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**EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION: WHAT'S
PAST IS PROLOGUE**

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Rudolph Augstein (1983) published a short editorial "About Hobbes and Us" in *Der Spiegel* several years ago.¹ The point of his piece was that our intellectual vision is more acute because of the brilliance of individuals like Thomas Hobbes; "we stand on their shoulders," he declared. It is the received wisdom that Hobbes commands by the clarity of his logic. From this conventional approach to Hobbes and the great tradition we wish to distance ourselves. For us the reason that Plato, Hobbes, Marx, Niebuhr and others in the great tradition speak to our condition is that they illuminate our deep feelings. For example, Hobbes tells us, whether we strike for security, for gain, for glory or some combination of these, that we create our own destinies by the moral and political choices we make. In this project we are also separating ourselves a little bit from Hobbes because we do not follow Hobbes's Delphic principle of rating ourselves. Like him, we are principally concerned with political obligation; unlike him, we are using small sample theory and Q-methodology² in order to discover the deep feelings of a group of student subjects on this issue. In a concluding section we ask how the above named members of the great tradition attempt to deal with the deep concerns we find among our student sample.

Our project originated in our reaction to two early efforts to make empirical investigations of political obligation. The first was a paper by William Reid and James Henderson³ which followed a suggestion by Richard Flatham that "because political obligation presupposes the existence of the most fundamental rules of society, the enactments of political authorities...", "one way to understand its practice is to "concern ourselves with types of beliefs, reasons, intentions, purposes, judgments, and choices, held, given, framed, and made by...(persons) participating in the practice."⁴ Reid and Henderson distinguished eight theories of

obligation from the literature of political philosophy and styled them as 1. Plato's "elite wisdom view," 2. St. Paul's absolutist approach, 3. Luther's "dreadful consequences view," 4. Bentham's egoistic utilitarianism, 5. Bentham's "social utilitarianism," 6. Bentham's view of duty, 7. a libertarian view reflected in the American Declaration of Independence, and 8. the populist view reflected in the French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen. Using Q technique they interrogated thirty-seven Maine citizens whom they found quite able to comprehend the implications of these various conceptions and who fell into five different attitude structures which they styled as Hobbesian, Rousseauist democrat, judicial conservative, libertarian, and utilitarian. What struck us most from this early empirical search for why people obey the law was their finding that their respondents including libertarians and Hobbesians all ranked highly those statements that related them to the community.

For purposes of our project, the major importance of the second paper by Austin Sarat was that his sample of 220 adults from Madison, Wisconsin, whom he interviewed, showed an over 70 percent agreement with the statement, "The law must always be obeyed,"⁵ with only 18 percent disagreeing and over 11 percent professing not to know. According to Sarat the "most striking feature of the reasoning used both in support of and in opposition to the idea of always obeying the law was its convergence on many of the same standards of judgment...There were no anarchists in my sample, none who rejected the idea of law and legal regulation;..."⁶ It was because our experience with friends, neighbors, and students was different that we undertook this project; our experience suggested the existence of a more rebellious group. Possibly the results of these two early experiments were artifacts of methodology. This may, of course, have been true of our experiments as well.

THE EARLY EXPERIMENTS

In our first experiment,⁷ a group of beginning political science students was asked to respond to two questions: 1. Why do you obey rules laid down by the government? and 2. Under what conditions would you disobey the law? From their written responses, forty statements were secured which could be divided evenly over the eight theories of obligation with which Reid and Henderson commenced. We also secured some statements rejecting obligation to particular laws (narcotics, draft), to particular circumstances (speeding laws in medical emergency), and to an unjust political system. Nineteen of these statements were added to our Q-sample. We assumed that by securing statements from our students, we would get ideas in their idiom and meaningful to them. Then the Q-statements were administered back to the sixteen original authors and also to twelve advanced students in political theory and fifteen individuals residing in Portage County, Ohio.

The results of our initial experiment were quite different from the earlier studies, and these results were consistently supported in the three subsequent experiments. Q-factor analysis led us to conclude that the three factors which always appeared might provisionally be styled as 1. those concerned with issues of personal conscience, 2. those obedient for reasons of self-interest, and 3. those who regard politics as a game they can win or lose. As with the studies of Reid and Henderson and Sarat we found no 'Tina Turner' factor committed to "break every rule." However, we did find anarchists, good citizens for their own reasons, and game-players. What follows provides evidence for our findings, and evidence that some in the great tradition were thinking about how to deal with the kinds of individuals we have discovered.

THE FOURTH EXPERIMENT

The principal purpose of this fourth experiment was substantially different from the earlier experiments. In

collaboration with Dan Thomas and Larry Baas,⁸ we sought to integrate the parallel developments in political science and psycho-developmental analyses of moral reasoning vis-a-vis the law. Again Q-methodology was used in assessing political obligation and the results were integrated using objective measures of the development of moral judgment. We found some correspondence between cognitive structure, or moral reasoning, on one hand, and the political-legal predispositions, on the other. While the conclusions of this study are reported elsewhere, it is the results of the Q sorting of eighty-four students in the fourth experiment who were recruited from undergraduate and graduate political science courses in four different colleges and universities in Iowa, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Alaska that require our attention now. During 1980-1981 subjects were instructed to model their opinions with respect to the statements in the Q-sample used in the second experiment by using the same rank-ordering from -5 (most disagree) to +5 (most agree) according to the following continuum:

Score	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
# of items	2	4	6	6	8	8	8	6	6	4	2

The data were analyzed as in earlier studies. The eighty-four Q-sorts were subjected to a Q-mode principal components factor analysis, with rotation by varimax criteria. Again the Q-factor analysis generated three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 with all but three respondents loading significantly on one or more of the three factors. The principled, deferential, and egocentrics factor which we discovered are displayed in our order to facilitate the purposes of this paper.

Factor 1: Principled Political Obligation includes 11 subjects. Those on this factor are uncomfortable with the idea of unquestioned and automatic compliance with law, possibly because they lack any confidence in the lawmakers. Crucial statements reflecting their point of view include the following statements:

Ordinarily I am law abiding. However, I would disobey individual laws that pervert the intentions of public order and are destructive of society. +5,0,+3

There are occasions when civil disobedience is proper, but never revolution in its violent forms. +4,0,-1

I disobey those laws that violate my conception of right and wrong. +3,-2,+1

I would not allow myself to be drafted because I am a pacifist and do not believe in fighting. +3,-3,-3

I would obey only those laws handed down by the government when I think they are fair and made with the interest of the people in mind. +3,0,+1

For this factor the coercive capacity of public authority provides little support for civil obedience.

I obey because of fear of reprisal, either by social pressure or by agents of the government. -4,-1,-1

Individuals fitting into this framework insist on deciding for themselves the degree to which they are obliged by the community to follow the law.

Factor 2: Deferential Obligation includes 30 respondents and is the most populous of the three. Individuals in this group are uncomfortable about making personal decisions; they prefer to depend upon some rule. Accordingly, the law is prior to personal conviction; these people find little room for civil disobedience. This is how they express their preference and aversions:

The majority of laws are to protect myself and others, and if these laws are not obeyed, people, including myself, may be injured. +2,+5,+2

Individuality is expressed by deviation from the general morality established by law. The rights of individuality came before the law. 0,-5,-1

I have the habit of obedience because the laws are the measures of men's experience and collective judgment taught me by my parents, church, and school. 0,+4,0

Because individuals on this factor are willing to try reforms within the

system, we have usually characterized them as good, albeit, self-interested citizens.

Rather than breaking a law, I would prefer to persuade lawmakers to change the law. Breaking the law is an act of rebellion. +1,+4,-1

It is the fear of the sovereign that provides for this group a sense of security.

If people constantly disobeyed governmental rules, our world would be in a state of chaos. +2,+5,+1

I will only disobey those laws which conflict with my ethical standards, and my ethical standards are situational. +1,-4,0

Deference to the law and suppression of private judgment seems to provide our good citizens with the greatest comfort.

Factor 3: Egocentric "Obligation" includes 20 individuals, and it is in some respects a mirror image of our citizens of factor 2. For example, "law" and "order" are viewed more as a constrictive than an enabling force, and for the students on this factor the laws are imposed by somewhat distant authorities unworthy of respect in their own right.

I would disobey the government's laws if these laws were to ever harm me personally. +2,0,+4

I obey the law because I help choose the lawmakers. -2,-1,+4

Because our lawmakers know more about the problems of our country, I feel certain that I can trust them. Therefore, I obey their decisions. -5,-2,-5

It is evident that individuals on this factor have some similarities to our "Principled" factor 1, and this similarity is also demonstrated in their lack of concern for the coercive capacity of government. However, our "Ego-centrics" do not moralize. For them politics has similarities to a game.

An assault of someone, including a public official, upon me or a member of my family would lead me to consider revenge. Governments don't make life less nasty or brutish. -2,-1,+4

I don't see anything wrong with breaking a law as long as I am the only one who could be harmed from it, but I think that I am obliged to accept the consequences. +2,-2,+4

I obey the law because I am forced to by the government. -4,-3,-4

Subjects on this factor are unblushing individualists who calculate their profit rather than a public good. Accordingly, they disapprove of the following:

I obey the law because there is a common benefit in order and I feel an obligation to contribute to the commonwealth no matter what the cost. 0,0,-4

A striking conclusion from our four experiments arises from the consistency of the results. In each the same three factors emerged. The differences within the factors were minor. The anarchist factor we reported on in the first experiment then evolved into what we later described as the "Principled" factor in the last experiment. Possibly as the Vietnam War receded into the background in time and as the Kent State massacre lost its salience as an image when we included students from three other states, the anarchists no longer were as apparent; merging instead into the "Principled" factor.

Another feature that is notable is the self regarding character of all our subject reactions. The "Principled" were concerned with their own conscience, the "Deferentials" were preoccupied with their security, and the "Egocentrics" wanted to win, or at least, not to lose. It must be emphasized that we are in no way dealing with a representative sample; for example, most of our subjects were students. Still, we are arguing that these factors reflect persistent structures of feeling and attitudes that statesmen only ignore at their peril. Naturally, we were not astonished that political philosophers have been dealing

with human beings such as we empirically discovered. Consequently, our concluding section deals with the various solutions proposed by our representatives from the great tradition.

THE MESSAGES OF THE TRADITION

At this point we need to shift our focus. Thus far we have emphasized the internal organizations of the factors. We need now to consider how the presence of these differing kinds of individuals in the political world would affect one's understanding of the problem of governing.

In order to get at this problem, we propose a small thought experiment. We shall consider how Hobbes, Niebuhr, and Plato might interpret the role of the sovereign with respect to the existence of these different factors. It is our contention that each of these philosophers anticipates tacitly many of our results. It is also our contention that each represents a systematically different and typical response to those results. Our choices of instruments are neither random nor innocent.

The received wisdom with respect to each would suggest that justice for each falls simply into the views of one factor apiece: Plato and a principled approach to justice; Niebuhr and a community approach; Hobbes--an egoistic one. We contend that the appreciation of each philosopher for reality is much richer.

We shall take Hobbes first. Hobbes presents two accounts of political obligation, each of which touches our problem.⁹ Hobbes is interested in accounting for the obligation of the subjects to obey the dictums of the sovereign. That is well known. Hobbes is also concerned with the duties of the sovereign which themselves are no less obligations for being less formally and clearly defined by the original contract.

First and foremost Hobbes is concerned with the obligations of subjects. His argument takes two forms. One form is formal and normative. The

other aspect is empirical and normative as well. As a matter of principle deduced formally from postulates concerning human nature at its most fundamental, subjects ought not disobey or disregard the will of the sovereign. This is so because of the logically demonstrated fiction that the sovereign's will is the will of the subject. Both, after all, will peace. Further, the formal argument is supported by the normative presupposition that promises ought to be obeyed.

But, as a matter of fact, subjects will disobey the sovereign. They will do so in Hobbes' view when they ought not do so, and, when they should not do so. That is to say that subjects will rebel even when it is in violation of their promise to obey; and even when it is, in fact, not in their best interests. That subjects would behave this way is an example of human frailty which Hobbes calls foolishness. Hobbes is careful, though, to point out that the fool is mistaken in his eagerness to get away with something on both moral and practical grounds.

It is, however, in Hobbes' treatment of the sovereign's duties that he anticipates our findings. The sovereign's will must be to do those things which tend to peaceful ends. While to say that one has an obligation to do what one wills is a little odd, it would seem that when one remembers Hobbes' appeal to the laws of nature that that is in essence his position regarding the duties of the sovereign. The problem that the sovereign faces is that his will cannot be fragmented even though the peace it must aim at has a variety of objects.

Hobbes seems to feel that some men will be influenced by his arguments based upon principle. Even though the principle Hobbes proposes employs the idiom of self-interest or egocentricity, the form of the argument itself is "principled." This is an argument that a Hobbesian sovereign has at his disposal. Obviously such an appeal might be approved of by our factor 1 individuals.

Hobbes' discussion of religion and other social mores are usually taken, probably appropriately, as examples of Hobbes' moral relativism. But it contributes as well to a view of social engineering which would appeal tacitly to our deferential factor 2 individuals. These individuals are not preeminently concerned with the content of the sovereign's rules so much as they are concerned that the sovereign be a rule-maker in all matters.

No one can neglect the fact that Hobbes aims at a sovereign who is sufficiently awesome as to terrify each of his subjects. At the same time Hobbes is wise enough to recognize that there exist individuals--possibly too many of them--who are not given to fright in normal commerce with their fellow subjects. Hence the wise sovereign also appeals to the subjects' principles while employing whatever means at his disposal to "socialize" his subjects. Even so, Hobbes worried about those "fools" who would not see their own advantage to be derived from obedience to the rules laid down by the sovereign. The ecocentric inside his own veil of ignorance can only be dealt with in Hobbes' view by giving him what he thinks he wants. Thus, the Hobbesian sovereign employs appearances to his advantage in dealing with those cynics on factor 3 who expect precisely that. It is Hobbes' view, however, that these fools are fooling themselves. Still, this is the dangerous game into which the Hobbesian sovereign is driven.

In sum, the sovereign for Hobbes is aware that his subjects will have different views of their obligations. The sovereign is aware of the various contents of those obligations in order to balance them in the service of peace. The substance of our findings is that justice is served in Hobbes' view by balancing the conflicting wills of subjects rather than any predetermined will of sovereigns.

Many things about Reinhold Niebuhr's approach to our problem are not all that dissimilar to Hobbes.¹⁰ Niebuhr's goal

is, like that of Hobbes, to find a check against barbarism and ideological extremism. Niebuhr wants to avoid ideologies which lead to totalitarianism from one angle and moral cynicism which leads there from another. At the same time Niebuhr does not want to deny the sources in human nature of these movements. To do otherwise would devastate the religious basis for his view of human transcendence.

Niebuhr, like Hobbes, forces us to confront the problem of governing in ways which anticipate the findings of our Q studies. His project is to find a basis for maintaining a free society in light of a seemingly perverse human nature. That nature is two-fold: indeterminacy and vitality. In other words, human nature is both unknowable and changing in creative fashions. These are reasons in his view for supporting freedom wherever possible; however, it does not make the problem of governing any less difficult. To the contrary, that humans have transcendent possibilities makes the art of legislation profoundly difficult.

The indeterminacy of humans produces conflict among them for precisely the same reasons as Hobbes' diffidence. But in a well-ordered community Niebuhr would see the laws of nature as playing a much different role in the process of governing than Hobbes would have envisioned. In Niebuhr's view the laws of nature inform solons. Thus, the laws of nature inform the process of doing justice, rather than telling about the ends of doing justice as Hobbes would have it.

In Niebuhr's view, justice must be done for all in a much more determinant fashion than for Hobbes in spite of the very indeterminacy which is supposed to be the very essence of our humanness.

Actually, the way out of this apparent dilemma is not as difficult as it might seem, and the relief comes in a fashion surprisingly close to our research findings. In general, any community needs to follow as best it can the prescripts of natural law, e.g.

equality. Still, it is Niebuhr's contention that no community will be able to perfectly apply more than proximate solutions to particular cases. Yet another difficulty is his requirement that all aspects of the community be open to challenge. It seems unlikely on the face of it that a Niebuhrian solon has much hope of a peaceful term in office.

Yet Niebuhr like Hobbes offers some fascinating advice to rulers. First, one must be aware that all humans share some primary needs which, if satisfied, go a long way toward providing for a stable basis for communal life. More on the point, Niebuhr finds it inexcusable that some might acquire great wealth. He sees no excuse for any one individual or group exercising inordinate control over significant parts of the means of production. In this connection, it should be pointed out that Niebuhr doesn't fear managers as much as oligarchs.

Along with Niebuhr's rather sympathetic reading of Marx, Niebuhr informs us that while man's nature is individually indeterminate, it is subject to a definite spiritual hierarchy. Man at his least is concerned with his own well-being physically, emotionally, and economically. Man, when he has moved beyond this egoism, is a creature of the community in which he lives. This communal man finds a richness and satisfaction in community life beyond most Hobbesians, but perhaps not so different as our "differentials." Lastly, man is capable of realizing his transcendent nature through religious experience.

The applications of the laws of nature certainly vary according to the rank of individuals within this Niebuhrian hierarchy. The poor require a basic standard of living, and the respect that comes from knowing that no one is by definition more privileged than they. The saintly perhaps need even less. The bulk of the community needs the freedom to challenge its own values and the vibrancy of a social life which makes those values virtually unassailable.

It is not clear how a community is to eliminate poverty or create a new

Florence or Athens. But Niebuhr gives us the shape of a program for dealing with different kinds of people whom one would expect to have organized attitudes towards political obligation similar to that of our Q factors.

It matters very much to Niebuhr that individuals have differing views of the world and their place in it. This is also true for Hobbes. What is very different for the two is their view of the nature of justice. For Hobbes, justice is essentially an appearance contrived for the sake of achieving peace. It would not be farfetched to say that for Hobbes, peace is justice, except one needs to understand for Hobbes the peace is constantly in the process of being created. On the other hand, Niebuhr is concerned with justice and peace too, but for him justice is a term laden with specific content not what he would consider mere process. For Niebuhr to do justice would require a different kind of treatment for each of the ranks in his spiritual hierarchy. In their turn each of our different factors would have different expectations about their relationship with Niebuhrian community. It seems to us that Niebuhr's approach to the problem of government is to try to find a common ground between the demands of natural law and the needs of the different kinds of individuals. But, whereas Hobbes would find that grounds in the process of creating justice, Niebuhr would find it in the context of just laws.

Plato brings to our consideration his own unique perspective.¹¹ Charged in The Republic with proving that justice is superior to injustice, Socrates goes about the construction of ideal cities in words. Because of the importance, perhaps, of his union of philosophy and power, most commentators focus upon the last of Socrates' cities. We need to remember three of the cities in The Republic: the city of pigs, the city of dogs and the city ruled by the philosopher-king.

The city of pigs is by far the most like paradise of the three. Individuals

in the city of pigs live their lives in near luxury, with plenty to eat, and lots of entertainment to keep them happy. Our egocentric factor which cares nothing for politics except for the fruits of the contest would find the city of pigs most appealing.

The city of dogs is outside the walls of the city of pigs. The "guardians" who inhabit the city of dogs are subjected to an extraordinary education, stringent childbearing practices, elaborate brainwashing procedures, and a rigidly monitored lifestyle. Obviously our "egocentrics" would want no part of such a city, but those who fear surprises, who look for leadership, and who need order and community might see utopia in Plato's city of dogs. Our deferential factor 2 individuals, for example, would probably prefer to cast their lot with the guardians than risk the free-and-easy self-indulgence of the city of pigs.

The perfect city Plato argues is the city in which philosophy and power go hand-in-hand. In the city ruled by the Philosopher-king, certain knowledge informs the actions of the members of the city. This knowledge comes, of course, from the contemplation of the underlying principles which governed our daily world. Our Factor 1 individuals would view this city alone as the one which would meet all their criteria for obedience. This is because in this city there is no gap between the knowledge of the citizens and that of the city as a whole.

In each of the cities Plato describes special care given to the question of obedience. There is especially a good deal of attention given to the obligation of a philosopher to rule. It turns out that philosophers are only likely to feel such an obligation when they are the product of a conscious attempt to create philosophical knowledge on the part of one city. This leads readers of The Republic into a kind of chicken-and-egg problem in which it is unclear whether philosophy might ever assume control in any city. But the point really seems to be that philosophers do not feel obliged

to obey force. Indeed, the whole dialogue often seems to be an object-lesson making just this point as Socrates continually confounds his kidnappers.

Throughout The Republic Plato seems convinced that force is of little use in creating obligations. The city of pigs needs little if any coercion because of the plenty which they enjoy. The city of dogs is content to obey the conventions of their society; and, while it is common in modern literature to claim that conventions may themselves be violent for individuals, it does not seem so in Plato's view.

The most important similarity in these cities is the presence of justice in each. Socrates claims each time that he is constructing examples of justice. Indeed, the creation of justice is most problematic where the creation of the city is most at issue--with the philosopher-king. In each of the cases justice comes, if it comes at all, from giving to each his due. This is the original sense of justice proposed at the outset in The Republic, and Socrates seeks only to explain it, not refute it. It seems then that "due-ness" is defined by the individual's state of self-awareness. It is, however, not so certain, as it is with Niebuhr, whether or not there is a hierarchy of self-understandings at work in the descriptions of the three cities. It is usually held that Philosophers have a higher and preferable level of self-understanding. It is also the case in the Myth of Er that given a choice, Odysseus wisely prefers the life of a simple man.

Where does all this leave us methodologically? One might choose to feel happier and more secure about the wisdom of at least parts of the tradition. It appears to us that the insights of these individuals certainly do reflect an appreciation of individual differences of type and kind, and an appreciation of the necessity of coping in governing with the substance of each type.

Where does all of this take us? Substantively, it would seem first of all that the wide-spread contemporary prejudice against the uniformity of mass man with his "apolitical," materialistic value structure is not universal. At least it is not to be found in the writings of representatives of such disparate groups as classical liberals, neoconservatives, or Platonists. We find as well much less emphasis upon violence on the part of the state as a means of creating obligations than one might have expected. Further, the differences between the treatments accorded the groupings seem dependent in large part upon the specific view of justice that a writer holds: justice as process, justice as law, or justice as self-understanding.

So we may conclude that when one looks at the problem of governing from the standpoint that different kinds of people exist in the world, one must turn to a conception of justice which varies from case-to-case to cope with the problem. This seems to us to be a valuable lesson to have gained from these projects. But, it should be noted that there are at least two perspectives which would deny our conclusions. From an anarchist position our concern with the problem of government is simply a problem stated wrongly. It is really a problem of living that is at issue. To live well might mean to purge one's own self of even the very limited acceptance of the state found in some versions of our so-called "principled" factor. Indeed, in our first Q study of political obligation, we argued that this group could be thought of as anarchists of a sort. Here we have been concerned with how political philosophy might deal with the individuals on different factors, not the internal workings of the factors themselves. We can only note the irrelevance in large part of the city or the state for Plato's philosophers or Niebuhr's transcendent personalities.

There is another perspective missing as yet from our analysis which would argue that we have stated the problem of governing wrongly. From a

Marxist point of view, the factor structures we report must by definition be related to class structures. If one eliminates class differences, then one replaces the problem of governing with the necessities of administration. Here it seems the role and importance of violence and coercion in society are re-emphasized both as a means of creating differences and eliminating them. There is, in truth, we believe no way to answer the charge that a Marxist might pose for us other than by shifting the argument once again to a preferred conception of justice.

Still, in our defense, we would argue that in spite of the importance of communal standards for productive distribution or moral values, it is with respect to individual differences of principle that the problem of governing as opposed to the administration of things comes about. Once this is granted, then it indeed becomes a question of preferred conceptions of justice. While this may not be a totally satisfactory response, what we have sought to do in this paper is to provide a contemporary empirical ground for a perennial political philosophic tempest.

ENDNOTES

1. Rudolf Augstein, "Hobbes und Wir," Der Spiegel, Nr 2 (1983), 136-7. The occasion for this piece was the republication of Carl Schmitt's Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. This book had originally been published for a Nazi celebration of the 350th anniversary of Hobbes' birth. Schmitt was noted, of course, for such statements as "Der Fuhrer defends justice."
2. The best book dealing with all the methodological issues involved in our effort is Steven Brown, Political Subjectivity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
3. W. R. Reid and J. S. Henderson, "Political Obligation: An Empirical Approach," Polity, 9: 237-252 (1976); A. Sarat, "Legal Obligation: A Survey Study," Polity, 9: 384-398 (1977).
4. R. E. Flatham, Political Obligation (New York: Atheneum, 1972), p. xvi.
5. Sarat, op cit., p. 391.
6. Ibid.
7. The first experiment was conducted by R. Martin and R.W. Taylor, "Political Obligation: An Experimental Approach," Political Subjectivity I: 61-69 (1978). A second experiment essentially replicating the work of the first was conducted by D. Brevoort and R.W. Taylor, "Political Obligation: A Second Experiment," Political Science Discussion Papers, 8, No. 2: 49-57 (Fall, 1978). A third look was reported by R.W. Taylor, "A Problem about Political Obligation and its Relation to Thomas Hobbes' Answer to the Fool," a paper presented to the Ohio Association of Political Scientists and Economists, Columbus, Ohio, 1981. These are what we refer to as the "earlier" experiment.
8. D. Thomas, R. Martin, R.W. Taylor, and L.R. Baas, "Moral Reasoning and Political Obligation: Cognitive-Developmental Correlates of Orientations Toward Law and Civil Disobedience," International Studies of Political Education. The technical work for the fourth experiment was done primarily by Dan Thomas.
9. The clearest treatment of this is in Hobbes' De Cive ed. S.P. Lamprecht (New

- York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949) Chap. XIII.
10. R. Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York: Scribners, 1944) Chapters I, II, & III.
11. Plato, The Republic, ed. A.D. Lindsay (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1957).

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