literature review suggests that aggregate public attitudes can affect both individual consumer preferences towards the country of origin and government trade policies. Hence, public attitudes towards a country are important determinants of trade patterns.

Marketing research contributes to a burgeoning literature showing how ideas about product branding can be applied to countries. Just as a product brand differentiates a good or service from competitors, a national brand represents a set of attributes that consumers associate with products originating in particular countries. Papadopoulos and Heslop (2003) illustrated the importance of country of origin studies to evoke long-lasting images. For instance French wines are reputed to be high quality and German engineering is considered among the best in the world. Even after an image no longer reflects reality, it may resonate with consumers. It took years of high quality manufacturing before Japan overcame the image as a producer of low quality items.

The ability of some brands to elicit emotional responses from potential customers is a critical aspect of product branding (Gobe, 2001). Brand extension studies suggest that emotions associated with a nation transfer to products originating in that country just as emotions associated with one product can be extended to other products produced by the same company. Efforts to link emotions with particular brands represent the genesis of national branding strategies (Thompson, Rindfleisch, and Arsel, 2006). Implicit in national branding is the view that nations elicit emotional responses that can be transferred to
products originating in that country. In other words, favorable public opinions about a country can be transferred to a favorable consumer sentiment about products associated with that country.

A product’s country of origin has been shown to affect a customer’s purchase decision (Kaynak and Cavusgil, 1983). Lotz and Hu (2001) found that consumers hold images of countries and use those images to judge products. Klien, Ettenson, and Morris (1998) determined that a product’s country of origin can affect a consumer’s purchase decision independent of the consumer’s view of the product. Accordingly, consumers may deem a product to be a “best buy” but decide not to purchase it because the product comes from a country they hold animosity toward. As global competition intensifies, the images associated with a particular country may become increasingly important competitive factors.

As corporations globalize production and other operations, they may diminish or at least alter the national image associated with their corporate brand. However, globalization of production and marketing activities may also allow companies to adjust the national brand associated with their products in importing countries as part of a marketing strategy. For instance, Toyota and Honda emphasize their U.S. manufacturing presence when targeting advertising towards U.S. consumers. Product lines, such as Lexus, have been labeled with non-Japanese names, reducing the association with Japan. In fact, no reference to Toyota could be found on the official Lexus website (www.lexus.com).

In contrast to most national branding studies, some researchers have followed Shimp and Sharman’s (1987) proposition that the importance of country of origin has been exaggerated and is only moderately capable of predicting what products consumers will purchase. Still other researchers have suggested that consumers consider the country of origin to be important only for a limited range of products, rather than being important for all products exported from a country (Pappu, Quester, and Cooksey, 2005).

Building upon national branding research and the growth of international trade, governmental and non-governmental organizations have increased efforts to promote national brands. As national branding has become more important, widely recognized indicators of top country brands have been published (Nations Brand Index and National Branding). Anholt, (2005) who pioneered the concept of national branding, sketched part of the methodology:

We asked consumers about their level of satisfaction with products and services produced in each country, and also about their tendency to actively seek out or actively avoid products from each country. These two questions allow us to measure any difference between the appeal of each country’s “Made In…” label and the reliability of the products produced there. We also asked what kinds of products people would expect to be produced in each country. (1)

Studies of consumer opinions about which countries have the best national brands produced similar but not entirely consistent results. Western nations and Japan dominate the top spots in both the appeal of the “made in” label and reliability. Evidence of substantial year-to-year variation in how well-regarded a county’s products are suggest consumer opinions are malleable.

Rosenbloom and Haefner (2009) examined the relationship between brand trust and country of origin. They found the perception that a brand had global scope contributed to consumer trust, perhaps indicating a high quality or “world class” product. They also found that brands associated with the home country or home region scored high on trust. Importantly, brand trust was more important for products requiring a significant pre-purchase investment in time, money, and information (high involvement) than low involvement products such as candy bars. In general, the marketing literature indicates that a favorable or unfavorable opinion about a country can affect consumer behaviors. However, no one has directly tested the relationship between public opinions towards a country and the propensity to import from that country.

A second mechanism by which public opinions (broader than simply consumer opinions, which are a focus of marketing research) influence trade patterns is political processes (Destler, 2005). It is well...
known that even liberal or free trade policies occur within a web of national and international regulations, laws, and policies. The laws and how they are implemented are likely influenced by citizen opinion about trade partners. For instance, in the United States, trade with China is often disparaged because of the rivalries between governments. The more comfortable political relations between countries, the more likely that trade policies will be accommodating.

International trade agreements and implementation practices are influenced by citizen opinion about trade partners regardless of whether or not the citizens are consumers. Further, the argument that public opinion influences government behavior does not necessarily imply that democratic and legislative processes exist. Autocratic regimes and bureaucratic functionaries can also experience pressures to synchronize trade policy with popular sentiments. When markets are suppressed, political decisions will probably play larger roles in determining trade flows.

As political tensions between countries increase, unfavorable public opinion towards the rival country is likely to grow. Consequently, more restrictive trade policies towards the unpopular become easier for some political factions to support and trade liberalizations become more difficult. (Milner and Rosendorff, 1997). Noneconomic issues, such as territorial disputes, diplomatic relations with third countries, human rights issues, and so forth, can become bundled with economic issues, complicating the political economy of trade.

The interaction between public opinion and government behavior includes complex, often self-reinforcing feedback. As trade between countries increases, familiarity will increase, potentially altering (hopefully improving) opinions. Trade may also build cultural and political relationships that, over time, manifest through familiarity and more favorable opinions. However, as imports increase, some domestic interests may be harmed, creating a possible public opinion backlash. Citizens of one country usually do not want to feel they are economically dominated by another. Furthermore, improving relationships with one country can have the effect of worsening relationships with another country. For instance, improving relations with India can make improving public opinion in Pakistan more difficult.

Whether through consumer choices or governmental actions, there is substantial literature indicating that public opinion influences the nature of a country’s imports. However, the timing of public opinion on trade is unclear. On the one hand, the impacts on trade from changing public attitudes may build cumulatively, over time. Public opinion may be the result of countless small exchanges, long-term business relationships, government efforts, and social contacts that have long half-lives. On the other hand, trade may also respond quickly to short-run changes in public attitudes. However, some short-run changes in public attitudes may lack permanent impact. They may reflect a transitory news event or even sporting events. However, other short-term changes in opinion can have long-lasting consequences. This paper will not resolve the length of time it takes for trade patterns to adjust to opinion changes. However, it will consider whether year-to-year changes in opinion are quickly reflected in trade patterns. Accordingly, this paper will examine both the impact of opinion on overall trade and the consequences of year-to-year changes in opinion on changing trade patterns.

**Regression Models**

Models examining the impact of foreign opinions towards the U.S. on U.S. exports are examined in this section. Both the effects of overall favorability and changes in favorability are considered. Data and other methodological issues are also discussed.

The gravity model of trade, widely used to predict trading patterns, describes trade between countries as analogous to gravity. The strength of trading relationships (imports and exports) increases in conjunction with the size of a country’s market and diminishes as distance between countries increases. Size represents trading opportunities and distance represents barriers to exchange such as transportation, communications, and other transaction costs. Distance may also reflect social and cultural differences that
can be trade barriers. The gravity model has been widely used as a base line to “hold other things equal” in the analysis of trade determinants (Bergstrand, 1985, Cheng and Wall, 2005, Evenett and Keller, 2002). This study is focused on exports from the United States. Hence the size of the U.S. economy can be dropped from the normal gravity model since it would be the same for all countries and hence a constant regardless of country importing from the U.S. The logged form of the gravity model of U.S. exports is:

\[(1) \ln E_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln Y_{it} + \beta_2 Dist_i + u_{it} \]

In Equation 1 \(E_{it}\) is the value of exports of goods from the U.S. to country \(i\) in year \(t\) and \(Y_{it}\) is the GDP of country \(i\) in year \(t\) measured in constant U.S. dollars. \(Dist_i\) is the shortest distance between the U.S. and the importing country \(i\). Stochastic error is represented by \(u_{it}\). The rationale for Equation 1 is relatively straightforward. The larger the importing county’s income, as measured by GDP, the greater its ability to import U.S. goods. The nearer the country is to the U.S., the more likely it is to trade with the U.S., at least partly due to lower transportation, information, and other transaction costs, including cultural factors. Real values are used to allow for better comparison between years. Variables are measured in U.S. dollars.

To assess the importance of foreign opinions, equations (1) can be modified slightly to include \(Opinion_{it}\), the percent of respondents in country \(i\) during year \(t\) who indicate a favorable opinion towards the U.S.

\[(2) \ln E_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln Y_{it} + \beta_2 Dist_i + \beta_3 Opinion_{it} + u_{it} \]

Based upon inferences in marketing and political science literature, the more favorable the opinion towards the U.S. in a trading country, the greater the trade between the U.S. and that country will be. Specifically, the U.S. will export more to that country or that country will import more from the U.S.

Equation 2 does not account for the potentially significant effects of different trading practices among countries due to differences in various historical, cultural, and social factors resulting in unobserved heterogeneity over time and space. Accordingly, a fixed effects model can be expressed as:

\[(3) \ln E_{it} = \beta_0 + \lambda_t + \beta_1 \ln Y_{it} + \beta_2 Dist_i + \beta_3 Opinion_{it} + u_{it} \]

Equation 3 includes a fixed effect coefficient for the year, \(\lambda_t\) but not for place. In many trade-oriented gravity models, a second dummy variable for place is included to reflect conditions distinctive to each country. However, in this case, distance from the U.S. is unique for each country to which it exports and would be reflected in a dummy variable distinctive to each importing country. Also, the distance is a continuous variable and inclusion of a country dummy variable would cost degrees of freedom. Because \(Dist_i\) is theoretically descriptive, it was included in the equation and the place dummy was omitted (Malyes, 1997). (The difference in regression results of including \(Dist_i\) compared to using a place dummy variable was negligible.)

In order to consider the consequences of short-term changes in favorable opinion toward the U.S., year-to-year changes in foreign opinion and exports can be calculated. The difference form of equation 3 is derived by subtracting 3 from the same equation for in year \(t+1\). The result is:

\[ 4 \Delta \ln E_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta \ln Y_{it} + \beta_2 \Delta Opinion_{it} + \Delta u_{it} \]

The distance variable is factored out during the differencing process.

**DATA**

The data on opinions towards the U.S. comes from the Pew Global Attitudes Project. The Pew Global Attitudes Project has surveyed individuals in 57 countries since 2002, asking a variety of questions ranging from views of foreign countries, attitudes on global issues, and the state of the world. This paper
uses survey data from a question asking respondents if they have a favorable view of the U.S. Specifically, participants are asked the following question: “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States.” Survey results are reported as a percentage of respondents having a “favorable” view towards a country. For the purposes of the survey, the “favorable” response combined both “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” answers. “Unfavorable” combines “very unfavorable” and “somewhat unfavorable” responses.

The Pew study had some missing observations for certain countries in certain years. This can cause problems when the missing data is correlated with the random errors $u_t$ (Wooldridge, 2002). Such might be the case if values tend to be missing for countries in which relations with the U.S. are poor, thus potentially rendering opinions of the U.S. that are also poor. This, in turn, could introduce correlation between the missing terms and the error term $u_t$. Although Pew Research does not provide the rationale for its yearly country selection, the selection of countries across years does not evidence any systematic bias according to a telephone interview with Pew researchers. As a result, the unbalanced nature of the panel data is not a source of methodological concern in this case. Also, the data is collected in the spring of each year. The export data used as the dependent variable is finalized at the end of each year. Consequently there is a six to nine month lag between the opinion and the export data.

Survey data is available for 55 countries from 2002 to 2010. For this study, data is only used for countries in which data was collected in at least one pair of consecutive years. These countries are Argentina, Britain, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey. Data for exports from the U.S. to the countries in the sample comes from the U.S. Census online foreign trade database. Values are for exports of goods only and do not include services. This paper deals with exports of goods only because of significant methodological and measurement issues that make combining the two types of trade problematic (Obie and Borg, 2002). Although service exports are growing compared to services, goods account for about 3 times the US trade deficit. Values from the U.S. Census are in nominal U.S. dollars.

Nominal GDP in U.S. dollars for each country comes from the IMF online World Economic Outlook Database for 2011. All conversions to real values are made by dividing nominal values in U.S. dollars by the U.S. GDP deflator as provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Real values are indexed to the year 2002.

Distances were taken from an online program that utilizes Google Maps. Distances are calculated for the closest point between the mainland U.S. and the country in question. The choice of using the closest point between countries was somewhat arbitrary. Alternative approaches could include distance to the closest point of entry, largest harbor, demographic centers, or capitals. Other approaches might be avenues for future research.

Finally, for the regression results to be appropriate under pooled OLS, it is necessary that the data not suffer from heteroskedasticity, collinearity, or serial correlation. A check of the variance inflation factors (VIF) does not reveal a problem with collinearity. Serial correlation is a potential problem. However, the inclusion of yearly dummy variables should eliminate the potential for serial correlation since these dummy variables control for unspecified time factors that may cause the error terms to be correlated over time. Finally, a check for heteroskedasticity revealed that the error terms do not have a constant variance. As a result, the regression results presented in this paper utilize robust standard errors.

**Empirical Findings**

Figure 1 displays the results of two regression models. The two left-hand columns show the results when total exports from the U.S. are the dependent variable. The simple gravity model plus a dummy variable for time can be compared to a similar model that includes the importing country’s opinion towards the United States. Comparable regressions reflecting the impact of year-to-year changes in opinion on changes in exports are shown on the right-hand side.
The model of the U.S. exports resulted in an $R^2$ of .78, indicating that the model explained a significant portion of variation in exports among countries over the period. The inclusion of the favorable opinion towards the United States resulted in a modest increase in the $R^2$ compared to the base model. The coefficient on the opinion variable was significant. It indicates that for every one percentage point increase in favorable opinion towards the U.S. there is a .61% increase in exports. The size of the coefficient coupled with the overall size of exports suggests that favorable opinion towards the U.S. is an important determinant of exports. Consequently the relationship between changed opinions towards the U.S. and changed exports were considered.

The second issue investigated by this paper is whether the change in opinion towards the U.S. affects the change in U.S. exports in the short term. The results shown in the two right-side columns of Figure 1 indicate that the regression results were consistent with the theory that the change in exports are influenced by short-term changes in opinions regarding trading partners. However, the explanatory power of the differenced equation is weaker than the model of total exports. In the fourth column of Figure 1, the overall $R^2$ is .58. The coefficient of the change opinion is .003, about half of the coefficient for the equation examined in column B of Figure 1. The coefficient of differenced opinion variable still has the expected positive sign and is significant at .01. The lack of significance on the intercept variable may reflect the fact that the intercept term drops when equation 3 is differenced.

Other regressions examined the change in exports as a function of lagged changes in opinion and the gravity model variables. None of the lagged relationships between export and change opinion were significant and are therefore not shown. Two possible reasons for the lack of significance of the lagged public opinion variables should be considered. First, there is a “built-in” lag between the time the opinion and export data is collected. The export data used as the dependent variable is finalized at the end of the year and the opinion data was collected in the spring. Consequently, there is a six to nine month lag between the opinion and completion of the export data. So, the time for the impact of a change in opinion to dissipate is greater than a year. Second, annual changes in opinion may have only short run impacts. If the impacts of opinion dissipate quickly, no relationship between imports and public opinions of the exporting country would be expected.

Comparing the results of the overall opinion model and the change in opinion model, it appears that cumulative opinions of the U.S. have a greater impact on exports than a single year-to-year changes in opinion. Nevertheless, exports respond relatively quickly to opinion changes.

**Policy Implications and Caveats**

Economic perspectives on trade evolved from the theory of comparative advantage to include a variety of other economic factors as primary determinants of foreign trade. While microeconomic tools have significant explanatory power, societal wide influences such as historical, cultural and political relationships also play a major role. A fruitful area for future research would be to explore the potential endogeneity in the model. Specifically, under what conditions does trade result in improved public attitudes, setting the stage for further trade. Indeed, this is the implication of the old wag, “trade follows the flag.” The literature suggests that consumer opinion and government actions are two important transmission mechanisms by which opinion may influence trade. However, descriptions about the transmission mechanisms through which public opinion may influence trade are ambiguous. Nevertheless, empirical evidence indicates that the opinions that a nation’s residents have towards another country influences trade patterns.

The most obvious policy implication from our findings is that there are trade benefits from improving foreign opinions. However, it is not obvious how to do that in a cost effective manner. The literature regarding effective strategies to improve opinion is voluminous but often lacks specifics needed to transform theory into practice. Our research did not address this important question. Foreign policies, trade missions, intergovernmental grants, person-to-person exchanges and so forth can certainly win
friends, but they can also create antagonistic sentiments, particularly among people in rival countries. A better understanding of the consequences of these policies should accompany spending resources trying to increase exports by improving favorability ratings.

The focus of this paper was on opinions of residents in various importing countries towards the United States. Because the U.S. is so prominent in world affairs, opinion formation and the impact on imports from the U.S. probably differs compared to less visible countries. Accordingly, the same actions may have different effects of trade patterns depending upon the nation taking the action.

Another area for future research is to consider the types of exports that are sensitive to public opinion in the importing country. This study considered total exports from the U.S. No analysis was made concerning particular types of exports. Rosenblook and Haefner (2009) have made a contribution toward this type of analysis by examining the importance of national branding towards various product categories. They found that high involvement products are the most sensitive to influence of the country of origin. But their analysis did not link opinions to actual exports.

Teasing out which specific attitudes influence exports is another, probably more intractable area for future research. When individuals respond that they have a favorable attitude toward the U.S., the response is likely to reflect a cluster of related attitudes. For instance the same group that responded that they had good feelings towards the U.S. probably responded that they appreciated U.S. values, so there is probably no single question that will capture the variety of opinions that influence the propensity to import from the U.S.

REFERENCES


### FIGURE 1: EXPORTS FROM U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Determinants of Exports from U.S.</th>
<th>Determinants of Changes in Exports from the U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.7583</td>
<td>0.4901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSE</td>
<td>0.8066</td>
<td>0.1363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(Y)</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26.04)*</td>
<td>(5.41)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.81)*</td>
<td>(4.77)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.00028</td>
<td>-0.00022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-6.39)*</td>
<td>(-4.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion</td>
<td>0.0061</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.86)†</td>
<td>(2.64)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16.63)*</td>
<td>(-1.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.06)*</td>
<td>(-0.89)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
* Significant at 1% level
† Significant at 5% level
‡ Significant at 10% level

50
OHIO’S CURRENT AGRICULTURAL USE PROGRAM: 
ELIGIBILITY, RECOUPMENT, AND CURRENT ISSUES

ALLEN PRINDLE
Otterbein University

ABSTRACT
This paper examines several issues related to Ohio’s Current Agricultural Use Value (CAUV) Program. Based on data from 2002–10, an average of $6.6 million was collected in recoupment payments per year, because the land was no longer eligible for the benefits of lower real estate taxation. The year with the maximum recoupment payments was 2005. Data from Ohio Department of Taxation appear to be incomplete and to underestimate the actual payments. Other issues related to CAUV eligibility were introduced to update readers and policy makers.
I. INTRODUCTION

Most states have taken steps to protect farmland by implementing various programs to slow the conversion of farmland to urban development or to increase the financial viability of the farming operation (American Farmland Trust, 2008). Ohio is one of 49 states that operates a differential assessment program to lower the real estate tax burden of owners of farmland. This allows the land owner to continue to operate the farm more profitably and reduce the rate of land convergence to urban uses. A differential assessment program is authorized by the state. Land owners who qualify will pay real estate taxes based on the land’s agricultural “use value,” rather than its “market value.” Use value of farmland is expected to be lower because it does not include the potential value of the land for urban uses.

Ohio created its differential assessment program, the Current Agricultural Use Value (CAUV) Program, in 1974. A publication from Ohio State University summarizes the history, the eligibility criteria, and other operational features of the program (Jeffers and Libby, 1999).

As of 2011, 14 million of the 28 million acres of land in the state of Ohio were in “Land in Farms,” as defined by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA/NASS, 2012). The Ohio Department of Taxation reports that over 16 million acres were enrolled in CAUV (Ohio Department of Taxation, 2014). Perhaps this suggests a difference in definition, but it clearly suggests that most of the land eligible for CAUV is enrolled. One of the difficulties with the CAUV program is that it may subsidize a real estate developer who keeps the land eligible for the CAUV program while the land is pending new development (American Farmland Trust, 2006).

The agricultural land use value depends on soil types and other factors. In communities subject to urban development pressure, the difference between market (development) value and CAUV (agricultural use) value can be large. A map showing the CAUV value as a percent of market value for 2011 indicates a high of 71 percent in Pike County and a low of 10 percent in Stark and Warren Counties. The statewide average for 2011 was 31 percent, while the comparable percentage for 2010 was 22 percent, and the percentage for 2009 was 18 percent (ODT Tax Equalization, 2012).

This paper examines Ohio CAUV Program and examines various issues related to this program. It is the intent that this information will better inform public discussion and decision making related to the CAUV Program.

II. RECOUPMENT

A. ELIGIBILITY AND RECOUPMENT

Participation in CAUV is voluntary. Eligibility for benefits from the CAUV Program is determined by the Ohio Revised Code Section 5713.30 and is summarized on the website for the Ohio Department of Taxation. Land owners must indicate eligibility for CAUV annually at the County Auditor’s Office. Owners of farmland are eligible for CAUV benefits if they enroll 10 or more acres devoted exclusively to commercial agricultural use. Also, they are eligible if they have less than 10 acres, but produce an average annual gross income of $2,500 or more (Jeffers and Libby, 1999).

If the farmland is converted to nonfarm use, then it is no longer eligible for the benefits of the CAUV Program. In that case, a recoupment payment is assessed by the county auditor in the amount of property tax savings during the last three years. This recoupment payment is defined in the Ohio Revised Code Section 5713.34. The recoupment payment occurs when the use of the land is changed, and it is no longer eligible for CAUV because it is not “devoted exclusively to commercial agricultural use …” The County Auditor calculates the amount of recoupment payment when the land is declared ineligible. The recoupment payments are distributed to the taxing authorities in the county, including schools, libraries, park districts, etc. Most states collect recoupment payments, but 15 states do not require such payments if the land becomes ineligible for the program (England, 2012).
B. **RECOUPEMENT BY YEAR**

The County Auditors annually report the amount of recoupment payments collected by taxing districts to the Ohio Department of Taxation (ODT). A taxing district includes a township or a municipality and the number of taxing districts in each county varies by county. The author obtained CAUV recoupment payment data from the Ohio Department of Taxation for the period 2002 to 2010 and created county summaries and statewide summaries. It is expected that the data shown are underestimates, due to non-reporting by some of the counties during a specific year. This report used only data received from the ODT. Recoupment data was not available for 2011 at the time of analysis.

The CAUV recoupment data were sent to the author by Ohio Department of Taxation and then assembled by county and by year. Table 1 shows the statewide totals for each year 2002–2010. For the period studied, the amount of recoupment increased until 2005, and then it trended downward. This reflects the changes in housing and other markets. The average per year for this period was $6,619,973. It is expected that recoupment funds would increase during periods that the housing and urban retail sectors were expanding and land values were increasing. It is also expected that recoupment funds would decrease with rising farmland values. Both trends were occurring during the second part of this time period. The recoupment amount per acre would increase with higher corn or soybean prices and higher yields, or lower farm input costs. These trends were also occurring during this time period.

Many counties did not report any recoupment collections to the ODT during this time period. Data in Table 1 indicates that about 55–60 counties reported recoupment each year. It is expected that there would be recoupment in most counties in most years. The conclusion is that the ODT data is a low estimate of the actual statewide total, due to the lack of a complete data set.

C. **RECOUPEMENT BY COUNTY**

The CAUV recoupment data were also summarized by county. For the period 2002 to 2010, Table 2 shows the five counties with the highest total recoupment payments for the 9-year period. It also indicates the number of years each county ranked in the top 5 counties. It is expected that the counties that were experiencing the highest rates of growth in housing and other urban features would have the highest conversion of farmland to urban uses, and therefore, the highest amount of recoupment dollars collected. Rural counties that are not experiencing high urban pressures would be expected to have little CAUV recoupment payment funds. Also urban counties would be expected to have very little CAUV recoupment payment funds.

The author contacted the Franklin County Auditor’s office to verify the accuracy of the above data. The Auditor’s office indicated that CAUV recoupment funds were collected every year from 2002–10. The total was $9,272,031 and would rank it as the highest county. The amount collected in 2005 was $2,572,738.76, according the Auditor’s office, and this is inconsistent with the data reported by ODT for that year. This confirmation of the incomplete nature of the data set is a concern to the research community. Clearly, the ODT data is an underestimate. The ODT data is useful in showing statewide trends, but should not be considered accurate. The data are “self-reported” to the ODT, and each County Auditor has the ability to respond as they wish, including to report no collection. The ODT data does not make a distinction between no response and zero collection.

D. **COUNTIES WITH NO REPORTED RECOUPEMENT**

The CAUV recoupment data were calculated and ranked. Twelve of the 88 counties reported no recoupment amounts for any of the years 2002 to 2010. These counties included: Athens, Auglaize, Clermont, Coshocton, Cuyahoga, Fairfield, Gallia, Greene, Morgan, Ottawa, Richland, and Seneca. There may be a number of reasons that the county did not have many conversions of farmland to ineligible uses. The author questions whether 12 counties would have no farmland conversions for any year during the period 2002–10 and the appropriate collection of CAUV recoupment funds during any year. Further
research may discover if the county did not collect the recoupment payment, or if there was no information reported to the ODT.

The author contacted a staff person in the Auditor’s office in Fairfield County, one of the counties on the list of no recoupment, to ask about the accuracy of the data. The author received a report that indicated recoupment dollars were collected each year and a total of $2,606,084 was indicated for the period 2002–10. This update supports the earlier prediction that the data used in this report is an underestimate.

Another county contacted by the author indicated that when asked by the ODT to report data related to CAUV recoupment, the software asked a “yes or no” question, and the county indicated “no.” The result was a “zero” in the data set and the statewide data are therefore underreported. Another suggestion was that the timing of the reporting to the state ODT did not allow accurate reporting for the year. The ODT is now aware of the lack of accurate reporting and may work with software vendors to encourage accurate reporting, according to phone conversations with ODT staff in 2012.

III. RELATED CAUV AND RECOUPMENT ISSUES

Several CAUV and recoupment policy issues have been debated during the last few years. The purpose of this section is to summarize these issues and recognize that the public has an interest in learning about these issues.

A. ELIGIBILITY OF WETLANDS

The Attorney General of Ohio issued an opinion that land used for a wetland mitigation bank does not qualify for CAUV benefits because it is not “devoted exclusively to commercial agricultural use” (Ohio Attorney General, 2009). This opinion recognized that an earlier ruling in Marion County had made an opposite decision in 2004. In its decision, the Eleventh Appellate District Court of Appeals of Ohio ruled that land in wetland mitigation banks qualifies for CAUV. This ruling concluded that the land qualifies as “land devoted exclusively to agricultural use.” The court also agreed that the lands qualify because they are “… under a land retirement or conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the federal government” (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2012).

At the same time as the uncertainty of eligibility of wetland mitigation bank lands, the Ohio Department of Taxation issued a statement that listed Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) as programs that would qualify for CAUV. This is based on the statement that there is a likelihood that the property would be returned to agricultural use (ODT, 2012).

Clarification of eligibility for CAUV was brought to public attention in 2011 as a result of a Franklin County family who enrolled 33 acres into the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) with the assurance that the property would continue to qualify for CAUV. Then the family was required to pay CAUV recoupment of more than $56,000 (Hunt, 2011). Ultimately in November 2012, the landowners were exempted from the recoupment payment because the WRP is a federally funded conservation program and meets the eligibility criteria for CAUV (Hunt, 2012).

Eligibility for this program is a critical issue for landowners and the public. Having a well-defined interpretation of eligibility is a critical public issue. Clearly defined eligibility criteria are likely to result in County Auditors in each county enforcing CAUV recoupment in the same manner. The eligibility of WRP and other USDA-supported conservation programs was included in the 2012 Issue Briefing Book prepared by the Ohio Environmental Council. The support of many land trusts across the state may mean this issue will be addressed by state hearings and/or legislation (Ohio Environmental Council, 2012).
B. **Eligibility of Nature Preserves and Parks**

Another eligibility issue related to CAUV concerns eligible farmland converted to nature preserves or parks. An issue paper from Ohio Environmental Council (OEC) discussed the need to revisit eligibility rules. This issue paper indicates that park districts are exempt from recoupment if eminent domain was not used. Qualified nonprofit conservation organizations must pay recoupment under the current laws, according to the issue paper. The OEC called for revisions of the Ohio Revised Code because the protection offered by these organizations is stronger than CAUV (Ohio Environmental Council, 2012).

C. **Eligibility of Energy Facilities**

The Ohio Department of Taxation has attempted to clarify the CAUV eligibility related to wind and other energy facilities. Legislation, introduced in 2011 and effective June 2012, was introduced to expand CAUV eligibility to include “algaculture, biodiesel production, biomass energy production, electric or heat energy production, and biologically derived methane gas production” to qualify for CAUV eligibility and CAUV benefits (Ohio HB 276, 2012). If a wind energy facility is constructed on a portion of land eligible for CAUV, the remaining part of the land still qualifies for CAUV. Recoupment would not be due if the remaining part of the land continues to be eligible for CAUV (ODT correspondence, 2012). Related to fracking sites, lands would be treated in a similar way with direct surface impact. If there are temporary impacts, and the land is likely to return to agricultural use, CAUV eligibility would not change (Hall, 2013).

D. **Extension of Recoupment Period**

During the last few years, there has been a proposal to extend the current 3-year recoupment period to 5 or 6 years, and to use the additional funds for support of local farmland preservation programs. A rural county with little farmland conversion would have very little funds, and an urban county would also have little funds. In a county with active urban development and rapid conversion of farmland, more farmland would become ineligible for CAUV, and more funds would be collected.

The proposal would make no change related to the distribution of the funds from the current 3-year recoupment payment policy. However funds collected from the added years would be available for funding of local, county farmland preservation programs. This policy has been discussed for several years and was included in a 2004 report to the Ohio House Subcommittee (Nikolic, 2004). No plans to implement this policy have been taken to date.

**Conclusion**

More than $6 million are collected each year in Ohio in CAUV recoupment payments. The payments are collected when agricultural land becomes ineligible for the CAUV program and are distributed within the county to schools, libraries, etc. Recoupment data are reported to the Ohio Department of Taxation. This paper summarized CAUV recoupment payment data for the period 2002–10, by county. The amount of recoupment payments peaked in 2005 at almost $10 million and has declined each year since. Medina County had the highest recoupment payments over the 9-year period with about $5.8 million collected. The ODT data are incomplete, since most counties reported no recoupment in some years. Twelve counties reported zero recoupment during every year 2002–10. The author contacted some of these counties and learned that these ODT data are not correct. The data from ODT are clearly underestimated. This suggests a need for ODT to actively assemble full recoupment data from every county, every year. This is needed for further research and also for fully informed public policy dialog.

Several issues related to CAUV eligibility and CAUV recoupment were summarized in the paper. These issues include eligibility of wetlands and energy facilities. A proposal to extend the recoupment period was also addressed as a means to fund local farmland preservation programs. It is hoped this paper will better inform public dialog and policy evaluation related to the CAUV program and land use decisions.
The issues discussed in the paper point to the need for all County Auditors to enforce the CAUV laws uniformly and with full disclosure to landowners and the public.

**TABLE 1: OHIO RECOUPEMENT AMOUNTS COLLECTED, 2002–2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Statewide Recoupment</th>
<th>No. of Counties Reporting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$5,877,654</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$7,062,905</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$7,555,500</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$9,989,892</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$8,329,578</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$6,111,172</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$5,075,798</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$5,263,640</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$4,313,624</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ODT. Data assembled by author.

**TABLE 2: OHIO RECOUPEMENT PAYMENTS COLLECTED 2002–2010, TOP 5 COUNTIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>9-year total</th>
<th>No. years in top 5 rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>$5,796,163</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>$4,641,880</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>$4,612,322</td>
<td>7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licking</td>
<td>$4,198,937</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin</td>
<td>$2,803,183</td>
<td>1 year (2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ODT, data assembled by author.
REFERENCES


PAIN, PUNISHMENT, AND NIETZSCHE’S VITALIST POLITICS

JONATHAN MCKENZIE
NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of power provides one of the most challenging and intriguing rethinking of political concepts in the modern period. While political theorists have paid ample attention to most of Nietzsche’s core ideas, little attention has been paid to his theory of pain and its affirmative possibilities for political theory. This essay explores Nietzsche’s theory of pain and its corresponding politicization in punishment through a close reading of key texts and notebooks. For Nietzsche, pain remains a barometer whereby strong states and selves can usefully experiment with different lives, institutions, and arrangements that serve the “aristocratic separation from the crowd” and allow strong selves to emerge. The concept of pain is also central to Nietzsche’s critique of political modernity, where the usefulness of pain is moralized and transferred to the concept of punishment, based upon an unsustainable fiction of free will and accountability. Ultimately, Nietzsche’s concept of pain allows us to appreciate more fully his critique of political modernity and the extent to which his aristocratic separatism contains a radical rethinking of basic political concepts.
This paper explores Nietzsche’s thinking on pain and punishment as entrée into his critique of political modernity. Nietzsche’s trenchant criticism of the modern spirit is well-known, but political theorists have neglected the role that pain and punishment play in this critique. I argue that Nietzsche’s affirmation of pain’s public and private virtues suggests a compelling aristocratic rejoinder to liberal democratic institutions designed to reduce collective suffering. The spirit of this critique is given in “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” from *Twilight of the Idols*:

> Liberal institutions stop being liberal as soon as they have been attained: after that, nothing damages freedom more terribly or more thoroughly than liberal institutions. Of course people know what these institutions do: they undermine the will to power, they set to work leveling mountains and valleys and call this morality, they make things small, cowardly, and enjoyable—they represent the continual triumph of herd animals. Liberalism: herd animalization, in other words. (Nietzsche, 2005, p. 213)

Nietzsche’s aim to identify liberalism with weakness and leveling echoes in his comprehensive critique of moral values. Nietzsche critiques not the ideas that give place to liberal institutions, but the work of those institutions themselves, which create values of equality, security, and a constrained sense of liberty, at the expense of the freedom of higher values and those whom Nietzsche terms “the strong.” Nietzsche notes later in the same aphorism, “a free human being is a warrior” (Nietzsche, 2005, p. 213). The wars to which those who become free dedicate themselves are placed upon the altar of life itself, as Nietzsche replaces the moral foundation of modernity with an expressive, experimental vitalism that privileges the intoxicating feeling of life.

Nietzsche moves forward in his understanding of freedom as becoming through experimentation: “The peoples with any value at all became valuable, and not through liberal institutions: great danger made them into something deserving of respect” (Nietzsche, 2005, p. 214). Nietzsche’s explication of becoming free is central to my argument in this essay. One becomes free through experiments that include great danger—that is, the possibility and reality of pain and punishment through retributive justice and the value of life in its bare expressivity. In this case, Nietzsche performs an intriguing revaluation of the experience of pain, suggesting that (certain) painful experiences provide a framework for overcoming the leveling of political modernity and reconfiguring the self as one who becomes free through that overcoming. This essay argues that Nietzsche’s critique of political modernity focuses on the devaluation of pain in favor of security and equality; as such, his reevaluation of the concept provides a core rethinking of the relationship between pain, politics, and the values that sustain modernity.

**NIETZSCHE’S VITALIST POLITICS**

Nietzsche prompts us to ask: Is there considerable downside to the seemingly obvious call for politics to reduce the suffering of citizens? Perhaps to ask the question more piercingly, why is it that we are averse to the experience of pain—so averse, in fact, that we maintain at times that the sole interest of public life is to reduce the suffering of others (Rorty, 1989)? The question of whether the experience of suffering contains positive value is both an exercise in clarifying the meaning of pain to politics and an examination of one of the primary values behind modern political theory. Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought takes seriously the positive advantages of pain, and incorporates the value of pain into a more comprehensive critique of modernity. Nietzsche’s aristocratic political theory, which calls into question the existential value of political equality, uses the revaluation of pain to critique the notion of reciprocity, a democratic value that reduces individual political value to even exchanges. Nietzsche’s view of pain sheds significant light on his critique of modern politics and his affirmative alternative to the security state.

Nietzsche’s economy of pain and pleasure takes advantage of the tendency in modern political theory to make pain a key political concept. The modern turn in political theory, highlighted by the calcification and exemplified (in Nietzsche’s time) by the utilitarian tradition, makes the safety of citizens the *sine qua non* of the state itself. The state is dedicated not to the lofty goals of the Aristotelian tradition (in which
the state helps (some of) us to realize our potential virtue) but to the promise of relieving individuals of painful experiences. In valuing pain as an affirmative political concept, Nietzsche inverts a principal goal of political modernity; instead of building a political theory of reducing suffering, Nietzsche constructs an aristocratic separatism that forges advantages from the experience of giving and receiving painful experiences.

Nietzsche’s philosophical views on pain appear, at first glance, paradoxical given his long-held views against punishment as a practice. This essay aims to explain Nietzsche’s critique of punishment within the bounds of his defense of giving and taking pain as a means of growth. While it appears that modern liberal theorists treat the concept of punishment sparsely, Nietzsche holds that while moderns desire the reduction of suffering, the legitimacy of the state requires that punishment be exercised in order to maintain the value of security. Nietzsche’s complicated views on punishment highlight the ways in which his political theory is wrapped up in his larger critique of modern values. Nietzsche would hold, with some contemporary theorists, that punishment “is not an exception to the rules of liberalism, but an integral element in the classical liberal paradigm” (McBride, 2007, p. 104). Nietzsche’s unique valorization of pain lends depth to his critique of the practice of punishment, one that sheds significant light on the value of security in the modern liberal state.

Concentrating on Nietzsche’s revaluation of pain and his consequentialist view of punishment sheds light on Nietzsche’s patchwork interpretation of modern political thought. Nietzsche’s views on pain develops from his criticism as the modern period is controlled by mediating feelings of security and the leveling of democratic practices. Although the object of most of Nietzsche’s critique from the modern period is the contemporary movement of utilitarianism, Nietzsche’s critique of the values of modernity envelops utilitarianism as well as the social contract liberalism it precedes. Nietzsche’s abiding critique of security as a primary value of modernity is countered by his own experimental vitalism, a valuation of life that extends from the individual toward the state. Experimental vitalism involves the willingness of individuals to exercise with disparate values in order to find those that enhance life. States, under Nietzsche’s aristocratic experimental vitalism, are encouraged to take additional risks and to appropriate values beyond the collective security of individual citizens.

Employing Nietzsche’s central theme of reconfiguring power makes him an attractive political theorist to many different strains of contemporary thought. But Nietzsche’s aristocratic tastes keep him from being taken more seriously as a political theorist; indeed, even those who allow Nietzsche some authority on political matters do so with great reservation (Shaw, 2007; Abbey and Appel, 1998; Ansell-Pearson, 1994; Thiele, 1990). There is little doubt that Nietzsche’s reflections carried over into the political at times. What is in doubt, however, is the relevance of Nietzsche’s political opinions to the cultivation of democratic projects of the modern age. Interpreters of Nietzsche who uphold and defend his aristocratic politics are few and far between (Hunt, 1993). Much more common assessments of Nietzsche laud his potential as a political thinker but stop short of endorsing his critique of democratic politics. In Politics Out of History, Wendy Brown proposes a defense of Nietzsche, only to back off and suggest one cannot practice his political thought:

In the form in which he offers it, Nietzsche’s critique of democracy is largely unlivable. No matter what its modality—socialist, liberal, or communitarian—modern democratic life in state societies cannot be conducted with shuttered rooms and aristocratic practices that disregard most of humanity. (Brown, 2001, p. 135)

Brown’s critique of Nietzsche holds true for many interpreters who cannot find a way in which radical aristocratic politics is relevant to democratic societies. Nietzsche’s distaste for democratic politics is just part of his major project, which Fredrick Appel argues consists of “great concern … for the flourishing of those few whom he considers exemplary of the human species” (Appel, 1999, p. 1). Can a thinker whose open distaste for democracy and its consequences offer any legitimate claim to authority on political matters in democratic societies?
Recently, Tamsin Shaw’s attempt to ground Nietzsche’s (absence of) political theory in the gulf between normative authority and political authority in secular societies has brought into question whether Nietzsche’s skepticism about politics could conceivably be curtailed (Shaw, 2007, p. 152). Shaw’s conclusion, that Nietzsche’s deconstruction of normative authority in the postmodern world creates a chasm that cannot be fulfilled by democratic experiments of dubious political authority, follows in the tradition of Abbey and Appel (1998) and Ansell-Pearson (1994) insofar as it challenges the application of Nietzsche’s philosophy to democratic projects. Despite Nietzsche’s destruction of philosophical hierarchies, “it is far-fetched to claim that his writings nurture democratic political thought” (Abbey and Appel, 1998, p. 83). Shaw remains unconvinced that Nietzsche’s thought could propose a positive alternative vision to democratic politics (151–52).

Nietzsche’s attention to the caverns of modernity makes him an essential political thinker. If Nietzsche’s experimental vitalism is indeed livable, then his thought provides an affirmative boon to a renewed aristocratic sensibility in the midst of political modernity. What is at stake in this essay, however, is not the practicability of Nietzschean politics; I am concerned with the role that pain and punishment play in constructing a critique of modernity that is unique and deft. While Nietzsche may not be capable of renewing democratic commitments or reimagining the hierarchies of the past, he remains alive to the great sacrifices involved in constituting a state with a thoroughly modern ethic.

POLITICS OF THE PAIN GIVERS

Nietzsche repeatedly sheds light on the costs involved in making the goal of reducing collective and individual pain. Nietzsche locates this critique in, among other places, Mill’s notion that the state is only justified insofar as that state enforces restraints on others (Mill, 1978) as evidence that political life promises security in exchange for affirmative freedom. In order for individuals to believe themselves “happier” within the confines of the modern state, they must theorize that happiness is coequal with the infrequency of pain, that one is happy insofar as one is not faced with death, disease, or decay. Nietzsche holds that this precise position accounts for the modern value of security: “Critique of ‘justice’ and ‘equality before the law’: what are these really supposed to eliminate? Tension, enmity, hatred—but it’s an error to think that ‘happiness’ is increased that way” (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 123).

Nietzsche’s deconstruction of political virtues in open societies centers on the relationship between pleasure and pain and the consequences of misconstruing that crucial relationship. For the modern state, reducing “enmity” or “hatred” are goals in themselves; indeed, one could argue that reducing suffering is the prime value of the state. Nietzsche takes the question further: what is it that states are doing when they aim to reduce suffering? The reduction of suffering, according to Nietzsche, allows citizens to exist within a sphere of constant familiarity, never being forced to meet with forces disparate from those to which they have grown accustomed. Because pain has become unfamiliar, we distance ourselves from its vital effects and begin to despise the possibility of it. This invokes a pathology of fear that limits one’s willingness to experiment with new forms of life, embracing an existentially conservative style of living that promotes steady values and valuations.

What type of individuals flourish in societies that support the alienation of the self from the types of pain that allow for personal growth—or, more importantly for Nietzsche, the types of risks and experiments that are or can be painful? Do we cut ourselves from a host of pleasures that are the result of experiencing certain kinds of pain? Inheriting a tradition that suggests we should perform actions out of sympathy for others, our highest values become giving to others what could be ours or, if we are in a position of power, pity over those who do not have (since pity itself is a sort of a “giving virtue” as Nietzsche maintains):

Behind the basic principle of current moral fashion: ‘moral actions are actions performed out of sympathy for others’, I see the social effect of timidity hiding behind an intellectual mask: it desires, first and foremost, that all the dangers which life once held should be removed from it, and that everyone should assist in this with all his might: hence only those actions which tend
towards the common security and society’s sense of security are to be accorded the predicate ‘good.’ (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 105–6)

Since pain delivers an uncomfortable response in individuals, Nietzsche argues that we experience an aversion to the sensation. This aversion, which takes a short view of the experience and denies the “big picture,” offers societies a chance to define themselves on the shortsightedness of individuals (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 115). Timidity as a cultural disease removes danger and, in so doing, removes the possibility of overcoming the standards and mores of contemporary life. Nietzsche’s critique of security, organized around a reevaluation of the “wisdom in pain” exposes modernity for its inability or unwillingness to properly value “the great pain bringers of humanity” (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 179). Nietzsche’s critique of the moral value of doing good for others takes two turns: first, it is a critique of the desire to reduce suffering to others as a moral postulate; secondly, however, it is also a critique of the notion that eliminating danger, pain, or suffering is in fact doing good for others.

Nietzsche consistently declares that pain has a direct relationship to health, although it is not the relationship we commonly associate. There is a crucial difference between being healthy and “not being sick”:

Health and sickliness: be careful! The yardstick remains the body’s efflorescence, the mind’s elasticity, courage and cheerfulness—but also of course, how much sickliness it can take upon itself and overcome—can make healthy. What would destroy more tender men is one of the stimulants of great health. (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 78)

Life, which consists of wills consistently overcoming the old in the search for the new, is preserved, strengthened, and made meaningful through its various experiments. This experimental vitalism, Nietzsche’s chief contribution to individualism, does more than just excuse pain—it makes pain necessary for advancement. Politically, this means that the normal avenues of democratic political participation do not portend a sense of health because they do not produce opportunities for overcoming. Political participation, of the modern liberal sort, occurs in the safest of circumstances (and ideally under rules of discursive reciprocity). What could possibly arise from this type of participation that is likely to infect someone to the degree that they will need to overcome it? In the preface to the second edition of The Gay Science, Nietzsche declares:

Only great pain, that long, slow pain that takes its time and in which we are burned, as it were, over green wood, forces us as philosophers to descend into our ultimate depths and put aside all trust, everything good-natured, veiling, mild, average—things in which formerly we may have found our humanity. I doubt that such pain makes us ‘better’—but I know that it makes us deeper. (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 6–7)

Allowing oneself to experience great pain forces a different kind of health—an experimental health that revels in presence and shakes off the idealism of the search for safety. For Nietzsche, the experience of pain enriches life; Nietzsche’s ethical transformation, then, is to take the notion of making individuals “better”—calling card of a moral life—and chooses instead to live in such a way that we gain “depth.” This involves internalizing pain and pleasure, seeking after each without prioritizing pleasure over pain. Nietzsche’s project is to embrace “as one’s own the pain that discloses power” (Noble, 2009, p. 45). Nietzsche’s valuation of depth as a means of advancement plays on the use of “democratic” words—veiling, mild, average—to suggest that while democratic means of participation stay on the surface, the embrace of pain allows individuals to acquire depth, to become subterranean.

Nietzsche’s preference for depth performs two basic functions: first, it allows him “the necessary space for his attack on morality to commence” (Bishop, 2012, p. 141). Nietzsche’s well-known critique of modern morality as privileging the average while veiling the self not only anticipates Freud but also offers a simple target for his repeated cultural criticisms. More importantly, Nietzsche’s “subterranean”
philosophy reevaluates the concepts we use to define the meaning and purpose of a person’s life. By eschewing happiness as a target of life, Nietzsche offers the freedom of looking at oneself in one’s nakedness and affirming one’s becoming as the solvent to the modern disease of mediocrity. Going deeper means to disenchant the values of political modernity, to supplant equality, justice, and liberal freedom with a genealogical understanding of one’s own place and the layers of self. In a sense, becoming subterranean fulfills Nietzsche’s philosophical mission; we can consider genealogy, for instance, as the method in which we dig up the buried past in order to allow it to determine the value of our present associations, values, and maxims. Valuing depth, for Nietzsche, means to begin to think about truth in an extra-moral sense, to return to the path toward uncomfortable realities.

Nietzsche demonstrates that, for the individual, the experience of pain is necessary in order to make life deeper—that is, to ascribe immanent meaning to that life. If our own pain is necessary to strengthen ourselves, what does Nietzsche say about the pain of others? The important question for Nietzsche is whether or not individuals are willing to admit that, despite the transcendent moralities that deny it, it feels good to cause pain: “will there be many honest men prepared to admit that causing pain gives pleasure?” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 39). By claiming that individuals take pleasure in causing pain, Nietzsche extends the ethics of overcoming pain beyond the self and toward others with whom the self has contact. If we wish to make ourselves deeper, we risk inflicting pain on others as well as ourselves in the process. How does Nietzsche, whose ethics of internalizing pain in the pursuit of depth advances aristocratic separatism, support inflicting pain on others? In order to answer the question, Nietzsche will clarify the meaning of inflicting pain out of “self defense.”

In a stunning aphorism in the early pages of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche endeavors to answer the question of whether individuals are morally justified for harming others out of self-defense. While we take self-defense to be a justifiable reason for harming another, Nietzsche brings up the question of whether causing harm out of “wickedness” can be morally justified. Questioning the notion that we can ever know how much pain our actions cause another, Nietzsche concludes with the following:

Thus: in the case of doing harm out of the so-called wickedness the degree of pain produced is in any event unknown to us; insofar, however, as the act is accompanied by pleasure (feeling of one’s own power, of one’s own strong excitation), it occurs for the purpose of preserving the wellbeing of the individual, and thus comes under a similar heading to self-defense and lying under duress. Without pleasure no life; the struggle for pleasure is the struggle for life.
(Nietzsche, 1996, p. 56)

By equating life with pleasure, Nietzsche argues that one is justified morally in acting for pleasure because we can never be sure of the pain we are causing another. This distance between the self and the other allows one to justify one’s actions by claiming that the positive consequence of increasing one’s pleasure (which, according to Nietzsche, is coequal with one’s well-being) outstrips any pain that one would have to assume his actions cause another. Nietzsche does not view causing pain to another as having committed a moral wrong when that act produces a feeling of pleasure in the individual. Another’s pain, therefore, provides no roadblock to individual action.

Nietzsche has uncovered an important aspect of his thought, however. In reconciling pleasure to life itself, Nietzsche makes the argument that human life is organized to produce and pleasure, an argument that sounds oddly reminiscent of Bentham’s notion of utility. If Nietzsche equates life with pleasure, how does he separate his philosophy from the classical utilitarian argument that one should act in such a way as to maximize pleasure? Nietzsche’s disagreement is not with the notion that one acts to produce pleasure, but the method in which one procures pleasure. Taking pain and pleasure politically, Nietzsche argues that the avoidance of pain is not in any sense the realization of happiness, but a secure means by which a state can promise mediocrity for its citizens:
Nietzsche’s utilization of pleasure and displeasure cements his belief that states and individuals crave the security of middling feelings at the expense of deeper feelings and subsequent action. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche refers to this pathology as “the democratic way of life” (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 93). When the state opts for security as its primary value, it stunts citizens’ abilities to experience anything beyond the mildness of self comfort. To Nietzsche, pain plays an important role in the immanent transition of the self (and the polity) to deeper levels of life. While the security state may aim toward the preservation of life, Nietzsche counters that life itself is “constantly transforming all that we are into light and flame” (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 6). Pain establishes the experiential premise through which we can discard the erstwhile ways of life in search of something, in Nietzsche’s terms, “deeper” (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 7).

Nietzsche’s late notebooks help to crystallize the relationship between pain, pleasure, and the will to power. Arguing that a strong pleasure is never unaccompanied by a similarly charged pain, Nietzsche states:

What is a pleasure other than a stimulation of the feeling of power by an obstacle (more strongly still by rhythmical obstacles and resistances)—leading it to swell? Thus, every pleasure includes pain.—If the pleasure is to become very great, the pain must be very long and the tension of the drawn bow prodigious. (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 18)

We can only feel pleasure as the result of a pain that stimulates something inside of us. For Nietzsche, this is the essence of the relationship between pleasure and pain, and the results of uncovering the utilitarian mistake of pleasure and pain. The relation between pleasure and pain is inseparable; one is completely dependent on the other. Nietzsche’s merger of pain and pleasure springs forward a new evaluative criterion of personal and social life, greatness, a criterion that attempts to rise above the mediocrity of the security state with high regard for taking chances, absorbing pains, and experiencing greater pleasures. Taking a risk that involves a measure of pain is indeed, for Nietzsche, the sole way of acquiring the sensations of pleasure; indeed, pain’s opposite sensation would not be pleasure, but boredom—insofar as boredom opposes itself to both pain and pleasure. Importantly, this is just as true for politics as it is for personal life—Nietzsche’s critique of modernity is based on the premise that pleasure and pain occur together, that the project of overcoming is just as necessary for states as it is for individuals.

Pain and pleasure are more than mere sensations for Nietzsche; their instrumental power lies in producing deeper individuals (and deeper political forces) that are more willing to take chances, to absorb the ill effects of encounters, and to find ways of evaluating action and inaction beyond the added security they may receive from an action or policy. Our reaction to pain may be to collectively make strides never to feel the pain again—in terms of a large-scale public policy or the smaller acts we make every day to avoid pain—but this avoidance of pain keeps us from acquiring the depth that comes only through affirming the reality of pain and pleasure and states of growth. Nietzsche’s critique of the security state highlights his belief that pain can augment individual life through accelerating an overcoming of the old in the service of the new. Individuals and states seeking solely the absence of pain mistake one of the great learning opportunities in life:

There is as much wisdom in pain as in pleasure: like pleasure, pain is one of the prime species-preserving forces. If it weren’t, it would have perished long ago: that it hurts is no argument against it—it is its essence. (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 179)
Nietzsche’s argument that pain preserves the species suggests that those states that evaluate decisions according to the avoidance of pain (and Nietzsche has the utilitarians in mind) may indeed be robbing citizens of their opportunities to survive. To decry pain, states appear to detach citizens from a feeling that is natural for them. We seek life, a constant overcoming, because “we simply can do no other” (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 6). Clearly, we overcome the past and anticipate the new through the experience of pain—which is, as Nietzsche notes elsewhere, the primary vehicle through which we make new memories (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 37).

Nietzsche clearly allows—or perhaps requires—the experience of pain in order to acquire depth according to his thought. Nietzsche’s difficulty, however, comes in making prescriptions for the infliction of pain on others, a case made difficult by our aversion to the thought that providing pain to those who do not ask for it lends a sense of growth. We may ask the moral question of whether it is better for us to receive pain than to inflict it; for Nietzsche, however, the vital interest in the experience of pain extends beyond that which is inflicted upon the self. Nietzsche is at ease making clear the notion that not only our pain is excused. In fact, Nietzsche makes the argument that one characteristic of “greatness” is the ability to withstand the pain one inflicts on others:

Who will attain something great if he does not feel in himself the power to **inflict** great pain?

Being able to suffer is the least; weak women and even slaves often achieve mastery at that. But not to perish of inner distress and uncertainty when one inflicts great suffering and hears the cry of this suffering—that is great; that belongs to greatness. (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 181)

One may find oneself overcome with guilt for the pain one has caused to another. For Nietzsche, however, this pain and suffering is simply a byproduct of the act of greatness; as such, the individual who inflicts the pain deserves no punishment or feeling of remorse in any ethical sense. Whether one feels guilt for inflicting pain or not is a test of temperament, not of moral fortitude. That “even weak women and slaves” can suffer suggests that the true category of greatness is reserved for the pain-givers, not those who merely receive a painful experience. This has tremendous importance for Nietzsche’s aristocratic politics, wherein leaders are forged with the call not to protect individuals, but to provide experiments in achieving what Nietzsche calls “greatness,” including experiments that may sacrifice the weak-willed in favor of the strong. A political theory like Mill’s, which bases political legitimacy on reciprocity and the ability to provide checks on the acts of others, furnishes the state with individuals incapable of realizing any degree of pleasure, thus valuing comfort as a stand-in for the feeling of overcoming obstacles.

What is it that we are seeking when we inflict pain on others? Nietzsche finds that pleasure and displeasure are not ends in themselves, but consequences of an entirely different motivation:

**Man does not** seek pleasure and **does not avoid** unpleasure: it will be clear which famous prejudice I am contradicting here. Pleasure and unpleasure are mere consequences, mere accompanying phenomena—what man wants, what every smallest part of a living organism wants, is an increment of power. Striving for this gives rise to both pleasure and unpleasure; out of that will man seeks resistance, needs something to oppose him. (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 264)

Pain itself is an “intellectual process” in which an individual recognizes something as “harmful,” but is neither endemic to the action nor to the individual itself. Pleasure and pain are after-effects of the primary motivation of gaining an “increment of power.” The experience of pain fosters the individual’s sense of strength by helping the self to realize its limits and, through these limits, to understand its will to power as it operates via the body. We no doubt find that pain is difficult to bear, but Nietzsche finds meaning in the belief that “the effect of that unpleasure is to stimulate life—and to strengthen the will to power!” (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 214)

Nietzsche is reversing the understanding of pain that associates it with guilt, remorse, and a desire for things to be different. The desire to place a moral significance on existence transforms the experience of
pain into something to be avoided, suggestive of a world out of order (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 28–29). In a late notebook entry, Nietzsche notes that psychology has harmed our understanding of ourselves by making certain that “all unpleasure, all unhappiness, has been adulterated with wrong and guilt—(pain has been robbed of its innocence)” (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 167). Pain, for Nietzsche, is not only useful, but also innocent with respect to its means and its effects. The association of pain with guilt—the subject of the second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality—fundamentally changes the self with respect to its relations to others and to its own life. Once pain loses its innocence, individuals begin to see their own pain and the pain they inflict on others through the lens of responsibility. In other words, pain becomes punishment.

**NIETZSCHE ON PUNISHMENT: FREE WILL AND CONSEQUENTIALISM**

Nietzsche’s complicated critique of punishment as a social and political practice seems to contend with the laudatory comments toward providing and taking painful experiences. In what does Nietzsche ground his critique of punishment, and does this critique sustain itself throughout his writings? This section argues that Nietzsche decries punishment as a specific type of pain-giving that is based not on personal or collective growth, but upon a moral of retribution that requires a murky utilization of free will. As Nietzsche’s philosophical project clarifies itself in his later writings, he begins to see the political advantage of punishment as a means of maintaining state power. Nietzsche’s middle writings tend to hold that punishment is an unacceptable sociopolitical practice because it relies on free will in order to prove desert; Nietzsche’s late notebooks, however, reveal a more mature understanding of the uses of punishment. Indeed, Nietzsche’s last word on punishment is a defense of the practice along consequentialist lines.

Nietzsche’s fascination with punishment begins as a key tool in the freedom of the will, a useful fiction employed by individuals and collectives for the purpose of providing security by promoting responsibility. Nietzsche’s response is a wholesale rejection of the concept of desert: “No one is accountable for his deeds; no one for his nature; to judge is the same thing as to be unjust” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 35). Nietzsche provides no philosophical space for punishment as a justifiable act or response; indeed, Nietzsche’s derision of free will suggests that punishment must come from another source than desert. He continues: “This also applies when the individual judges himself. The proposition is clear as daylight, and yet here everyone prefers to retreat back into the shadows and untruth: from fear of the consequences” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 35). Nietzsche argues here that our belief in desert grounds itself in a wish to resist pain and suffering (or, in the most utopian terms, the possibility of pain and suffering). Punishment, then, exhibits the worst public use of pain for Nietzsche; it is anti-life, it performs an escapist fantasy of liberal utopia, and it uses sanctioned pain (as punishment) to promise citizens a way out of experiencing their own pain. By moralizing pain via punishment, the state strips pain of its affirmative characteristics.

While there is no evidence that we indeed have a will capable of choosing to act or not to act, we uphold this belief because without it we cannot sustain the type of society we desire. While Nietzsche discredits the truth of accountability and the subsequent punishments that individuals place upon each other, this does not necessarily mean that punishment and accountability serve no purpose in contemporary life. In a late notebook entry, Nietzsche notes that “necessity, causality, purposiveness are useful illusions” (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 213). The twin notions of free will and punishment serve the purpose of allowing weak states to found themselves. The counterstrike here, for Nietzsche, is that punishment exhibits the weakness of the state. From The Genealogy of Morality: “To be incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for very long—that is the sign of strong, full natures” (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 475). The strong state will be the one that can afford, through a surplus of strength, to dissolve the useful fictions of free will and the right to punish.

Nietzsche develops this notion most fully in *Human, All Too Human*, a book rapt with concerns of free will and punishment. In a section titled “Justice that rewards,” Nietzsche claims:
He who has fully grasped the theory of total unaccountability can no longer accommodate so-called justice that punishes and rewards under the concept of justice at all… For he who is punished does not deserve the punishment … likewise, he who is rewarded does not deserve this reward: for he could not have acted otherwise than he did. … Neither punishment nor reward are something due to a person as his; they are given him for reasons of utility without his being able to lay any just claim to them. … If punishment and reward were abolished, the strongest motives for performing certain acts and not performing certain acts would also be abolished; mankind’s utility requires their continuance. (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 56–57)

Nietzsche ties the theory of free will tightly to the notion of desert, arguing that individuals do not deserve punishment or reward because they were indeed not free to act in another fashion. Nietzsche’s early annihilation of free will has troubled scholars who find in Nietzsche a source of self-creation that assumes agency. But, as Nietzsche maintains throughout this section, his critique of free will centers on the reasons for the notion of desert; that is, Nietzsche’s critique of punishment is a critique of the notion that pain should come only when it is deserved, when it is a manner of retribution. Nietzsche’s antiretributive argument is not centered in the impossibility of correcting behavior, but in the necessity of sustaining an illusory center of agency.

Nietzsche’s central question on the matter of free will and punishment follows directly from his critique of modernity’s political and juridical reliance on a notion of free will: “have the adherents of the theory of free-will the right to punish?” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 312). Nietzsche puts free will to the test in claiming that, while individuals who do not have knowledge of good and bad reasons for action are generally not punished, the punishment that results from individuals who “should have known better” rests on no better ground. What exactly is it that free-will adherents believe should be punished? Nietzsche finds that it is not intelligence (because how could intelligence decide against ‘better reasons’?), but “willfulness, in a case in which willfulness ought not to reign, which is punished” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 313). Individuals are punished for employing free will, that is, for “act[ing] without a reason where he ought to have acted in accordance with reasons” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 313). Individuals are punished for invoking the will, for suspending the determined values of action and rationality in favor of the willed action without reason. The action is nonrational, unintentional, not acting “contrary to his intelligence” because, according to the doctrine of free will, one chose without reason, “without motive, without origin, something purposeless and non-rational.” The perpetrator did not act contrary to his intelligence, because he made a choice through willfulness that denied the input of rationality. Through a nonrational act, then, the individual cannot be considered criminally responsible under the halo of free will. Nietzsche concludes: “You adherents of the theory of ‘free will’ have no right to punish, your own principles deny you that right!” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 313).

Nietzsche’s critique of free will ultimately undermines punishment but does not correspondingly undermine pain as a useful concept and practice. What Nietzsche attempts is to disenchant the practice of punishment as something deserved and as a civilized practice of retribution. Punishment, simply put, is a weak person’s (and weak state’s) use of pain; Nietzsche decries the moral explanation of the action—the claim that one must have a reason to punish that goes beyond the self—but not the action itself. Political modernity requires punishment in order to ground its individualist claims to self-government—Locke struggles with this reality in the Second Treatise—but the attempt to confront the reality of the affirmative value of pain by moralizing its necessity sidesteps the important role that what Nietzsche later calls “mnemotechnics” plays in situating adherence, community, and docility in becoming a subject.

Nietzsche’s early critique of free will leads him to reject both the practice of punishment as well as the right to punish. As Nietzsche’s philosophy progresses, however, his mature vision of the question of free will provides some clarity. In particular, a passage from Beyond Good and Evil illuminates what Nietzsche is critiquing when he examines free will: “The ‘un-free-will’ is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills” (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 23). What separates the strong will from the
weak? The major question is whether Nietzsche’s later works affirm a sort of self-creative agency, in contradiction to his denial of free will. While Gemes (2007) has argued that Nietzsche intends to separate “deserts” free will (which he denies) to “agency” free will (which he supports), it is unclear how this agency manifests itself without existing prior to its application.

Nietzsche’s early and middle works tie the critique of punishment to the larger critique of free will. Nietzsche’s late notebooks, however, reveal a more nuanced defense of punishment along consequentialist lines. Nietzsche’s late notebooks take a distant look at the uses of punishment and suggest what it is that punishment can and should do:

The concept of punishment should be reduced to the concept of putting down a rebellion, security measures against the one put down (total or partial imprisonment). But the punishment should not express contempt: at any rate a criminal is a man who risks his life, his honor, his freedom—a man of courage. Likewise, punishment should not be taken as penance; or as clearing a debt, as if there were a relation of barter between guilt and punishment—punishment does not purify, for crime does not pollute. (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 183)

Here Nietzsche turns the concept of “punishment,” wherein we believe that individuals are responsible because of their ability to choose a different path, and turns it into “suppression,” an effort geared toward maintaining or increasing a state’s level of power. Punishment, in Nietzsche’s new vision, does not attempt to return a state to a previously held position of purity nor does it attempt to turn a prisoner into a lesser human being. Punishment no longer takes into account whether individuals are responsible or not; instead of righting the moral order, punishment-as-suppression takes power as the primary value of a state. This vision of punishment, nearly Nietzsche’s last word on the subject, is punishment beyond morality. Nietzsche suggests that punishment can exist even after the theory of free will is annihilated; although, of course, it will not be punishment in the same sense.

Other sections within the late notebooks suggests that Nietzsche would like to do away with the concept of punishment altogether. Nietzsche argues “that one takes the idiosyncrasies of society out of existence in general (guilt, punishment, justice, honesty, freedom, love, etc.)” (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 162). Under the heading of “My Five Nos,” Nietzsche argues that he is motivated by a “struggle against guilt and against mixing the concept of punishment into the physical and metaphysical world, likewise into psychology and the interpretation of history” (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 172). Nietzsche sustains his critique of punishment, all the while maintaining that it can exist even after our belief in free will subsides. In Nietzsche’s late works, it is important to know that just because the moral-historical reasons behind punishment—that is, punishment’s particular meaning—subsides, that there will still be a purpose for inflicting pain and for absorbing pain. States can still punish, but the meaning of that punishment changes dramatically. States, under Nietzsche’s notion, would no longer concern themselves with the “truth” of punishment, but with the effect of that punishment upon the state itself. As a matter of strengthening, punishment offers possibility.

Nietzsche’s consequentialist defense of punishment depicts a transformation of attention from metaphysical to political considerations of punishment. Nietzsche’s denial of punishment as a concept is largely bound in considerations of the metaphysical claims of reward and punishment by transcendent force; when reduced to mere politics, Nietzsche’s consequentialist defense of punishment supports the practice in a limited, after-moral manner. If individuals and states cease attaching metaphysical significance to punishment, Nietzsche uncovers real value in the practice as a means of maintaining and extending state power, while allowing offenders to maintain dignity and suffer only the punishment, not the transcendent after-effects. The state allows itself to punish as a means of going beyond moral outrage toward experimentalism between parties looking to express power.
“AN ARISTOCRATIC SEPARATION FROM THE CROWD”:
THE STRENGTH OF STATES AND SELVES

Nietzsche’s critique of political modernity exists along several planes, primarily dealing with concepts central to the modern philosophical spirit. A persistent source of critique for Nietzsche, particularly when it pertains to pain and punishment, is the utilitarian theory of justice promoted by, among others, John Stuart Mill. Nietzsche’s distaste for Mill’s version of liberalism goes beyond pain and pleasure, however, as it extends to a criticism of reciprocity as a valid political concept:

Against J. Stuart Mill: I abhor that vulgarity of his which says: ‘What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander’ … which wants to base the whole of human intercourse on mutuality of services rendered, so that every action appears as a kind of payment for something that’s been done for us … ‘Reciprocity’ is a great piece of vulgarity; precisely that something I do could not be, and ought not to be done by someone else, that there must be no settling up … that in a deeper sense one never pays anything back, because one is something unique and only does unique things—this fundamental conviction contains the cause of aristocratic separation from the crowd, because the crowd believes in ‘equality’ and consequently in ‘reciprocity’ and the possibility of settling up. (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 226)

The politics of reciprocity, which includes the justification of punishment as a means of setting things straight, reduces the uniqueness of individuals and places them in an ethical sphere of compulsive action and reaction. For Nietzsche, the demand for reciprocity as a demand of justice places undue burden on individuals who, out of their own power, commit acts that serve to strengthen themselves. Those with strength need not be compelled to act in accordance with a law that does not suit their needs. According to Nietzsche’s “aristocratic separation,” there are tests of strength that do not measure a person’s abilities to obey transcendent orders but experiment with vital value.

Nietzsche’s trenchant criticisms of socialism make the case that state protection of individual citizens, while well meaning, often enfeebles those citizens and renders them incapable of overcoming their mores: “The state is a prudent institution for the protection of individuals against one another: if it is completed and perfected too far it will in the end enfeeble the individual and, indeed, dissolve him” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 113).

Nietzsche’s concerns about modern states and their overprotection leads him to argue that, in order to become ‘deeper,’ individuals and states have to be able to get past security, to be willing to experiment with possibility. The modern fixation with security does not offer the chance for individuals to gain victory over circumstances because circumstances are controlled to the degree that individuals keep comfortable, out of fear for the consequences of losing:

To aim for equal rights and ultimately equal needs, an almost inevitable consequence of our kind of civilization of commerce and the equal value of votes in politics, brings with it the exclusion and slow extinction of the higher, more dangerous, stranger and, in short, newer men: experimentation ceases, so to speak, and a certain stasis is achieved. (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 232)

Nietzsche’s discussion of modern politics almost inevitably includes a warning of the consequences of equality. In this case, equality, the desire to lend to citizens not only equal rights but equal needs, lessens the diversity of power and achievement in a society and, in a sense, replaces expressivity with security as primary value of the society itself. The greatest consequence of this development (which is ongoing, in Nietzsche’s view) is that “experimentation ceases” and states and individuals grow hollow and stale.

Nietzsche’s argument with modern politics highlights the relationship between democratic legitimacy and reciprocity between individuals within the polity. Reciprocity as a political value binds individuals to actions that can be performed (or repaid) by the other; that is, reciprocity limits individuals to each other in ways that distort natural relationships and difference. Nietzsche’s alternative vision values
experimentation, and allows individuals to absorb defeat and pain in the exercise of something deeper: “The best thing about a great victory is that it takes the fear of defeat out of the victor: ‘Why not also be defeated once?’ he says to himself; ‘I’m rich enough for that now’” (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 134).

States which seek peace (the macro-level equivalent of individual security) do so out of poverty of power; the Nietzschean state, by contrast, consistently experiments with alternatives that allow it to both express and extend its sphere of influence. States, as individuals, should not seek primarily to express themselves but to extend themselves, to overcome themselves and consistently experiment with the new in any form in which it may arise. Nietzsche speaks of the “brave and creative men” who “never see pleasure and suffering as ultimate questions of value—they are accompanying states, one must want both if one wants to achieve anything” (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 142). The aristocratic separation from the crowd involves the pursuit of a wealth of strength that allows individuals to express their generosity toward other opportunities; this generosity, in the form of an expression of vital force, is not an ethical but a vital release. In this sense, Nietzsche’s test of individual and collective strength manifests itself in the demonstration of experimental vitalism, the principle of action that replaces morality.

The strength of states after morality’s overcoming is based on the state’s willingness and power to experiment: “a culture of the exception, of experiment, danger, nuance, as a consequence of a great wealth of forces: every aristocratic culture tends toward this” (Nietzsche, 2003, p. 163). As Abbey and Appel note, “All exercises of power should be directed at the flourishing of higher individuals” (Abbey and Appel, 1998, p. 310). Higher individuals are those who are able to absorb pain without adding a particular meaning to that pain. Those aristocratic separatists who are the exception, and who experiment, are acted in such a way that they replace reciprocity as a goal of political life. This includes, importantly, the reciprocal aspects of punishment.

Nietzsche’s affirmative vision of aristocratic politics makes clear the connection between pain and punishment. Nietzsche’s creative affirmation of pain as well as his critique of punishment forms a political alternative to reciprocity as a model for politics. Nietzsche notes that the “seal of having become free” is “No longer to be ashamed before oneself” (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 153). Strength of states and selves allows for the psychological freedom of irresponsibility for the pains of others combined with an immanent prescription of meaning for individual pain and pleasure. Nietzsche’s theory of punishment becomes necessary for understanding how it is that states preserve their power, and how it is that individuals enfeeble themselves within the state’s bounds. Nietzsche’s transvaluation of political values—turning reciprocity, security, freedom, and happiness into strength, power, hierarchy, experimentation, and depth—provide both a critique of modern values and a toolkit for the one who wishes to overcome political modernity through a rethinking of its core concepts.

**CONCLUSION**

This essay addresses the question of Nietzsche’s affirmation of pain as a means of growth, combined with his distaste for punishment as a practice of modern politics. More broadly, Nietzsche’s philosophy of pain and pleasure highlights his broader critique of modernity, the attempt to justify the state according to its ability to provide security for individuals. Nietzsche’s critique of political modernity can be best understood as an attack on security as a political value; indeed, Nietzsche’s valorization of pain and his aristocratic separation from the crowd are specifically hierarchical and not contract-based, while his views on punishment are decidedly anti-retributivist and, especially in the later work, consequentialist in theory. Nietzsche’s contribution to modern political theory is to call into question the valuation of safety and security, and possibly to awaken individuals and collectives to the values on which they place the highest value. The major question for those who wish to incorporate Nietzsche’s critical political theory without taking seriously his aristocratic separatism is: can one incorporate a critical vision that is a wholesale rejection of the modern model without applying Nietzsche’s aristocratic political theory. Nietzsche’s views on pain and punishment constitute a rejection of modern politics from which Nietzsche leaves room only for an aristocratic alternative that is unsettling but perhaps not unlivable.
Experimental vitalism constitutes Nietzsche’s response to the central value of security in modern political thought. The experience of pain, whether physical or mental (and Nietzsche does not often make the distinction), contains serious possibilities for growth. Nietzsche’s valuation of pain is not a progress narrative; in other words, he does not claim that individuals will necessarily improve their lives through experimenting with disparate values. But Nietzsche holds open the question of whether pain is a deeper means of growth than the safety of the modern liberal state. The question of political possibility is the same question Nietzsche will ask of modern culture, art, literature, and philosophy: does it express life? Does it enhance life? Nietzsche’s always tentative answer to these questions is dependent upon the experiments individuals and states undertake and the values they yield.

REFERENCES

ENDNOTES

1 While Nietzsche is often taken as politically engaged, many theorists question whether he is politically relevant—that is, engaged in questions important to modern and postmodern political theory. See, in particular, Schact (1983); Williams (1993); Berkowitz (1995); Nehamas (1987); Abbey and Appel (1998).

2 Shaw concludes her study by noting that “So long as there is still a gap between the demands of normative authority and the demands of political authority, legitimacy remains a mere aspiration. Nietzsche’s insights do not entail the view that we should give up on this aspiration, rather that we should preserve the conditions of its possibility, without ever assuming that it has been fulfilled.”

3 From The Gay Science: “The general inexperience with both sorts of pain and the relative rarity of the sight of suffering individuals have an important consequence: pain is hated much more now than formerly” (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 61).

4 In Daybreak, Nietzsche argues: “‘In doing this you will cause pain to many people.’—I know; and I know also that I shall have to suffer twofold for it: once from pity at their suffering, and then through the revenge they will take on me. Nonetheless it is no less necessary that I should do as I do” (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 467).

5 Ansell-Pearson (1994) notes: “In contrast to the Hobbesian tradition, therefore, Nietzsche thinks of the law of life, not as ‘self-preservation’, but as ‘self-overcoming’. This leads him to an entirely novel conception and justification of power, one which has dramatic influence on his thinking about morals and politics” (48–49).